Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

327. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

12688

Washington, December 14, 1988

SUBJECT

• NST: Plenary summary report

REF

• A: NST-X-026² B: NST-X-027³ C: NST-X-028⁴ D: NST-X-029⁵

1. This is NST-X-025. Secret—Entire Text.

2. Date: November 15, 1988

Time: 1000–1230 hours

Place: Soviet Mission, Geneva

3. Begin summary: Ambassador Kampelman read a statement (Ref A) which reviewed the achievements of the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) and outlined possible future progress in the talks and U.S.-Soviet relations generally. He noted two particularly important obstacles to completion of the START and Defense and Space (D&S) treaties: the continued Soviet failure to correct its Krasnoyarsk radar violation of the ABM treaty, and continued Soviet linkage, holding a START agreement hostage to completion of an agreement in D&S. Separate statements by Ambassadors Hanmer and Cooper (Refs B & C) reviewed the status of the START and D&S talks, respectively. Ambassador Obukhov delivered the Soviet statement (Ref D) covering both D&S and START issues. He also reiterated Soviet proposals regarding the Krasnoyarsk radar. End summary.

Kampelman’s Statement

4. Kampelman recalled that the U.S. side had begun the NST in March of 1985 with hopes tempered by realism. He reaffirmed the commitment of the United States to continue to pursue strategic arms control agreements. Describing the purpose of the negotiations as ensuring greater security and stability for both sides, he outlined the guiding principles for the talks which had resulted in the INF treaty and which continued to guide the current negotiations. Kampelman noted that START had accomplished a major portion of its tasks, and could be completed consistent with the guiding principles. He reviewed the basic agreed points in START, emphasizing the measures for effective verification. In summarizing the D&S negotiations, Kampelman noted that disagreements outnumbered agreements. The sides had reached somewhat greater understanding of each other’s positions, but the differences that remained were serious. He added that the U.S. side will continue to pursue mutually acceptable solutions that would enhance deterrence.

5. Regarding the Krasnoyarsk radar violation, Kampelman said the Soviet side had not dealt with U.S. concerns that the prohibited radar capability must be eliminated and that there must be no “lead-time advantage” after the corrective actions were completed. Failure to resolve the violation would prevent completion of START or D&S agreements. On the linkage issue, Kampelman observed that the Soviet side continued to hold START hostage to agreement in D&S, but a START agreement should be concluded on its own merits. He emphasized that the sides’ interests in the arms control area transcended leadership changes. President-elect Bush’s administration would be committed to continuing efforts to reach agreement. Kampelman noted that the U.S. side had proposed a specific tentative opening date for round XI, and hoped that it would be accepted. He then called upon Hanmer and Cooper to review developments in their respective negotiations.

Hanmer’s statement

6. In a prepared statement, Hanmer reviewed the status of the START negotiations, noting that the sides had made substantial progress toward an agreement. Hanmer also cited unresolved issues:

—Heavy bombers and ALCMs: i.e., range and attribution, whether to exclude former heavy bombers from accountability in the 1600/6000 central limits, and the scope of OSI for verifying heavy bomber constraints;

—Mobile ICBMs: i.e., the need to resolve remaining outstanding issues before the U.S. could reconsider its proposed ban, including provisions for suspect site inspection;

—SLCMs: The unacceptability of Soviet proposals, the sides’ inability to develop a mutually acceptable verification regime, and the preferred US-proposed declaratory approach;

—Sublimits: The requirement for an ICBM warhead sublimit, and the counterproductive Soviet proposal for a reciprocal SLBM warhead sublimit; and,

—Throw-weight limits: The US-proposed throw-weight protocol provides for an effective and workable approach for determining accountable throw-weight for existing and future types of ballistic missiles.

Hanmer enjoined the Soviet side to give serious consideration to U.S. proposals during the recess.

Cooper’s Statement

7. Cooper noted that the Soviet side had hindered progress toward facilitation of a jointly managed transition to greater reliance on effective strategic defenses, and toward finding ways to enhance predictability and strategic stability within the context of the ABM treaty. Soviet positions were inconsistent with extensive Soviet programs in the strategic defense field; when these positions became more consistent with both U.S. and Soviet interest, a D&S Treaty could be readily completed. Cooper described the U.S. position as comprehensive, and noted that there had been progress on some issues, although the Soviet side had backed away from the Washington Summit Joint Statement (WSJS), and limited progress on others, including by its refusal to complete a joint draft text of the separate agreement.

