Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

2. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State (Timbie) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)¹

Washington, November 28, 1984

SUBJECT

• SDI

The attached speech by Ken Adelman² raises two points concerning SDI that you will be hearing more about, and deserve comment.

The speech as a whole is more balanced than most treatments of this subject. One serious (but common) defect is that it is fuzzy on the crucial question of whether the objective of defenses is to make offensive deterrent forces more effective, or to remove the threat of mutual annihilation of societies. (Both are mentioned.) These objectives are mutually exclusive (assuming the two sides devote equal talent and resources to the task), and the goals of increased security and stability are unlikely to be realized without a clear conception of our objectives for defense. (One of the few places where this distinction is not blurred is the President’s March 1983 speech;³ he came out squarely for protecting people rather than avenging them.)

One passage deserving comment reads as follows: “Some SDI research stands at the very frontier of today’s scientific and technological advancements . . . . In contrast, components of strategic nuclear offensive systems have been exhaustively researched for decades. Breakthroughs here are far less likely.” This statement is not as self-evident as it seems:

— Miniature electronics. One of the critical technologies being pressed in the SDI is the miniaturization of computers and other electronic devices. After all, we have known for some time how to intercept RVs with large, expensive, nuclear systems. The challenge is to find ways to do this with small, cheap, conventional systems that could cope economically with a large offensive force. Miniature electronic technology is also applicable to offensive systems. The cruise missile and the Pershing II homing RV are just two recent examples; there will be many more such applications to strategic and conventional offensive forces.

— Infra-red sensors. Another technology being pushed hard is infra-red for both surveillance and homing. IR is hardly new; it was pursued in World War II as a competitor to radar, and has been developed intensively ever since for air-to-air missiles, early warning sensors, and intelligence collection. An optical homing ABM interceptor was pursued in the 1960’s. (The current ASAT MV is a derivative of this program.) The concept clearly works (the HOE test is a spectacular example), but IR is a mature subject, the result of 40 years of development, not an uncharted territory with vast unexplored potential.

— Offense against SDI. Most of the concepts being explored can directly threaten not only RVs but space-based SDI components as well. If the definition of “offensive systems” is broadened to include offense against defense components, most SDI research is directly applicable to the offense. This is one reason why survivability of space-based SDI components is such a difficult problem.

— Communications. Another critical area for the SDI is communications, since the various sensors, computers, and kill devices need to exchange large amounts of information in a hostile environment. A successful SDI deployment will require major advances in communications. By contrast, communications requirements for strategic offensive forces (while not trivial) are much more modest.

— New offensive technology. Stealth offers new opportunities for offenses (both missiles and aircraft) comparable to the opportunities the new technologies offer defenses.

— Countermeasures. In many cases, relatively low-technology concepts (balloons, decoys, MaRVs, fast-burn missiles, etc.) can counter advanced-technology defenses.

— The “breakthrough” on offense was the development in the late 1940’s and early 1950’s of thermonuclear weapons, which increased the explosive power carried by individual missiles and aircraft by a factor of 10 million. This revolution was much more significant than the advances in delivery systems. The “breakthrough” on offense is behind us; the “breakthrough” on defense is not in sight.

The other point deserving comment is the notion that the ultimate decision whether or not to deploy defenses will be straightforward, depending on whether or not the technology “pans out”: “There is the chance that the technology may not pan out, that systems may not prove cost-effective, or cannot be made survivable. If so, those facts alone would presumably determine the decision not to go further.”

This will not, however, be a simple technical decision. More likely, SDI will play out as follows:

— After some preliminary problems, there will be spectacularly successful demonstrations. (The HOE experience illustrates the pattern—three failures, spectacular success).

— The SDIO will then propose deployment of a system along the following lines:

— Cost in excess of 10% of the DOD budget into the indefinite future.

— Both area defense and point defense components.

— Emphasis on kinetic energy devices, with directed energy playing a smaller, later role.

— Objectives include enhanced survivability for offensive forces, protection for population and industry, protection from third country and accidental attack. This long list of objectives avoids the hard choice between defending against attack or deterring it through threat of retaliation.

— The rationale for the systems will stress defense of ICBMs, the deployments will stress area defense components.

— The system would have a plausible capability to intercept most existing Soviet RVs.

— Relatively straightforward, low-cost Soviet countermeasures could sharply reduce its effectiveness.

— The system would not be vulnerable to existing Soviet systems.

— New Soviet systems could seriously threaten the survivability of space-based defense components.

— No reductions will be proposed for our offensive forces. On the contrary, enhancements will be proposed to offset Soviet BMD.

— The arguments advanced in favor of the system will be:

— We will be better off with the ability to shoot down some RVs rather than none.

— It is stabilizing because it complicates attacks.

— It could lead to future more effective defenses of societies, and a withering away of offenses.

— All military systems have countermeasures, and if we didn’t buy systems that might be countered by the Soviets, we’d never buy anything.

— If the Soviets build countermeasures, we can add counters of our own.

There will be sharp debates over this system in the Pentagon, in Congress, and in the public. But the real argument will not hinge on the technology developed in the SDI. The debate will be between those who believe deeply that defense is something we ought to be doing, even if the initial deployments are imperfect, and those who believe defense is counterproductive in that it stimulates the offense, precludes reductions, and is destabilizing because it favors the first striker.

This debate is not going to wait until a specific system is proposed for deployment, of course; it has already started. Two kinds of experiments will be especially contentious in the immediate future:

— projects which appear more related to system development than exploration of technology, and

— tests which arguably conflict with the ABM Treaty.

1. Source: Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control and Disarmament Records, 1969–1990 Subject Records of James P. Timbie, Lot 01D127, Papers for DepSec Ken Dam, 1983–1985. Secret. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates Dam saw it on December 1.
2. Attached but not printed is a speech on “Arms Control and Space: Reducing the Risk of War” Adelman delivered at the United States Space Foundation Symposium in Colorado Springs on November 28.
3. Reference is to Reagan’s address from the Oval Office, March 23, 1983, in which he announced the Strategic Defense Initiative. (Public Papers: Reagan, 1983, Book I, pp. 437–443) Information about the address is printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Documents 144 and 145.