7. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Clark) to
President Reagan1
Washington, April 20, 1982
SUBJECT
- NSC Meeting, Wednesday, April 21,
1982
Issue: What factors affect the choice of basic
units to be limited in a START
agreement?
Facts: The basic unit of limitation used in SALT II was Strategic Nuclear Delivery
Vehicles (i.e., ballistic missile launchers plus heavy bombers). All
agencies agree that this unit alone is inadequate for START, but there are disagreements on
how it should be supplemented or replaced.
Possible candidates for limitations (which are not mutually exclusive)
include the number of ballistic missile warheads, ballistic missile
warhead weight, ballistic missile throw weight, and the number of
strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.
All agencies concur that a START
agreement should provide for reductions of ballistic missile warheads to
equal levels, but agencies differ as to what the level should be. Views
differ on the desirability of limiting ballistic missile launchers, and
on whether to limit ballistic missile throw weight directly or
indirectly.
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All agencies agree that it is to the U.S. advantage to seek different,
looser constraints on bombers than on missiles.
Discussion: The purpose of this NSC meeting is to begin highest-level discussion developing our START negotiating position. Follow-up
meetings are being scheduled for necessary decision making early in May.
The choice of a unit of limitation must especially address: (1) how we
intend to make significant reductions; and (2) control Soviet potential
to break out of an agreement, while (3) providing sufficient U.S.
military capability to execute our own military strategy; and (4)
assuring a verifiable agreement.
Tab A1
Paper Prepared in the National Security
Council2
START DISCUSSION PAPER
This paper summarizes those issues which should determine a U.S.
START negotiating position. A
five-page summary of criteria and candidate elements for limitation
is followed by a short description of agency views on those elements
and our approach to the negotiations.
Criteria
The following criteria are those which must guide formulation of a
position for START:
• Military capability. A START agreement must permit the U.S.
to develop and possess sufficient military capability, taking into
account that allowed to the Soviet Union, to deter the Soviet Union
and to execute the U.S. national military strategy with reasonable
assurance of success.
• Equality. Nothing less than equality is
acceptable in the provisions of any future strategic arms limitation
agreement for military reasons and for political/perceptual
reasons.
• Strategic stability. A START agreement must promote
stability by reducing the vulnerability of U.S. strategic forces.
Significant constraints on the most threatening Soviet
systems—ICBMs—could contribute
to this goal.
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• Effective verification. A START agreement must provide for
necessary counting rules, collateral constraints, and cooperative
measures required to achieve this objective.
• Substantial reductions on each side.
Whatever unit of measurement is adopted should lend itself to
substantial reductions below current levels of forces. Reductions
should be to equal ceilings.
• Easily understood. To gain support and hence
underscore the credibility of the U.S. negotiating position, the
approach we choose should be explainable in clear and simple
terms.
• Alliance impact. A START agreement should take into
account Allied concerns: the ability of the U.S. to maintain a
credible deterrent, the relationship of the START approach to the INF negotiations, and the likelihood
of success.
• Anticipated Soviet reaction. The Soviets
will undoubtedly resist any of the reductions proposals now being
considered. We should concern ourselves with how defensible the
proposal is against Soviet propaganda efforts.
Units of Account
Which elements of strategic nuclear forces should be subject to
specific limitations in a START
agreement? This “unit of account” issue has been the focus of
interagency discussion and is of central importance in defining the
basic framework of a U.S. START
position. The basic unit used in SALT II was strategic nuclear delivery vehicles
(ballistic missile launchers plus heavy bombers). All agencies agree
that this unit alone is inadequate for START, but there are disagreements on how it should be
supplemented or replaced.
Possible candidates for limitations, which are not mutually
exclusive, include the number of ballistic missile warheads,
ballistic missile warhead weight, ballistic missile throw-weight,
and the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.
Summary of Alternative Units of Account
1. Number of Ballistic Missile Warheads
The number of warheads, the weapons atop missiles, are a direct
indicator of strategic power. The sides are about equal in the
number of ballistic missile warheads. All agencies concur that a
START agreement should
provide for reductions of ballistic missile warheads to an equal
level for each side. Agencies differ as to what that level should
be.
2. The Number of Ballistic Missile Launchers
Views differ on the desirability of limiting the number of launchers
(a device that launches ballistic missiles). The Soviets have a
substantial lead in launchers. Some agencies believe such limits are
important to
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reduce the
potential for a rapid buildup of Soviet strategic capabilities in
the event of treaty abrogation (i.e., a large force of single
warhead missiles permitted by a Treaty might be rapidly fitted with
multiple warheads). They also believe that limiting launchers will
facilitate verification and preserve some continuity with past
negotiations. Other agencies believe such limits are undesirable
because they could foreclose possible U.S. options and do not by
themselves significantly reduce Soviet capabilities.