8. Cooper noted that agreement on a period of nonwithdrawal from the ABM Treaty was contingent upon three conditions’ being met:

—First, there must be recognition, in an agreement with the same legal status as the ABM Treaty, of each side’s right to choose its course of action at the end of the nonwithdrawal period;

—Second, supreme interest and other standard rights must be included;

—Third, there must be mutual, unambiguous agreement on the the meaning of the WSJS language “research, development and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty.”

9. Cooper said the U.S. side had offered compromise proposals on all these issues, including a three-part initiative on activities during the nonwithdrawal period that included predictability measures, a proposal on space-based sensors, and, as a response to expressed Soviet concerns, an initiative on testing in space. The underlying reality was that both sides were pursuing advanced defenses against strategic ballistic missiles, Soviet D&S positions should reflect this. When the sides met again, the U.S. side would be ready to cooperate in the search for mutually acceptable resolutions of the outstanding issues.

Obukhov’s Statement

10. In his statement, Obukhov said he hoped that progress would continue in the NST, and reviewed familiar Soviet positions in the D&S area, stressing that fifty-percent reductions in strategic offensive arms could only take place under conditions of strict observance of the ABM treaty. After quoting the WSJS language, Obukhov claimed that the Soviet side had been willing to work on that basis, and had introduced a draft agreement to that end. Other issues of interest to the U.S. side could be discussed and subsequently resolved in the protocol to the agreement. The Soviet side had also proposed a joint statement to be issued at the signing of a D&S agreement to make possible realization of the right of the sides, following the expiration of the agreement, to decide their course of action in the event of failure to agree on an alternative. He charged that the U.S. side had sought to use the WSJS to assert the possibility of moving to a more defense-reliant regime. The Soviet side had pointed out the drawbacks of this approach.

11. Obukhov said confidence-building, predictability and verification measures in the protocol were intended to assure that obligations under the ABM treaty and the D&S agreement were being complied with. The U.S. side, however, had made proposals for data exchange, space test notification measures, and sensors that were in conflict with accords reached at the highest levels and would undermine the ABM treaty. Obukhov expressed Soviet willingness to continue to discuss the U.S. sensors proposal in light of the earlier Soviet proposal that the sides agree on a “list of devices” they would allow to be introduced into space; this would include agreement that the launch of such sensors into space would be verified using on-site inspection.

12. Turning to the question of the Krasnoyarsk Radar, Obukhov claimed that the Soviet side had presented concrete views on how to turn the radar into an international space research facility during a recent meeting of U.S. and Soviet experts. The Soviet side at that meeting had explained the mission the radar would perform and proposed additional measures to satisfy U.S. concerns and guarantee the impossibility of the radar being used for early warning or ABM purposes. The Soviet side would not rule out structural changes in the overall radar design called for by the scientific missions of the Space Research Center. So far, the U.S. side had not responded adequately, or made an effort to address Soviet concerns about violations of the ABM treaty related to the U.S. large phased-array radar in Greenland and construction of a similar radar in Britain.

13. Addressing START, Obukhov noted that progress had been achieved, evidenced by the fact that the sides now had a JDT of a START agreement. He pointed out progress made in agreeing on legal formulations for the Moscow elements of common ground on heavy bombers and ALCMS and on mobile ICBM launchers—progress that had given the sides a good head START for the future. Obukhov also said that serious work needed to be done to remove the remaining brackets.

14. Obukhov also listed basic unresolved problems, including the issue of space arms and their relationship to the implementation of fifty-percent reductions in strategic offensive arms and the limitation of long-range SLCMs. A stable accord on strategic offensive arms could not be concluded without limitations on SLCMs. Obukhov added that the issue of heavy ICBMs still remained on hold, although it had already been resolved at the Reykjavik and Washington Summit meetings. The Soviet side believed that it was possible to settle the issue of heavy ICBMs on the basis of agreements reached at the highest levels and earlier soviet proposals. Some key elements on mobile ICBM launchers and ALCMs/heavy bombers remained unresolved. Work on provisions on mobile ICBM launchers had been held up, in the Soviet view, by the ambiguity in the U.S. position regarding such systems. The Moscow elements of common ground offered a solution. Concerning ALCM counting, the Soviet side proposed that heavy bombers be counted as carrying the maximum number for which they were equipped. Also, all heavy bombers, regardless of how they were armed, should count in the 1600 aggregate limit. It was also important to preserve the earlier understanding of 600 km as the division between longer- and shorter-range ALCMs, particularly regarding the agreed rule that all short-range air-to-surface missiles and gravity bombs carried on a heavy bomber would count as one unit in the 6000 limit. The Soviet side had made a package proposal that would provide the necessary grounds for resolving this problem.

