Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

284. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

415651.

Washington, December 28, 1988, 0141Z

SUBJECT

• Moroccan Démarche: Libyan Chemical Weapons Capability

1. Entire text—C.

2. Moroccan Ambassador Bargach urgently requested a meeting with DAS Burleigh on December 27. Making what he described as his last official démarche, Bargach said that his government had instructed him to say that Morocco, as a good friend of the United States, urged restraint and moderation in the U.S. approach to the question of the Libyan CW production facility. Bargach said that Rabat had noted that the briefing recently provided to the GOM had coincided with reports President Reagan had said the U.S. was consulting with its allies about possible direct action against the Libyan facility. The GOM hopes that U.S. will not act precipitately, particularly in the light of the opening to the PLO with its potential for progress towards peace in the Middle East. Noting Libyan assertions that the Rabat plant was producing pharmaceuticals, Bargach said the U.S. should make absolutely certain that the facility in question is really a CW production plant before considering any action. Saying that Morocco was very concerned about the proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons, Bargach assured Burleigh that the GOM would monitor the situation closely and pass on any information it developed to the U.S.

3. Burleigh thanked Bargach for his presentation and assured him the U.S. welcomed and valued Morocco’s advice. He said that the presentation already made in Rabat had put the GOM in possession of the facts which lead us and many of our allies to conclude that Rabat is indeed a chemical weapons production plant. The U.S. has been conducting a diplomatic campaign to bring world attention to focus on the threat posed by the Libyan facility.² The U.S. is also actively supporting the Paris Conference on Chemical Weapons and believes it is important to find ways to reinforce the 1925 agreement banning such weapons.³

Whitehead

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D881125–0854. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Ralph Winstanley (NEA/AFN); approved by Burleigh. Sent for information Immediate to Algiers, Nouakchott, Tunis, Paris, and Madrid. Documentation on the Libyan chemical weapons program is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad.
2. In telegram 12658 from Rabat, December 28, the Embassy commented: “While Morocco is seeking to cover all its bases vis-à-vis its Arab neighbors, it has up to now eschewed condemnation of U.S. policy, and is bending over backwards to prevent the Libyan CW affair from damaging U.S.-Moroccan relations.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D881128–0134)
3. Reference is to the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.