Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

185. Memorandum From Steven Steiner of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Acting Assistant for National Security Affairs (Keel)¹

Washington, December 23, 1986

SUBJECT

• Follow-up on SDI Deployment Plan

Purpose. This memorandum provides our recommendations on how to follow-up on the SDI briefing provided to the President on December 17th by the Secretary of Defense.² Specifically:

— it summarizes the problems and issues that we feel must be resolved before the President can act on the recommendations made in that briefing;

— it lays out the gameplan we would recommend for resolving those issues;

— and asks your approval to press ahead along the course suggested in this memorandum.

Background. As you indicated in closing the SDI briefing on December 17, the plan which was presented raises some important questions—military, political and legal—which will require further staff work prior to moving toward any Presidential decision. We recommend, therefore, that we follow up with the DOD staff along the lines below. We also see need, once we have consulted further with DOD, to surface the DOD briefing and its recommendations (including protecting the option of beginning deployment of SDI systems in 1993) in some form in the correct interagency forum. This is particularly important since other agencies are now aware that such a briefing was presented and since a more extensive version of such a deployment plan has been surfaced publicly in the Marshall Institute report (Jastrow, Seitz and company).³

The specific deployment plan recommended by DOD raises so many important military questions that we feel the risks of taking on the associated budget, political and legal issues at this time would clearly outweigh the potential benefits. Nonetheless, the presentation made by DOD is based on some key concepts which we would like to endorse. Our plan would be to work these concepts further with DOD while we continue to address the military questions raised by the proposed deployment plan. Building on these concepts, we would hope to produce a draft NSDD by mid-January which would lay out a strategy and philosophy for future deployments without committing at this time to specific systems to be deployed or the exact timing of deployments. We could use the draft NSDD as our vehicle for surfacing these ideas interagency, on a very senior level and close-hold basis.

Substantive Issues to be Resolved. If you approve, we would like to begin immediately to address the following key concepts and issues with DOD staff.

Phased Deployments. We are in basic agreement with DOD that we should seek to reach the President’s ultimate goal of truly comprehensive defenses through incremental deployments which build upon each other and gradually expand our defensive capability. We would seek USG endorsement of this general concept, without committing in detail to what is to be deployed or when. We would seek, however, to protect the DOD-proposed beginning point of 1993, provided that:

(a) a deployment plan can be created which clearly moves us toward meeting the President’s SDI criteria;

(b) the needed resources can be obtained; and

(c) the Soviets have not accepted existing US arms control offers which would require reshaping such a plan.

We would develop this concept in a manner designed to serve the President’s objective of moving gradually toward deterrence based increasingly on the contribution of advanced defenses.

Heavy Lift-launch Vehicle. We likewise would seek endorsement of DOD’s concept of beginning now to develop a national HLV capability. While we believe it substantively sound and politically prudent for initial work on this concept to be carried out within the SDI program, we are not convinced that it should remain exclusively within SDI since:

(a) as both Admiral Crowe and Dr. Graham indicated at the meeting, such a vehicle would have benefits for the nation far beyond SDI; and

(b) placing such a major project exclusively within SDI could undermine our ability to obtain the needed funding for the continued research essential to achieving the President’s central SDI goal of global population protection.

We would endorse, however, General Abrahamson’s suggestion that DOD/SDIO, working with NASA and the other members of the space community, begin now to develop a philosophy on roles and missions for an HLV. (See below for discussion of budget strategy.)

Survivability. This is clearly the weakest element of the specific plan put forward by DOD, and a potentially serious obstacle—politically and militarily—for any initial deployment proposal. It has long been one of the President’s key SDI criteria and has been invaluable to us politically in putting behind us for now the debate over “whether” we should be pursuing SDI. To avoid reopening this debate, we need to ask DOD to present us with a full description of how they have been pursuing the survivability problem and what further work needs to be done to ensure that when the time comes we will be able to deal effectively with Congress on this issue.

