7. Telegram From the Embassy in Mauritania to the Department of State1

3060.

SUBJECT

  • President Haidalla Returns to Mauritania After Moroccan-Mauritanian Reconciliation.

Ref:

  • (A) Nouakchott 3022,2
  • (B) Nouakchott 3034.3
1.
(C—Entire text)
2.
Defeat and dismay had been the prefaces to the small diplomatic victory that President Haidalla brought back with him from Saudi Arabia late at night on June 29. There was an almost palpable feeling of accomplishment in the air. It was almost as if Mauritanian officials were welcoming home a victorious football team. Haidalla and his delegation, tired from an all-day and half-the-night plane ride from Saudi Arabia, seemed to feel, for the first time, that they had acted rather than reacted. As if to cap off their contribution to this reconciliation, the Mauritanian delegation arrived in a Saudia Airlines Boeing aircraft. Haidalla’s antiquated puddle-jumping and gas-guzzling Caravelle is probably still making its way back to Nouakchott.
3.
As per ref (B), there had been no official GIRM media announcement of the normalization of relations between Mauritania and Morocco. Haidalla, responding to a question from a Mauritanian reporter at the airport, said that normalization of relations had been agreed to “in principle” as an outgrowth of King Hassan’s call for a “just” referendum in the Western Sahara. (Comment: Haidalla made no mention of the “controlled” referendum proposed by King Hassan.) Prior to this, in an airport statement, Haidalla praised the “significant and courageous [Page 10] decision” taken by King Hassan at the OAU summit and outlined once again the concrete steps, as seen by Mauritania, to bring peace to the Western Sahara conflict. He repeated what he had said in his speech in Nairobi, emphasizing the long-standing GIRM policy of advocating direct negotiations between the “conflicting parties—Morocco and the Polisario” with Algeria and Mauritania cooperating closely. Haidalla called for a cease fire between Morocco and the Polisario and the “withdrawal of foreign forces to certain points to be determined” and their replacement by neutral forces.
4.
I chatted at the airport with former Prime Minister and now presidential counselor Sid’Ahmed Ould Bneijara who characterized the OAU summit as a summit of “reason and not of extremism.” When I asked him if this reconciliation meant that the GIRM was going to “forgive and forget the 16th of March,” Bneijara said that “we are going to try to forget the 16th of March.” He then added, with a grin, “there is always the 16th of something.”
Schrager
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810306–0344. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information Priority to Algiers, Jidda, Riyadh, Nairobi, and Rabat. Sent for information to Bamako, Conakry, Dar es Salaam, Freetown, Khartoum, Paris, Tunis, USCINCEUR, and Lagos.
  2. In telegram 3022 from Nouakchott, June 29, the Embassy reported: “June 28 announcement from Riyadh of reestablishment diplomatic relations between Morocco and Mauritania is a positive step.” The Embassy continued: “GIRM appears to have finally demonstrated the basic moderation of its April 25 government, helped along by Saudi largesse, uncertainty about Qadhafi and Polisario, and King Hassan’s basically accommodating speech at the OAU.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810304–0075) Reference is to Hassan’s call for a referendum on the Western Sahara. (See Document 378.)
  3. In telegram 3034 from Nouakchott, June 29, the Embassy reported: “Although it is common knowledge around Nouakchott, there has been no official word on GIRM media concerning reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Morocco,” likely due to the fact that “President Haidalla and his delegation are not scheduled to return until 1930 this evening” from Riyadh. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810305–0021)