79. Editorial Note
On September 10, 1983, President Ronald Reagan convened a meeting of the National Security Council in the Cabinet Room of the White House. The meeting lasted from 11:02 a.m. to 12:03 p.m. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary). No formal minutes were found. National Security Council staff member Ronald Lehman sent President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs William Clark a briefing package for the meeting under cover of a September 9 memorandum; Clark made a number of handwritten notes on the talking points provided for his use. (National Security Council, Box SR–103, START/LEBANON 10 Sept 83) Participants spent most of the meeting discussing Lebanon: a transcription based on handwritten notes of Howard Teicher of the National Security Council staff is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, volume XVIII Part 2, Lebanon, September 1982–March 1984. In his handwritten notes of the meeting, which otherwise describe the discussion of Lebanon, Admiral John Poindexter of the National Security Council staff wrote: “Brent feels that builddown should not be handled separately from other possible changes to START.” (National Security Council, Box SR 084, NSDD 0098) The reference is to Brent Scowcroft.
On September 19, Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam dictated a personal note that read in part: “I had lunch with Eagleburger and Scowcroft today to discuss the general situation on the START negotiations and the build-down. Then at 5 o’clock in the afternoon I went to a meeting of the Clark group to discuss our position on START and the build-down, looking to a meeting with six key Congressmen, three Senators (Cohen, Nunn, and Percy) and three Representatives (Aspin, Dicks, and Gore) on Wednesday. The idea is to come to some sort of a bipartisan consensus on the arms control position.” The meeting took place on Wednesday, September 21. After discussing the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces negotiations, Dam continued: “The Clark group is clearly becoming a decision-making group, and in fact things are moving very rapidly now. Unfortunately, the Clark group does not always meet as a group, and too much is left to Ron Lehman, Judge Clark’s defense programs assistant, who really does not have the stature that Bud McFarlane had. He is quite substantive, but he is young and has not got the clout that Bud had. Clearly the use of Bud as a negotiator in the Middle East has been a big loss for the coherence of our arms control position.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982–Sept. 1983)
The next day, Dam dictated another personal note that read in part: “The most important meeting of the day was the Clark group, [Page 285] which met on arms control at 5:30. We went through our position on START and on build-down with a view to meeting with the so-called Gang of Six, three Senators and three Representatives, of whom the most important are Senators Nunn and Cohen for these particular purposes. We essentially agreed on our position by the end of the meeting, and there will be a meeting tomorrow with the six Members of Congress.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982–Sept. 1983)
On September 23, Dam dictated a personal note that read in part: “I spent much of the afternoon on arms control. I received a briefing from the Rand Corporation on the new double build-down idea, where the briefing was given by its creator, General Kent, and on the Rand summer study on defense against ballistic missiles. The latter project grew out of the star wars speech of the President last March. Thereafter, I went to the Situation Room for still another meeting of the Clark group. This was strictly procedural. Clark gave a briefing on his meeting with the Group of Six on Wednesday and showed us the letter that had been sent back on Thursday promising a position on build-down within a week. We then agreed that it was necessary to come up with a formula for how we were going to respond. We did arrive at the heads of agreement, so to speak, and an agreement that we would work on it over the week. We will have four parts to our response, Clark decided, based upon a suggestion by Rick Burt. First, we will get a resolution next week through an NSC meeting of the outstanding START issues. Second, we will have a build-down proposal of some kind. Third, we will work on the build-down within START through a special working group, which we will propose to the Soviets, as well as a proposed build-down annex. And finally, we will expand the membership of the General Advisory Committee (frankly, to bring in some members more agreeable to the Hill and, from my point of view, additional members of greater stature) and announce that there will be a public member of the START delegation (who, it is already decided, will be Jim Woolsey, who is a Democratic member of the Scowcroft Commission).” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982–Sept. 1983)