3. Ballistic Missile Throw-Weight and/or Warhead
Weight
Missile throw-weight is the weight that can be delivered by an
individual missile; it effectively determines the number and size of
warheads that can be delivered by a ballistic missile. The Soviets
have a growing advantage in throw-weight: currently about 2-½ times
the U.S. level of missile throw-weight. Some agencies believe we
should explicitly seek sharp reductions in throw-weight to equality
at low levels. Other agencies believe it would be preferable to seek
constraints on warhead weight. Still other agencies would seek sharp
reduction in Soviet throw-weight by requiring reductions in or the
elimination of the Soviets’ heavy ICBMs, i.e., the SS–18, plus constraints on future
ICBMs.
4. Bombers
All agencies agree that it is to the U.S. advantage to seek
different, looser constraints on bombers than on missiles. The
United States currently has a small lead in bombers even if Soviet
BACKFIRE bombers are included, and a substantial lead in bomber
weapons. All agree that BACKFIRE should be included and that we
could accept equal levels of bombers. Some agencies prefer that such
limits be omitted from the U.S. opening position.
Verification
In general, the Intelligence Community believes that high confidence
levels in monitoring units of account, where achievable, will
require access to flight test data, prohibitions on concealment,
type and counting rules and agreed definitions. In many cases,
cooperative measures would be needed to enhance and supplement
national technical means. Our capabilities to monitor the units of
account under consideration are summarized below. It should be noted
that the relative verifiability of these units of account depends on
factors such as specific treaty provisions and collateral
constraints, which are beyond the scope of this paper. In addition,
there are factors, such as refire missiles, which could have a
significant impact on verification but would affect equally all the
units of account.
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A. Ballistic Missile Launchers
High confidence in counting SLBM
and fixed ICBM launchers can be
achieved with national technical means and appropriate counting
rules. For land-mobile ICBM
launchers, intrusive measures would be required for high
confidence.
B. Deployed Ballistic Missile Warheads
With flight test data and counting rules, we would have high
confidence in the number of warheads to be attributed to each
missile system and high confidence in the aggregate deployed warhead
count for SLBMs and fixed ICBM launchers.
C. [1 line not declassified]
[9 lines not declassified]
D. [1 line not declassified]
[3 lines not declassified]
E. [1 line not declassified]
[2 paragraphs (6 lines) not declassified]
Tab A2
Paper Prepared in the National Security
Council3
Questions for Discussion
Note: Although the choice of the units of
account will be a critical decision in determining our negotiating
proposal for START, the scale of
reductions that we seek to achieve is equally critical. Thus, in
addressing the questions below, the proposed level of limitations as
well as the units of account should be discussed.
1. How does our choice of units of account help us to achieve
significant reductions and also protect our military
requirements?
2. How does our choice of units of account build or undercut support
for the President’s strategic modernization program and for the
defense program as a whole?
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3. What is the political environment surrounding START? How does the choice of units
of account build or undercut support for the U.S. position?
—with the public?
—in Congress?
—with our Allies?
4. Is continuity with SALT I and
SALT II good or bad?
5. How does verification bear on the choice of the U.S. negotiating
proposal?
6. Are some proposals more resilient than others? What is the
relationship between our negotiating position and the likely course
of the negotiations?
7. Do we require equality in every important measure of strategic
capability? What are the requirements of Public Law 92-448?4
Tab A3
Paper Prepared in the Department of
State5
State Department Views
The choice of our START proposal
will be one of the most important decisions reached in this
Administration. Our supporters and critics alike will view our
proposals as a litmus test of our seriousness in seeking an
agreement.
It is imperative that our proposal elicit broad support in the US and
with our allies, enhancing the credibility of US arms control policy
and strengthening the President’s position during his trip to
Europe6
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and to the UN in June. This is clear in view of
the political challenges of the freeze movement in the US and the
peace movement in Europe. We must keep this in mind in choosing a
negotiating approach.
The State proposal seeks to strike a balance between cosmetic arms
control such as SALT II (which
would allow the Soviet buildup to continue) and an approach which
would offer little hope of success and thus provide an easy target
for those who argue that we are not serious about arms control.
The State approach would focus on the most easily understood
indicators of strategic power: nuclear weapons and their delivery
systems. Specifically, this approach would:
—require both sides to reduce to a common ceiling of 5000 ballistic missile warheads and a sublimit of
2500 ICBM
warheads (SALT II placed
no direct limits on warheads);
—limit missile launchers and bombers to 1500
(the SALT II ceiling was 50%
higher at 2250);
—focus on the most destabilizing Soviet systems by requiring
reductions in the heaviest Soviet ICBM the SS–18, which could be linked to an offer to
forego MX deployment.