15. On verification, the U.S. approach, Obukhov said, was less than fully comprehensive, that is, not applicable to all types of strategic offensive arms. The U.S. side also would not accept verification of strategic offensive arms that were outside the confines of U.S. territory. The U.S. side had presented a truncated version of verification measures for heavy bombers and ALCMs. Long-range SLCMs would be left completely outside of verification under the U.S. approach. The system of continuous monitoring of production facilities under the U.S. approach was seriously curtailed and there were other shortcomings in the U.S. proposal.

16. Obukhov said that another important issue is that of “non-circumvention.” The Soviet side had proposed a non-circumvention obligation in Article XIII of the JDT, but the U.S. side continued to shy away from its substantive discussion.

17. Obukhov noted that, in response to the U.S. throw-weight proposal, the Soviet side had made a proposal that was aimed at a mutually acceptable solution. He again raised the idea of a separate accord for limiting the number of warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs and said that such an accord could become part of the future treaty.

Closing Remarks

18. Kampelman thanked Obukhov for his hospitality and for his clear statement of the Soviet side’s position in his formal statement, which Kampelman promised the U.S. side would review with care. Kampelman said he wanted to close with a warm personal greeting to Obukhov, to Ambassadors Kuznetsov and Masterkov, to Generals Detinov and Kurlanov, and to all of the Soviet delegation’s associates and colleagues in Moscow. Kampelman said he had both enjoyed and been enriched by their relationship and many exchanges. He offered his best personal wishes to the Soviet side and to their families. Obukhov concluded by offering his best wishes to the U.S. delegation, wishing all its members and officials a happy return home, and hoping they might do much productive work during the working recess.

19. List of Participants:

U.S.	USSR
Amb Kampelman	Amb Obukhov
Amb Cooper	Amb Kuznetsov
Amb Hanmer	Amb Masterkov
Mr. Barry	Mr. Artem’yev
Mr. Carpenter	Gen Lt Detinov
Mr. Courtney	Mr. Kardashev
Mr. Daniel	Mr. Kelin
BGen Daniel	Mr. Kryuchkov
Mr. Davison	Mr. Kulebyakin
Col Dellermann	Gen Maj Kurlanov
Dr. Dyster	Gen Maj Lebedev
LTC Evans	Mr. Lysenko
Mr. Foley	Col Novosadov
LCDR Frye	Mr. Mizin
Mr. Furniss	Mr. Pakhomov
Maj Godby	Capt Perlovskiy
Mr. Herlihy	Col Romanov
Mr. Ifft	Mr. Roslyakov
BGen Johnson	Mr. Sokov
Capt Johnson	Mr. Yakushina
Mr. Levinson	Mr. Yeroshkin
Mr. Maddalena	Col Yoznyuk
LTC Madding	Mr. Zaytsev
Mr. McDowell	Mr. Berezhkov (Int)
Col Miller
Dr. O’Fallon
Mr. Orban
LTC Siemon
Mr. Wattawa
Mr. Arensburger (Int)

Hanmer/Courtney

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D881013-0266. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent Priority for information to the Mission to NATO, and USNMR SHAPE, and Moscow.
2. In telegram 12636 from NST Geneva, November 15, the Delegation transmitted the text of Kampelman’s final Round X statement. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D881009-0597)
3. In telegram 12641 from NST Geneva, November 15, the Delegation transmitted the text of Cooper’s final Round X statement. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D881009-0661)
4. In telegram 12602 from NST Geneva, November 15, the Delegation transmitted the text of Hanmer’s joint plenary statement. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N/A)
5. In telegram 12763 from NST Geneva, November 17, the Delegation transmitted the text of the official translation of Obukhov’s final Round X joint plenary statement. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D881018-0058)