Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

1. Memorandum From Donald Fortier of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, November 14, 1984

SUBJECT

• The MX—Your Meeting with the President and Secretary Shultz, Wednesday, November 14, 1984

You will discuss the future of the MX today with George Shultz and the President.² We believe there are three basic points to keep in mind:

— President Reagan inherited a system that simply could not survive the kind of attacks the Soviets will be able to launch: it is too big to be truly mobile, and fixed, undefended silos for the MX will be defeated by accurate Soviet missiles.

— Because MX in silos cannot survive, it is useful only as a first strike weapon, or if we are willing to launch them on warning that will always be less than 100 percent certain. It moves us toward a more dangerous, less stable world.

— No President has unlimited political capital. Do we wish to fight the protracted war for MX on the Hill, in order to get a system we do not really want, or do we want to use the President’s capital to work for systems that make sense—SDI, and offensive weapons like Midgetman that are either more survivable or more accurate than the MX or both. We are not recommending the cancellation of the MX in isolation. We are opposed to terminating the MX if we do nothing to accelerate other, preferable U.S. strategic programs. The cancellation of the MX is recommended as a part of a coherent plan to reduce our dependence on offensive nuclear weapons while still thwarting Soviet war plans.

We understand our proposal is complicated by the argument that the unilateral cancellation of the MX will hurt our chances for successful negotiations. If talks on strategic weapons resume, it will be argued, we will need the MX as a bargaining chip, and the Congress will fund the MX because it will understand the need not to give up a bargaining chip in the middle of negotiations.

In particular, we might be able to trade the MX for the SS–X–24, as you suggested. The SS–X–24, like the MX, is a large, transportable MIRVed ICBM that is close to operational status, but not there yet, so there is a logical link between the two systems. If the Soviets did give up the SS–X–24, we would have achieved a very worthwhile objective—the elimination of one MIRVed ICBM system on each side. At the same time, we believe it is worth keeping in mind that:

— the Soviets have never given up or offered to give up a new weapon in any negotiations; the Soviets have not targeted the MX in their negotiating strategy, which suggests that they are not likely to “pay” anything in future negotiations to get rid of the MX.

— if they did give up the SS–X–24, they would still retain their other MIRVed ICBMs (and the future modernized versions of those ICBMs) that have created our strategic problem. Our current ICBMs would still be vulnerable. We would still need a good, truly mobile, small ICBM.

— If, as we believe, the Soviets refused to cancel their SS–X–24 and we went ahead with MX in silos, we would be stuck with a costly, vulnerable system that we basically do not want. We will then face pressures to give up SDI to make progress in negotiations.

More generally, we believe that the idea that we should build weapons as bargaining chips is profoundly wrong. It has already created a harmful cynicism on the Hill. The “bargaining chip” ploy has led people to question whether we ever recommend a strategic system because our national security actually requires it, or whether we are continually engaging in an expensive game of “pretend” in order to negotiate with the Soviets. It has already led people to ask if we are working on SDI only so that we can bargain it away later on. Playing the same game with MX will make it that much harder to get money for SDI now, and in the years to come.

Cancelling MX can and should be part of an arms reduction strategy, however. You will recall our suggestion for a unilateral cap on U.S. offensive megatonnage, a way to move away from a strategy based on mass destruction. Cancelling MX helps us make this cap a real, credible part of a U.S. policy to make our strategic forces more effective and less destructive.

We may wish to use the decision on the MX to help build a bipartisan consensus on the Hill. You could sit down with key Congressional leaders to discuss your strategic objective of moving away from destabilizing offensive weapons. It might then be possible to get a Congressional commitment to support our other strategic programs in return for giving up the MX. This could help make the Congress feel it has a stake in our strategic problems, and help handle the real danger that with MX out of the way, our critics will simply shift their attacks to our other offensive programs like cruise missiles and D–5. On the other hand, getting a Congressional commitment that is really worth something will be an extremely tricky maneuver. We may wind up looking like the Congress can back us down without getting any real support for SDI and other programs.

Giving up the MX, before our hand is forced by Congressional action, or before negotiations with the Soviets stall again, offers the President the opportunity to make a strong, clean decision, rather than have events force him into a corner. To take but one example, our allies may complain about this change in U.S. policy. Our allies like predictable U.S. policies and generally complain when we make any major change. But they will be even unhappier, and rightly so, if the President is forced to give up MX rather than suffer a defeat on the Hill. It is not just that we may fight and lose on MX, it is what such a crucial loss could mean to the President’s credibility in getting other initiatives off the ground. We have to control the agenda this time around—not get consumed, as we did with AWACS, in a year-long battle that impedes other progress.

If, instead, the President announces that he is cancelling the MX because after four years no one had come up with a workable way to make it survivable, because it would move us toward a more dangerous world, and because we had militarily superior ways of defending our national security—SDI and high accuracy weapons—he will be seen as a President who will do what is right, who will not let the Soviet gerontocracy block his search for ways to reduce our dependence on nuclear weapons, and who is willing to act unilaterally if necessary to make progress.

As you recall, other sections of our planning paper discuss ways to deter better for less. Shifting resources from MX to systems like SDI is a good example of precisely this strategy. Defenses give Soviet war planners an entirely new set of uncertainties. MX is a familiar weapon they have adjusted to. We get more deterrence from money spent on SDI and other systems than we do from MX. This must be a factor as we face constricted defense budgets.

Finally, cancelling the MX will give us a valuable lever on our own defense bureaucracy. This is a consideration Secretary Shultz has probably not thought much about. (Does he know how the Midgetman system weight has grown under the influence of the MX mentality?) The Air Force likes the MX, and simply will not take other, better systems seriously as long as it is fighting every day to build the MX. As you suggested, I have spoken to Fred Ikle about the general tension between MX and SDI, and he agrees that this is a problem. He has spoken to Cap about this as well, and believes he has made some headway.

1. Source: Reagan Library, John Poindexter Files, Subject File, Miscellaneous Meeting Items 1984. Secret. Sent for information.
2. Reagan met with Shultz and McFarlane in the Oval Office on November 14 from 1:30 until 2:45 p.m. to discuss the global agenda and foreign policy in the second term. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) No minutes were found. In a diary entry for that day, Reagan wrote: “A long meeting with Sec. Shultz. We have trouble. Cap & Bill Casey have views contrary to George’s on S. Am., the middle East & our arms negotiations. It’s so out of hand George sounds like he wants out. I cant let that happen. Actually George is carrying out my policy. I’m going to meet with Cap & Bill & lay it out to them. Wont be fun but has to be done.” (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 396)