Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

308. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, May 30, 1988, 9:15 a.m.–12:05 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Defense and Space, START

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • AMB Nitze
  • AMB Kampelman
  • AMB Hanmer
  • AMB Cooper
  • AMB Rowny
  • AS Lehman
  • ADM Howe
  • COL Linhard
  • Mr. Castillo
  • Dr. Timbie
  • Dr. Graham
  • Mr. Richardson
  • Mr. Korobovsky (Interpreter)
  • Mr. Stafford (Notetaker)

• USSR

  • MSU Akhromeyev
  • AMB Obukhov
  • AMB Kuznetsov
  • AMB Masterkov
  • AMB Karpov
  • GEN Chervov
  • GEN Lebedev
  • GEN Starodubov
  • CPT Beketov
  • Mr. Khromov
  • Mr. Batrushev (Int)

AKHROMEYEV stated that the Soviet side had worked on the documents provided the previous night by the U.S. side. It had singled out agreed elements. On ALCMs, it had focussed on distinguishability and counting rules. Reading from a paper that he subsequently passed to the U.S. side (Tab 1),² Akhromeyev said that the following was agreed:

1. All currently existing long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles will be considered to be nuclear-armed.

2. Future conventionally armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles will be distinguishable from nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles. (In this connection, the Soviet side was proceeding from the fact that nuclear and non-nuclear long-range ALCMs would have externally observable and functionally related differences.)

3. Heavy bombers equipped for nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles will be distinguishable from other heavy bombers. (In this connection, the Soviet side was proceeding from the fact that heavy bombers with long-range nuclear-armed ALCMs would have externally observable and functionally related differences from other heavy bombers.)

4. Any long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles which have been tested and deployed in a nuclear variant, including all existing such missiles, may be carried only by a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles.

5. Nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles will not be located at bases for heavy bombers not equipped for nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles.

The following were proposed additional elements:

6. The sides will base at separate locations their heavy bombers equipped for nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles and their heavy bombers not equipped for nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles. Visits of heavy bombers of each such category to airbases of the other categories will be subject to notification. The former heavy bombers converted into tanker aircraft, jamming aircraft and reconnaissance aircraft may be based at bases for heavy bombers equipped for both nuclear- and non-nuclear armed ALCMs.

7. All heavy bomber bases and all heavy bombers with their armaments are subject to inspection.

With regard to counting rules, the following were apparently agreed elements:

1. Heavy bombers not equipped for nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles, i.e., those equipped only for nuclear gravity bombs and SRAMs, will count as 1 delivery vehicle against the 1600 limit and 1 warhead against the 6000 limit.

2. Heavy bombers equipped for nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles will count as 1 delivery vehicle against the 1600 limit and an agreed number of warheads against the 6000 limit. (Included in Soviet paper but not read by Akhromeyev: The Soviet side was prepared not to count nuclear-armed long-range ALCMs against the 6000 limit in connection with agreement on counting rules for nuclear-armed long-range ALCMs on heavy bombers, based on the maximum number of ALCMs for which a heavy bomber of a specific type was equipped. In this connection, heavy bombers with non-nuclear long-range ALCMs would be counted against the 1600 limit.)

The following were proposed additional elements:

3. The number of warheads that will be attributed to each type of heavy bomber equipped for nuclear-armed long-range ALCMs will be the maximum number of ALCMs for which a heavy bomber of that type is equipped.

4. The number of ALCMs counted in START will be the sum of the numbers determined by multiplying the number of heavy bombers of each type equipped to carry nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles by the number of warheads attributed to that type. (Included in Soviet paper but not read by Akhromeyev: There will be no limit on the total inventory of nuclear-armed long-range ALCMs in the event agreement is reached on paragraph 3.)

5. The sides may convert, through agreed procedures, heavy bombers equipped for nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles to heavy bombers equipped only for nuclear gravity bombs and SRAMs.

6. The sides may convert a limited number of nuclear-armed heavy bombers, using agreed procedures, into reconnaissance aircraft, jamming aircraft, or tanker aircraft. These aircraft will not count against the 1600 or 6000 limits.

7. Each nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missile capable of a range in excess of 600 KM, installed on a heavy bomber, will count as one warhead against the 6000 limit. An increase above 600 KM in the range criterion for such missiles would render inoperative the agreement on counting nuclear munitions on heavy bombers equipped with nuclear bombs and short-range (under 600 km) ALCMs as one warhead against the 6000 limit. This would result in a setback of much that had been accomplished at the negotiations.

