313. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell) to Secretary of Defense Carlucci1
SUBJECT
- JCS Military Evaluation of U.S. Strategy Under a START Regime (U)
As we’ve discussed, outlines of the strategic forces which will be allowed under a START Treaty are now clear. While there are a number of important issues outstanding, both within the United States Government and with the Soviets, the bulk of these involve verification, not fundamental treaty limits. (U)
[Page 1449]While we have spent long hours on specific details of the START treaty, we have spent much less time in recent months on the broader question of our overall strategic posture once such a treaty is implemented. While this topic was examined thoroughly when our START approach was initially devised, I believe we should do it again for several reasons:
—First, we will be completing our START position over the summer. Stepping back to examine the impact of the treaty is logical and appropriate.
—Second, it is clear that a treaty cannot be completed this year without extraordinary efforts. Before making those efforts, with the attendant risks of being misinterpreted in a political year, we should have a better understanding of the value of such a treaty.
—Both supporters and opponents of our position are beginning to assert that we do not understand the strategic result of our proposals. While I believe this charge to be unfounded, where national security is involved we have an obligation to make absolutely certain we understand where we are going and what the results of our approach will be.
—Finally, such a review would be useful in responding to the issues raised by the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. (S)
The Joint Chiefs of Staff are uniquely qualified to conduct the type of review we need. While the formal JCS evaluation of military sufficiency must await completion of negotiations, I believe the President and his senior advisors would benefit from the Chiefs’ current assessment of the benefits to the United States of a START treaty. I therefore request that the JCS prepare a 30–45 minute briefing on whether, and if so to what degree, START will improve the overall U.S. strategic posture. (S)
To be most useful, I suggest the briefing:
—Assume our current START position prevails in a final treaty;
—Not focus on verification details, but consider the effect of Soviet non-compliance at appropriate levels;
—Assume the continuation of the strategic modernization program; and
—Provide the JCS professional military judgement of the benefits to the United States of a post-START world compared with a world without START. (S)
I do not believe that deployment of advanced strategic defenses need be considered in this specific briefing. (S)
—I suggest a briefing; rather than a formal study, because I hope the briefing will serve as a vehicle to stimulate discussion among the President’s senior advisors. I would appreciate it if the briefing could be available for presentation to the President by the end of July. (C)