Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

254. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, May 30, 1988, 10–11:45 a.m.

SUBJECT

• First Plenary Meeting (U)

PARTICIPANTS

• US

  • The President
  • Secretary George P. Shultz
  • Secretary Frank C. Carlucci
  • Senator Howard Baker
  • General Colin Powell
  • Ambassador Rozanne Ridgway
  • Ambassador Jack Matlock
  • Mark Parris, Department of State (Notetaker)
  • Nelson C. Ledsky, NSC (Notetaker)

• USSR

  • General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev
  • Chairman Andrei Gromyko
  • Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze
  • Defense Minister Dmitri Yazov
  • Politburo Member Aleksandr Yakovlev
  • Secretary Anatoly Dobrynin
  • Deputy Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh
  • Mr. Chernyayev
  • Ambassador Yuri Dubinin
  • Mr. Victor Sukhodrev (Notetaker)
  • Mr. Sredin (Notetaker)

While photos were being taken, General Secretary Gorbachev commented that the President had been warmly received by the Soviet people during his first day in Moscow. The Muscovites’ feelings were sincere; nothing had been arranged for the President’s benefit. It was all spontaneous. (S)

[Omitted here are discussions not related to SDI or the ABM Treaty.]

The President said he had some points to make on Defense and Space. The objective of SDI, he explained, was to make the US and its allies more secure, not to threaten the Soviet Union. The Soviet side knew the merits of defending itself, as it devoted far more resources to strategic defense than did the US. As the two leaders had discussed in Reykjavik,² the US was willing in the context of a START agreement to agree to a period of nonwithdrawal from the ABM Treaty, after which, unless it were otherwise agreed, each side would be free to choose its own course of action. (S)

The President said he could not agree to a nonwithdrawal provision until the Soviet Union had corrected its violations of the ABM Treaty.³ In Washington, he reminded Gorbachev, the General Secretary had made clear that he opposed the United States investigating advanced strategic defenses. Nonetheless, he had accepted that, at the end of a nonwithdrawal period, unless agreed otherwise, each side would have the right to deploy strategic defenses if it so chose. This needed to be made clear in the agreement. (S)

The US also needed, the President continued, the right to take necessary steps if its supreme interests were jeopardized by unexpected extraordinary events. This was standard in treaties. It needed as well to protect the right to research, develop and test advanced strategic defenses during the nonwithdrawal period, and could not accept restrictions beyond those actually agreed in the ABM Treaty. We had thus proposed an agreement not to object to each others’ space-based sensors. Both sides used space to collect information for a variety of purposes. It was impossible to distinguish among these purposes. Why not agree not to make this the subject of unnecessary disputes? The two sides’ negotiators, the President concluded, had put together a joint draft D&S agreement text. He proposed they be instructed to press ahead. (S)

General Secretary Gorbachev said that that task could be facilitated if the US could accept a single formula in the treaty—that, if one side violated the ABM Treaty, the other would be free of its obligations under the treaty to reduce strategic arms by 50 percent. Such an approach would make it unnecessary to discuss what was or was not permitted under the ABM Treaty. But Secretaries Shultz and Carlucci argued against this. (S)

Secretary Shultz reminded the General Secretary that the US viewed the Krasnoyarsk radar as a violation of the Treaty. The essence of the problem, however, was that the two sides did not agree on what was permitted by the Treaty with respect to research, development and testing. If that were agreed, the US would not have so many hang-ups. We had always felt that the Soviet Union agreed that during the period of strategic arms reductions, it would be a good thing to know what would be happening with respect to nonwithdrawal. But there was no such agreement. (S)

General Secretary Gorbachev said he could give the President some free advice—even though Henry Kissinger would have charged him millions for the favor. The President, he stated amiably, was being deceived. He had initially been deceived by former Defense Secretary Weinberger; perhaps Carlucci was now doing the same thing. Some might think that it was possible to put something in space which could give the US an advantage (even though, Gorbachev pointed out, this would be contrary to one of the principles, which had been agreed to at the Geneva Summit).⁴ But during the proposed nonwithdrawal period—nine or eight and a half years—SDI was not a workable concept. If the President would tell his military people to confine their experiments to earth, nothing would happen. There was no need during this period for research in space. Attempts to conduct such research, on the other hand, would produce suspicion and mistrust. It would lead to a cooling of relations. That was why Gorbachev felt Carlucci, with Shultz’s help, was moving the President in the wrong direction. He wanted to state this in their presence so they could defend themselves. (S)

