Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

256. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

3965.

Rabat, April 22, 1986, 1807Z

SUBJECT

• Internal Debate Continues Over Reaction to U.S. Attack on Libya.²

Ref:

• Rabat 3829.³

1. Confidential—Entire text

2. Summary: Differences within Morocco on appropriate reaction to U.S. military action against Libya have sharpened with the opposition complaining that the GOM has quashed parliamentary and popular manifestations of solidarity with Libya. The charges have some validity and several contacts have confirmed press reports that police rapidly cracked down on incipient protests in various Moroccan cities. The government controlled press has also begun to move beyond the Libyan issue. Hassan has a strong domestic motivation for wanting to keep protests under control and, equally important, he is anxious that no incident jeopardize the effort to restore normalcy to relations with the U.S. End summary.

3. Moroccan reaction to U.S. military action against Libya has increasingly become an internal political issue. Leaders of opposition parties have complained strongly of “weak” official Moroccan response to the April 15 attack. Mohamed Yazghi, generally considered the second most powerful figure in the Socialist Party, told EmbOff April 18 that he was “astounded” that King Hassan’s April 15 letter to Qadhafi contained no condemnation of U.S. action. He said that in April 16 parliamentary debate, government parties, clearly acting on orders from the Palace, had deliberately watered down a resolution on the U.S. attack. The resolution finally approved, while denouncing the U.S. by name for the “aggression”, confines itself to “supporting the position of solidarity with Libya expressed by King Hassan” and “supports any action of the King to restore peace and security in the region.” The Istiqlal and Socialist Party press have also strongly criticized the GOM for preventing protests, noting that in other parts of the Islamic world, governments have declared official periods of mourning.

4. Contacts outside Rabat confirm press reports of attempted protests against the U.S. action. Peace Corps volunteers, especially in northern Morocco, report isolated instances of schools being closed. One volunteer reported that the high school in Ouezzan had been closed for two days, and said that, at one small student demonstration, an American flag had been burned. The stabbing of four British tourists (resulting in the death of one) in Marrakech on April 15 would appear to be an exception to the generally nonbelligerent protests, although police officials insist that the sole attacker has a history of mental problems. Police contacts maintain, however, that student protests, while in response to April 15 raid, also reflect a combination of grievances, such as the lack of job prospects as the end of the school year approaches and generally depressed economic conditions. Most protests appear to have been concentrated in northern Morocco where economic and political disaffection tends to be highest, but have now largely subsided.

5. The GOM has already begun to signal its intent to put the Libyan attack behind it, at least in terms of domestic political sentiment. On the one hand, police have been unusually solicitous to avoid any incident involving an American citizen. Peace Corps volunteers around the country report that authorities have gone out of their way to offer protection, in some cases personally visiting the PCV homes on a daily basis. In Rabat, authorities have exceeded what the Embassy requested in terms of protection. The pro-government press, in the meantime, has continued straight forward reporting on Libya. While Communist Party daily “Al Bayane” gave banner headlines to a “Washington Post” report⁴ alleging that the April 15 attack sought the death of Colonel Qadhafi, pro-government dailies have avoided reference to the “Post” report. By contrast, semi-official daily “Le Matin du Sahara” described in detail inter-Arab divergences over convoking an extraordinary Arab League meeting to condemn the attack. Equally significant was an extensive report carried on Moroccan television on April 18 on activities of a delegation of ten governors on an IVP trip to the United States. The story focussed on the delegation’s meeting with USIA Director Wick,⁵ with the voice-over quoting both sides’ comments on “excellence of” the “perennial ties” with the United States.

6. Comment: Hassan has several reasons to keep “displays of solidarity” with Libya within reasonable bounds. Government officials claim that vocal demonstrations by a small minority would misrepresent the depth of actual sentiment in Morocco over Libya. One senior police official also told EmbOff that the Interior Ministry is suspicious that demonstrations to date have been less spontaneous than they would appear, and report that known Libyan contacts have been the most active in fomenting protest. From the King’s perspective, it could set a bad precedent to allow popular protests which could also give vent to discontent over current social and economic conditions. Additionally, the palace is also clearly anxious to protect its ties with the U.S. and does not want to risk reactions to the U.S. attack on Libya jeopardizing prospects for a royal visit to Washington.

Nassif

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860308–0389. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to Algiers, Tunis, Damascus, Amman, Riyadh, Baghdad, Cairo, Paris, Madrid, London, and USUN.
2. See footnote 2, Document 159.
3. In telegram 3829 from Rabat, April 17, the Embassy reported: “Reaction to the U.S. raid on Libya is mixed here. After a 24-hour delay, the political parties have come out strongly pro-Libya, and a special session of Parliament on April 16 emphasized those same sentiments. Privately, many Moroccans have offered a different line, expressing understanding and sympathy with the U.S. action, and even the hope that the U.S. goes further in combating Qadhafi.” The Embassy continued: “many observers doubt whether there will be much permanent benefit for Libya or damage to the U.S. image here.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860295–0358)
4. Reference is presumably to George C. Wilson, “Qadhafi Was A Target of U.S. Raid: ‘Hoped We’d Get Him,’ Official Says; At Least 1 Jet Aimed at Compound,” (Washington Post, April 18, 1986, pp. A1, A17).
5. No record of Wick’s conversations with the ten governors has been found.