22. Editorial Note
On February 20, 1985, Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters Paul Nitze delivered an address before the World Affairs Council in Philadelphia titled “On the Road to a More Stable Peace.” In it, he elaborated on the “strategic concept” that he and Secretary of State George Shultz had developed in advance of the latter’s meetings with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in January, which would provide the basis for the U.S. position in the Nuclear and Space Arms Negotiations set to begin in March and could, he said, “be summarized in four sentences: During the next 10 years, the U.S. objective is a radical reduction in the power of existing and planned offensive nuclear arms, as well as the stabilization of the relationship between offensive and defensive nuclear arms, whether on earth or in space. We are even now looking forward to a period of transition to a more stable world, with greatly reduced levels of nuclear arms and an enhanced ability to deter war based upon an increasing contribution of non-nuclear defenses against offensive nuclear arms. This period of transition could lead to the eventual elimination of all nuclear arms, both offensive and defensive. A world free of nuclear arms is an ultimate objective to which we, the Soviet Union, and all other nations can agree.” (Department of State Bulletin, April 1985, pages 27–28)
Nitze went on to discuss the three phases of this concept—the near term, transition, and ultimate phases—consistent with the talking points prepared in the Office of Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam for Shultz’s use at a lunch on January 15; see Document 16.
On February 27, Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam dictated a personal note that read in part: “I attended the Secretary’s meeting with the arms control negotiators this afternoon. The discussions were basically procedural up to the end when we got into a very interesting discussion of what will be the central problem, not only in negotiations with the Soviets but also in explaining our position here at home: How do we square the emphasis on SDI in our programs with the argument that we are trying for deep reductions? There are various fancy theories as to how that is so, but this is obviously a difficult point in our own thinking. The fact of the matter is that SDI and deep reductions are both articles of faith with the President, and the question of how they are presented in a consistent way is being left to an interagency process which is simply unable to confront basic questions of this nature. Fortunately Paul Nitze is with us, and he has been doing some rather interesting thinking about how the future might evolve such that we could move on both fronts simultaneously. The Soviets are doing everything they can to argue that the two goals [Page 71] are inconsistent and that, if SDI goes forward, they will have to build up, rather than reduce, their intercontinental ballistic missile force.” Dam continued: “I attended a very interesting presentation by David Stockman to George Shultz, Charlie Hill and myself this afternoon. He came in to show us what was really involved in the defense budget. It turns out that the actual content of the defense budget increase is quite different from that discussed in the public press. Contrary to the normal assumption, the big strategic programs such as the MX and SDI do not account for any growth in the defense budget. Strategic programs will be level over the next four years, assuming that the President’s budget is adopted. It is in the conventional defense category that the big buildups are going on, and there it is not so much for things like fighters and tanks but rather intangibles such as sustainability and readiness that are causing the big increases. Thus, what we are doing is raising the conventional threshold, which would reduce the possibility of nuclear weapons ever being used. It is one of the inconsistencies of political argument in Washington that the people who attack strategic weapons on the ground that their acquisition may lead to their use also attack the defense budget, quite inconsistently, because it is in fact a bigger defense budget on the conventional side that will reduce the possibility of nuclear weapons use. But if we really want to reduce the defense budget, then we ought to build more nuclear weapons, because it is a fact that nuclear weapons are cheap as a means of defense compared to conventional weaponry.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1984—June 1985)