To approve the details of deploying the 131st ALCM-carrying B–52 bomber, thus
passing out of technical observance of SALT II.
On May 27 you decided that, in the future, the United States would base
decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and
magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces, and not on the
flawed SALT II Treaty which was never
ratified, would have expired if it had been ratified, and has been violated
by the Soviet Union. At that time you noted that, in late 1986, the United
States would equip its 131st heavy bomber (a B–52) for cruise missile
carriage, without undertaking compensating dismantlements under SALT II. At that time we would no longer be
technically in observance of the SALT II
sublimits.
Two Poseidon submarines, identical to the two you elected for cost
effectiveness reasons, to dismantle in May, are due for overhaul this fiscal
year. At yesterday’s NSPG it was the
unanimous opinion of your national security advisors that these overhauls
should proceed as scheduled and that the 131st bomber should be deployed
without further delay and without any compensatory retirements.
When we treat the bomber as becoming operational is somewhat arbitrary. It
will make its first flight on Friday, 27 November but will still have
several days of testing before it returns to its operational base. To avoid
conflict with impending NATO meetings, we
believe Friday 27
[Page 571]
November is the
appropriate date to consider the bomber’s conversion complete. Prior to that
date we believe it is essential to notify the Congressional leadership and
our allies and to have pre-positioned press guidance. We recommend this not be portrayed as a major new decision. Instead we
should suggest that: (1) you made a decision in May, (2) the logical
consequences of that decision have now occurred, and (3) you and your top
advisors conducted one final review and were unanimous in seeing no reason
to alter your previous decision.
Making the announcement from Defense rather than the White House reinforces
the position that this is not a new decision but simply the implementation
of the decision you made in May.
____ ____ That you approve the above approach to the deployment of the 131st
bomber.2
Attachment
Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense5
On June 17, 1982, I addressed the United Nations Special Session on
Disarmament.6 I told this gathering a
fundamental truth:
Simply collecting agreements will not bring peace. Agreements
genuinely reinforce peace when they are kept. Otherwise, we are
building a paper castle that will be blown away by the winds of
war.
I have formally reported to the Congress several times on Soviet
non-compliance with arms control agreements. In my most recent report to
Congress of December 23, 1985, I noted the scope of Soviet noncompliance
with existing agreements:
The Administration’s most recent studies support its conclusion
that there is a pattern of Soviet non-compliance. As documented in
this and previous reports, the Soviet Union had violated its legal
obligation under or political commitment to the SALT I ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement, the SALT II agreement, the Limited Test
Ban Treaty of 1963, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the
Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons, and the Helsinki Final Act. In
addition, the USSR has likely
violated provisions of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.
I have made abundantly clear the seriousness of Soviet noncompliance:
It calls into question important security benefits from arms
control, and could create new security risks. It undermines the
confidence essential to an effective arms control process in the
future.
The United States has attempted to resolve our compliance concerns with
the Soviet Union for many years through both the Standing Consultative
Commission and senior diplomatic channels—but to no avail.
[Page 574]
I have even expressed my personal concerns directly to General Secretary
Gorbachev during my meetings
with him last year in Geneva and again in October of this year in
Reykjavik.
Despite these intensive efforts, the Soviet Union has failed to correct
its non-compliance and has not provided explanations sufficient to
alleviate our concerns on other compliance issues.
Thus, on May 27th, 1986, I announced that the United States would no
longer unilaterally observe the SALT
structure. This decision should not have taken anyone by surprise. In
June 1985 I announced that we could not accept a double standard in
which we observe arms control agreements and the Soviets do not. At that
time I decided to go the extra mile by dismantling a Poseidon submarine
in an effort to give the Soviets more time to correct their
non-compliance and resolve our other compliance concerns and reverse
their military buildup. Unfortunately, their violations and military
buildup continued.
Of particular concern to me was the pattern of Soviet noncompliance with
SALT and the ABM Treaty. These violations have involved
some of the most important provisions of SALT II which were cited by proponents of SALT II as the principal reasons for
supporting the agreement.
- —
- the development and deployment of the SS–25 missile, a prohibited
second new type of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM);
- —
- extensive encryption of telemetry during test flights of strategic
ballistic missiles;
- —
- concealment of the association between missiles and their
launchers during testing;
- —
- exceeding the permitted number of strategic nuclear delivery
vehicles (SNDVs); and
- —
- an issue related to the throw-weight of a certain SLBM.
It is important to note that prior to my May 27th decision, the Soviets
tested what was probably a new follow-on heavy ICBM. Such a new heavy ICBM would be prohibited by SALT II.
Soviet SALT violations have been
compounded by the construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar in violation of
the ABM Treaty and other ABM-related
activities suggesting that the Soviet Union might be preparing an ABM defense of their national territory,
which is prohibited by the Treaty. Such an action, if left without a
U.S. response, would have serious
adverse consequences for the East-West balance that has kept the
peace.