Funding Strategy. Here, too, we have serious concerns and believe DOD needs to sort out its planning in further detail. Working in terms of specific budgets, we would seek to develop a USG strategy along these lines:

FY87 Supplemental. Secretary Weinberger stated at the December 17 meeting that $300m of the $500m already requested by DOD would be used for early work on the HLV. The NSC Staff supports this concept, but believes it has not been sufficiently developed to justify taking the serious political risk of seeking an SDI supplemental primarily for the HLV. We have proposed, therefore, that we support the full supplemental request but ask DOD to go back to their original justification, while protecting the HLV option.

FY88–89 Budgets. If DOD can modify its proposed deployment plan to meet the major military problems which have been raised (above all, survivability), we may need to ask reconsideration of their decision to move in this direction within our existing SDI projection for this two-year budget ($5.2B and $6.4B, respectively). This is based on our concern over the effect which the increased funding for FSED and eventual deployment could have on our ability to continue the key research designed to meet the President’s central objectives. Further thought will also need to be given to our budget strategy for an HLV. In our view, until this concept has been worked out further, General Abrahamson should continue to pursue it quietly within existing SDI funding; we would endorse, for example, his concept of moving now to start a “horserace” competition for developing with private industry an architecture and roles/mission philosophy for such a vehicle.

FY90 and Beyond. Our planning here would depend in considerable detail on how well we have thrashed out in the meantime the various issues raised in early deployment studies. However, as indicated above, we should seek to protect the option of beginning to deploy as early as 1993 and should try to determine how to protect this in our budgetary planning and how it relates to possible arms reduction outcomes.

ABM Treaty. We need to press DOD now for the needed detail on how planned and putative SDI testing may bump against the restrictive interpretation, as this has not yet been established. Much more information is needed as well on the kind and pace of testing which would be required for various early deployment options, including the one proposed by DOD. Further technical and legal analysis is needed, for example, on the kind of integrated testing which would be needed to develop and ultimately deploy various space-based systems, including the SBKKVs which are crucial to the DOD plan.

Also, to use the legally correct interpretation (LCI, or broad interpretation) of the ABM Treaty to accomplish all that was suggested in the briefing to the President, one would have to rely (once again) on what may be viewed by some as a “sharp practice.” DOD may be counting on taking the view that any integrated test that involved both traditional elements and elements that were based on other physical principles (OPP) would be considered totally a test of systems based on OPP and therefore only governed by Agreed Statement D of the Treaty. This approach may stretch the legally correct interpretation more that it can stand. This needs more staffing to ensure that it is fully understood by all concerned before the President considers any decision on the recommendations made in the DOD briefing.

Arms Reductions. Finally, as our thinking is developed further in the areas outlined above, we need to ensure that our present arms reduction proposals and any future steps which we contemplate continue to be mutually reinforcing with our forward movement in SDI.

Next Steps. As we see it, our immediate objective should be an NSDD which provides the President’s guidance in response to the recommendations made in the DOD briefing while addressing the issues identified above. To get there, the specific steps we would recommend are as follows.

a. Put the supplemental behind us while maintaining all of the President’s options. (late-December)

b. Lay the necessary foundation with DOD so that our immediate questions are answered and they are prepared to present DOD’s views in the appropriate interagency forum. (early January)

c. Draft the NSDD, vet it as appropriate in the interagency, and provide it for the President’s review and approval. (mid-January)

Recommendation

That you approve our working promptly with DOD staff to develop further the concepts presented above and to develop a more detailed action plan by the end of December which would permit us to provide a draft NSDD to the President for his approval by mid-January.⁴

Concurrence: Cockell, Linhard, Donley, Tobey

1. Source: Reagan Library, Steven Steiner Files, Arms Control File, 51—AC/SDI (12/1/1986–12/31/1986). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Printed from an uninitialed copy.
2. See Document 180.
3. Reference is to George C. Marshall Institute, Report of the Technical Panel on Missile Defense in the 1990s (Washington: Marshall Institute, February 1987).
4. Keel neither approved nor disapproved the recommendation.