Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

167. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Crowe) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger¹

CM–483–86

Washington, December 11, 1986

SUBJECT

• ICBM Modernization (U)

1. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff and I have reviewed the Air Force proposed response to NSDD–227² and offer the following comments for your consideration as you prepare your recommendations for the President.

2. (S) The Peacekeeper missile is a key element of the President’s Strategic Modernization program, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have consistently supported deployment of 100 Peacekeeper missiles. Deployed in the rail-garrison configuration, the second 50 Peacekeepers provide 500 survivable, prompt, and highly accurate weapons at a relatively low cost. In addition to being the least expensive Peacekeeper deployment option, the rail-garrison basing mode has several other advantages: it can meet an early IOC (1990); it does not suffer public interface problems because the missiles would be garrisoned on existing bases; it has potentially the highest survivability of any ICBM basing option considered. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend ending study of the basing alternatives for the second 50 Peacekeepers and going to full scale³ development of the rail-garrison basing mode as soon as possible.

3. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff are clearly aware, however, that Congress has previously favored the Small ICBM over the Peacekeeper and that not to submit the Small ICBM as part of the ICBM modernization package would probably jeopardize authorization and funding of the second 50 Peacekeepers and perhaps the full scale development funding for the basing mode. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe it is extremely important that the analytical data comparing Peacekeeper and Small ICBM cost-effectiveness be included in the final submission to Congress. Congressional decision-makers need the benefit of the comparative analysis contained in the Air Force proposal. For example, with life cycle costs of approximately 40 billion dollars for 500 missiles, the Small ICBM is extremely expensive. The same number of warheads deployed on rail-garrisoned Peacekeepers would be highly survivable, but have a life cycle cost of only ten billion dollars. It should be noted that this cost differential of 30 billion dollars would require a diversion of funds from other critical strategic and conventional military programs unless Congress would be willing to provide funding through overguidance. Assuming Congress does decide to procure the Small ICBM, the JCS support this funding approach.

4. (S) It is the JCS position that Congress expects a Presidential decision no later than January, and the impact of delaying the decision would be to significantly degrade the chances of deploying the first full increment of Peacekeepers and further reduce chances of funding and deploying the second 50 missiles. These weapon systems have been sufficiently studied and delaying decisions now would only place ICBM modernization in jeopardy.

William J. Crowe, Jr.
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Weinberger Papers, Department of Defense Files, Box CL 857, Subject File, 1986, ICBM modernization #37–45 (3). Secret. A stamped notation indicates Weinberger saw the memorandum on December 12.
2. Not found. See Document 108.
3. Weinberger underlined “scale development of the rail-garrison basing mode as.”