The President said that, before they did that, he had some things to say of his own. He had come into office believing in the instability of a world whose security was based primarily on nuclear missiles. The average person could envision and was psychologically prepared to deal with the threat of conventional weapons. But when cities could be destroyed at the push of a button, it was another thing. Shortly after entering office, therefore, he had called in America’s senior military leaders and asked if it would be possible to devise a system to render missiles obsolete. They had come back after consulting with our scientific community and said that, with a lot of time and resources, it could be done. The President had said, “Do it.” So SDI from its inception has been a defensive weapon. (S)

General Secretary Gorbachev said that the systems being developed in connection with SDI could be used for other than defensive purposes. (S)

The President replied that Gorbachev was overlooking the President’s frequently stated belief that a nuclear war could not be won and must never be fought. The President believed nuclear weapons must be eliminated. When he had been informed that SDI was possible, the President had announced, if a workable system were devised, the US would make deployment of such a system available to all countries, and would not deploy until nuclear weapons had been eliminated. (S)

But if nuclear weapons were eliminated, there would still be a need to ensure that no madman could obtain the knowledge necessary to develop a nuclear weapon and blackmail the world. The situation, the President explained, was akin to that after World War I. Poison gas had been banned, but people had kept their gas masks. The President said he really meant this. There had been breakthroughs, and US scientists were very optimistic SDI could work. But the purpose of the exercise was to eliminate the arsenals which could bring about such destruction in minutes. The nuclear accident at Chernobyl had shown what damage could be done with a release of radioactivity which was miniscule compared to that of even the smallest nuclear warheads. No one could be a victor in a nuclear war. (S)

The President reiterated that if SDI were proved workable, it could not be put into effect until nuclear weapons were eliminated. It was not an offensive weapon in any way. It was, therefore, non-negotiable, as far as the President was concerned. (S)

General Secretary Gorbachev asked why SDI would be necessary if all missiles were destroyed. (S)

The President repeated that it was like a gas mask. It was impossible to unlearn the knowledge of how to build nuclear weapons. One had to be sure that a madman like Hitler was not at some point able to build a bomb and name his terms to the world. (S)

General Secretary Gorbachev said one could not be too careful where nuclear weapons were concerned. He reaffirmed that the Soviet side believed SDI was not just a defensive system, but also would provide a means of attacking targets on Earth. The question also arose as to why, if one party wanted to build such weapons, the other should make it easy for him. It was one thing for SDI to defend against a certain number of missiles; it was another for it to stop that number times X. But if both sides devoted all their national wealth to such a competition, the discussions the two sides were having were meaningless. Stability would also suffer. The capital which had been accrued in negotiations to date would be undermined; mistrust would arise; Moscow would have to consider a response. (S)

The President reminded Gorbachev that he had offered in Geneva to share development of SDI with the Soviet Union. (S)

General Secretary Gorbachev said he had to express doubt as to that offer. He pointed out that the US had refused to work out a system of on-site inspection of SLCMs aboard US warships. How could one believe that America would open its laboratories. This simply was not serious. The two sides were talking about matters of life and death. (S)

Secretary Carlucci noted that there was a difference between verifying an operational system and exchanging data and mutual observation opportunities relating to research and development. (S)

General Secretary Gorbachev said Carlucci had not convinced him. He reiterated that the two sides should proceed on the basis of the Washington Summit statement language on the ABM Treaty. In that connection, he noted that the US had raised the question of sensors. Perhaps the experts could talk more about that. But Gorbachev urged the President to think about what he had said. The President was listening only to scientists like Teller, not to scientists, including those in Europe and the Soviet Union, who had very different views. So the experts could work, but Gorbachev hoped the President would weigh what he had said. (S)

On the Krasnoyarsk radar, General Secretary Gorbachev added, several things needed to be kept in mind. First, construction had been stopped. Second, US “scientists” (sic) had visited the site and found nothing. Finally, the Soviet side had expressed its willingness totally to dismantle the radar if an agreement were reached. Gorbachev reminded the President that there were also US “forward” radars which should not be forgotten. But experts could discuss all of this, “including the US sensor idea,” in Geneva. (S)

[Omitted here are discussions not related to SDI or the ABM Treaty.]

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow Summit 5/29– 6/1, 1988. Secret. The meeting took place in St. Catherine’s Hall at the Kremlin. The complete memorandum of conversation is printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 158. Additional documentation of the May 29–June 1, 1988, Moscow Summit is in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Documents 155–163.
2. See Document 138.
3. See Document 243.
4. See Document 84.