This approach has several advantages:
—It would keep US military options open to shape our forces to meet
future threats.
—We would be able to verify these limitations with confidence.
—It would be a major step forward from SALT II but would not be seen as a total rejection of
years of SALT negotiations. It
would place the President center stage as a man of peace and vision,
committed to negotiating seriously on an end to the arms race, thus
allowing us to seize the high ground on an issue of intense public
concern.
A major strength of the State approach is that it accomplishes the
same military objectives as other approaches without the attendant
political difficulties. In particular, the State approach would
require major reductions in Soviet missile throw-weight without the
problems associated with explicit limits on throw-weight. These
include the following:
—Direct limits on throw-weight would be less verifiable than limits
on missile warheads or launchers.
—Direct limits on throw-weight would create an impression of
unfairness, as the Soviets would be required to make major changes
in their forces without the US having to do so. This could reduce
pressures on the Soviets to accept reductions, undermine public and
Congressional support for the strategic modernization program, and
weaken the allies’ support for US nuclear policy and their
confidence in our ability to do business with the Soviets.
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—Negotiations on throw-weight could lead to a ceiling considerably
above US levels, creating only a cosmetic equality which would have
no benefits for the US and which could diminish Congressional
support for an agreement.
In sum, the State proposal offers the best hope of securing real arms
reductions for our adversaries, while providing a politically
attractive START position which
will gain the solid support of our friends and establish the
President’s position as an advocate of serious arms control.
Tab A3
Paper Prepared in the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency7
ACDA View: Limitation on the Number and Destructive
Power of Ballistic Missile Warheads
Our START approach should
significantly reduce missile destructive capability, and therefore
should reduce the number and destructive power of ballistic missile
warheads. The essential elements of this approach can be described
clearly and succinctly: A cut of roughly half the total number of
missile warheads, and a substantial reduction in their destructive
power as well. Reductions should be phased over five years.
Warhead number. One key measure of destructive
capability is the number of warheads. As missile accuracy improves,
most targets can be destroyed by a single reliable warhead of
nominal size. The US should press for substantial reduction in the
total number of missile warheads, to an equal level of perhaps 4000
on each side, which would be roughly one-half the present numbers. A
sublimit would permit no more than 2500 warheads on ICBMs. Such an approach would force
the Soviets to dismantle more than half of their present ICBM force. Substantial Soviet ICBM reductions are essential if we
are to achieve our objectives of enhanced deterrence and
stability.
Destructive power. Limits on warheads alone
would not be sufficient for an equitable agreement, since some
warheads are substantially larger and more destructive than others.
Soviet warheads are on average larger than US warheads, and if only
warhead numbers were
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limited, there would be an incentive to increase missile and warhead
size. To constrain such increases, and the corresponding breakout
capability, there should be limits on warhead size.
A straightforward way to accomplish this would be to place limits on
the weight of RVs. Any RV with a weight above the ceiling
would be counted more than one, in proportion to its weight. In the
long run, the weight threshold should be low, e.g., 200 kilograms
(roughly the size of the MM–III
RV); in the near term
transitional period, the threshold could be higher, e.g., 450 kg.
The low warhead ceiling could be phased in over a number of years to
give the sides time to adjust their forces, and transitional
arrangements could be made for existing systems. In order to limit
breakout potential, the throwweight of missiles could be limited to
no more than twice the weight of their RVs. The essential point is that the unit of account
for START should measure
destructive capability of strategic forces, and should therefore
constrain the number and size of warheads. Such an RV weight limit would force the Soviets
to reduce their ICBM throwweight
by half in the near term, with further reductions when current
systems are replaced.
Negotiations should focus attention on reductions in missile forces,
rather than on bombers and cruise missiles, which do not pose the
same first strike threat, and face unconstrained defenses. In the
context of Soviet agreement to substantial reductions in missile
forces along the lines of the U.S. proposal, the U.S. could accept a
separate limit of 250 heavy bomber aircraft.
Tab A3
Paper Prepared in the Delegation to the
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks8
VIEWS OF THE CHAIRMAN, START DELEGATION
The head of the START Delegation
believes that a combination of significant reductions of ballistic
missile warheads and throwweight provides the most effective overall
constraint on the destructive capability of Soviet forces. In order
to enhance negotiation of a successful agreement, the United States
should seek reductions in ballistic missile warheads over the first
five years of an agreement to a level of perhaps
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6000 with ICBM warheads limited to one-half of that total. How
the reductions are phased over time is not only important to our
security but to the negotiability of an agreement. Deeper
reductions, down to a level of perhaps 5000 ballistic missile
warheads, should be sought over a longer, 10-year period. The final
warhead level should ensure U.S. ability to carry out its military
objectives against Soviet forces and preserve a viable triad.