On May 27th, I announced a new policy for the United States concerning
interim restraint:
Given this situation, I have determined that, in the future, the
United States must base decisions regarding its strategic force
structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posted by Soviet
strategic forces and not on standards contained in the SALT structure which has
[Page 575]
been undermined by Soviet
noncompliance and especially in a flawed SALT II treaty which was never ratified, would have
expired if it had been ratified, and has been violated by the Soviet
Union.
I went on to note that, since the United States would retire and
dismantle two Poseidon submarines last summer, the United States would
remain technically in observance of the terms of the SALT II Treaty until the United States
deployed its 131st heavy bomber equipped for cruise missile carriage
late in the year. I noted my intent to deploy that and future
ALCM-carrying heavy bombers as an appropriate response to Soviet
violations without dismantling additional systems as compensation to
remain within SALT II limits. My
decision is effective November 28 in that regard. I have given
instructions for the aircraft to deploy to its operational base.
Since May 27th—during the period of U.S.
technical observance of SALT II—the
Soviet Union has failed to take any constructive steps. The activities
which constituted violations of SALT
have continued. The Soviets have also continued to violate the ABM Treaty and to increase their
capability to deploy a prohibited nationwide ABM defense. Recent developments include the construction
of additional radars which are capable of supporting an ABM system and the deployment of a
surface-to-air missile which has tactical ABM capability and may have significant ABM capability. The continuation of the
massive Soviet offensive and defensive programs, some of which clearly
violate existing arms control treaties, create a significant threat
which we must meet. In view of the foregoing, I have determined that our
cruise missile deployment programs must continue and that we cannot
dismantle additional missile submarines at this time.
The integration of the Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) into the B–52 weapon system is one
key element of our full modernization program. The program began for 99
B–52G models in 1981 and will conclude when the last B–52H model is
modified in 1990.
You may recall that last May I chose to dismantle two of our older
Poseidon submarines when their reactor cores were exhausted rather than
overhaul and refuel them. This decision had long been planned and was
based on military and economic circumstances at that time. Had I been
convinced that refueling and retaining these two Poseidon submarines
would have contributed significantly and to the national security, I
would have directed that these two Poseidon submarines not be dismantled
but overhauled and retained.
During the fiscal year ahead, we will be overhauling three Poseidon
submarines. Funds for these overhauls were appropriated by Congress in
the Contingency Resolution for Fiscal Year 1987. The U.S. can no longer afford to reduce its
future nuclear deterrent force structure. Our SLBM submarines at sea have the least day-to-day
vulnerability of our TRIAD forces. The weapons they carry are critical
to our
[Page 576]
national security as
the Soviet target base continues to grow and ABM potential continues to grow. These prompt arriving
weapons—which pose a threat against a wide variety of less hardened
targets—are a key element of our deterrent force. For example, they are
highly effective against the Soviet ABM
threat. In addition, they represent a sizeable portion of the U.S. reserve force. For these militarily
sound reasons, I have directed that these Poseidon submarines be
overhauled, refueled and retained. Once overhauled, they will remain in
the operational deterrent force until the mid to late 1990s.
The Future
As I noted in my May 27th statement, “The United States seeks to meet its
strategic needs, given the Soviet buildup, by means that minimize
incentives for continued Soviet offensive force growth.” We intend to
continue the measured, yet absolutely vital, strategic modernization
program we adopted in 1981. Full funding for this and for the SDI is essential if we are to protect our
national security and to make progress in arms control agreements. I
also announced in my May 27th statement—and affirm once again—that:
Assuming no significant change in the threat we face, as we
implement the strategic modernization program, the United States
will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles than does
the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the United States will not deploy
more strategic ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet
Union.
Noting this unilateral U.S. action, I
called upon the Soviet Union to seize the opportunity to join the United
States in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint.
Yet, no policy of interim restraint can be a substitute for the
negotiation of meaningful, new agreements involving substantial
reductions in strategic and intermediate range nuclear forces. At
Reykjavik I put forward the most far-reaching, realistic arms control
proposal in history. I proposed the 50% reduction of strategic nuclear
forces and the total eliminating ballistic missiles of all ranges.
Those who argued that the Soviets could never be brought even to consider
the concept of deep reductions have been proven wrong. Those who argued
that we had to accept or rationalize Soviet SALT violations to improve the climate for arms control
have also been proven wrong.
The United States intends to press for the realization of the agreements
in principle achieved at Reykjavik. We cannot promise that this will be
a speedy or easy process. Things of real value are not easily obtained.
We will not accept a bad agreement or Soviet noncompliance. We will
continue our SDI program and will not
agree to limits proposed by the Soviet Union which are designed to
cripple and kill our effort to find a more stable way to maintain
deterrence. Our intent, quite simply, is to build a safer, more
secure—and most fundamentally a free—world.