The U.S. START position should
also include an initial limit on aggregate ballistic missile
throw-weight set at approximately one-half of current Soviet
ballistic missile throw-weight. Throw-weight is the only significant
measure which completely identifies the capability of the missiles
and which prevents the Soviets from exploiting the destructive
potential of their heavier missiles. Limits on launchers or on
reentry vehicle size, without limits on throw-weight, would allow
the Soviet warheads on their existing missiles if there were a
breakout or termination of the treaty. A throw-weight/warhead weight
ratio would require the parties to agree, in effect, to a
throw-weight aggregate, but adds another element of complexity to
negotiating an agreement.
Reducing Soviet warheads and throw-weight to these levels would put
significant bounds on the ICBM
survivability problem we now face, would make it easier to deploy
MX in a survivable mode, and
would be readily understandable. Although the Soviets would
initially retain a throw-weight advantage, the U.S. should make
clear its objective of bringing Soviet throw-weight down to the U.S.
level in ten years.
Any agreement entered into must be effectively verified. This
includes as a minimum access to unencrypted telemetry and going
beyond national technical means. Two additional important issues
related to effective verification are the refire capability and
ground mobility of ICBMs.
Tab A3
Paper Prepared in the Department of
Defense9
Defense Department Views
The Department of Defense believes that a Reagan Administration
START proposal should depart
clearly, in form and substance, from the SALT I and II agreements in order to achieve real arms
control.
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The Department of Defense proposes sharp reductions in the two
principle units of account—ballistic missile
warheads, which we would reduce by about 50% to 4,000 on
each side, and ballistic missile
throw-weight, which we would fix equally at a level slightly
below the current US level (and 40% of the current Soviet level). We
believe that this proposal, which deliberately departs from the
flawed approach of the past, offers our best chance to negotiate a
stable equilibrium with sharp reductions.
SALT I and II gave the appearance,
but not the reality, of significant limits on Soviet strategic
power. A START proposal that
parallels the structure of SALT
II, as recommended by agencies that would limit warheads and launchers alone, would drive the
Administration into a repetition of past mistakes and produce a
START treaty that would
resemble the SALT II treaty
against which it campaigned successfully. Such a SALT II style proposal would increase
pressures to proceed with ratification of SALT II while we negotiate START, thus, undercutting efforts to negotiate
substantial reductions. Indeed, a SALT II style proposal would leave the Administration
with no credible argument for resisting ratification of the existing
SALT II treaty.
The principal failure of the SALT
II treaty was its perpetuation of a 2½-to-1 Soviet advantage in
ballistic missile throw weight. So fundamental was this inequity
that the Senate Armed Services Committee, in opposing the treaty as
“not in the national security interests of the United States,”
listed first among the changes it proposed “remedying such
inequalities as the Soviet advantage in ICBM throw-weight . . .”
Now we find the Department of State opposed to a US START proposal calling for equal
throw-weight at sharply reduced levels. Indeed, the Department of
State wishes to remain silent on the subject of throw weight, even
though it is here that the Soviets enjoy their most dramatic margin
of superiority. We believe that a failure even to
ask for equal sharply reduced levels of ballistic missile throw
weight would be inconsistent with PL 92-448, a Public Law passed following SALT I that called on the President
to achieve strict equality in any future treaty.
The Department of State argues that we can obtain equal throw-weight
as an indirect consequence of other features of a new START proposal. But without
articulating the principle of equality in throw weight and
incorporating that principle prominently in our START proposal, we believe that
equal throw weight will inevitably be sacrificed in the
give-and-take of bargaining as we head down the familiar path of a
SALT II type treaty—limiting
only the number of warheads and launchers.
The Defense Department emphasis on sharp reductions to a low and
equal level of warheads and throw-weight would distinguish the
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approach of the Reagan
Administration from its predecessors, meet the requirements of
PL 92–448, throw the spotlight
on the area where the Soviets have (and have insisted on retaining)
an immense advantage, and provide a principled position that we
could sustain effectively in the face of Soviet and other hostile
opposition.
Among the arguments advanced for not proposing equal throw-weight the
least convincing is that equal throw-weight will prove difficult to
negotiate. In SALT I and II, the
US effort suffered from the tendency to compromise our goals even
before the negotiations got underway—with the inevitable result that
we found ourselves concluding agreements that reflected Soviet objectives, permitted the Soviet
build-up to continue and protected and legitimized the Soviet margin
of superiority. We must have the courage to make proposals that are
defensible, fair and balanced, even if they will be somewhat more
difficult to negotiate. Enshrining the principle of equality
throughout is the most effective way to do so.