Having finished his paper, Akhromeyev added that he wanted to clarify that the Soviet side felt sure that the number of warheads for which each heavy bomber was equipped should be the basis for the ALCM count. According to available information, U.S. heavy bombers were equipped with more than 10 cruise missiles. For example, on May 16–17 of this year, the U.S. House of Representatives had looked at the U.S. approach to limits on strategic arms, and the Congressmen and experts had indicated that B–52s were being equipped with 12 ALCMs, B–1Bs (99 assets in all) were being equipped with 24 ALCMs, and future B–2s would be equipped with 12 ALCMs. Therefore, according to Akhromeyev’s count, all U.S. heavy bombers would be carrying 5688 ALCMs. The Soviet side would abide by the obligation not to exceed the 1100 limit while equipping its heavy bombers with long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles, and it would show those bombers, including the command systems, to the U.S. side. But it could not agree to allowing the U.S. to equip its heavy bombers with many more long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles.

He suggested the sides agree to a compromise. The Soviet side was prepared not to count long-range cruise missiles in a non-nuclear variant against the 6000 limit, if the U.S. side would agree to the counting rule of attributing warheads to heavy bombers according to the maximum number of ALCMs for which each type of heavy bomber was equipped. Heavy bombers carrying non-nuclear ALCMs should be counted against the 1600 limit. The Soviet side would not envisage limits for the total number of long-range ALCMs that were deployed, i.e. 1100, given agreement on the counting rule for nuclear-armed, long-range ALCMs, which would be limited by the number of cruise missiles for which heavy bombers were equipped.

Turning to mobile ICBMs, Akhromeyev said the two sides had much common ground in their proposals. Reading from another paper, which he subsequently passed to the U.S. side (Tab 2),³ he stated that the Soviet side proceeded from the following:

—Conversion of SLBMs into mobile ICBMs would be prohibited.

—For road-mobile ICBMs, the regime would be as follows:

—The missiles and their launchers would be confined to restricted areas specified in the MOU, of an agreed size. The Soviet side had in mind that a restricted area would be approximately 100 square kilometers. Each restricted area would contain a limited number of missiles and launchers.

—Within each restricted area, the number of structures unique to mobile ICBM launchers would be limited to no more than the number of missiles on launchers specified for that restricted area in the MOU. These structures would be described in the MOU.

—Each side would be required, at the request of the other, to carry out measures at the restricted areas to enhance observation by NTM. The number of such enhancement measures would be subject to agreement.

—Missiles and launchers would be allowed to depart restricted areas for routine movement, for example, for training, maintenance and testing. Such movements would be subject to prior notification and would involve no more than an agreed percentage of the total mobile force at any one time.

—Dispersal of mobile ICBMs and launchers from the restricted areas would be permitted. Such dispersals would be of two types:

—Exercise dispersal, which would be limited in duration and frequency.

—Operational dispersal, which would be for national security purposes; there would be no constraints on duration and frequency of operational dispersal.

—Notification of a dispersal would be provided within an agreed number of hours after the dispersal began and notification of return would be provided within an agreed number of hours after the dispersal ended. All dispersals would be assumed to be exercise dispersals, unless the dispersing party notified otherwise.

—One day before the planned end of an exercise dispersal, the dispersing side would have the option of returning forces to base or notifying that an operational dispersal was in progress. Upon such notification, the dispersing side would be required to state the reason for the operational dispersal.

—Upon return of a dispersed force to restricted areas, the other side would have the right to designate a percentage of the total deployed road-mobile ICBM force for enhanced NTM measures and/or on-site inspection:

(a) NTM enhancement measures would involve either moving launchers halfway out of their structures or opening the roofs of the structures, at the discretion of the inspected side;

(b) Post-dispersal OSI would be in addition to those inspections conducted under the quota for short-notice OSI. (It would be wise to examine the problem of proliferation of these non-quota inspections so as to be prepared for dispersal of other strategic offensive arms.)

—Non-deployed ICBMs of types that had been deployed in road-mobile launchers, and road-mobile launchers that did not contain ICBMs, would be restricted to facilities listed in the MOU or in transit between permitted facilities.

—The non-deployed ICBMs would be limited in number; except for an agreed number of missiles, they would have to be stored at least an agreed distance from any restricted area and from any facility at which road-mobile ICBM launchers were stored.

—The non-deployed road-mobile ICBM launchers would be limited in number; except for an agreed number of launchers, they would have to be stored at least an agreed distance from any restricted area and from any facility at which road-mobile ICBMs would be stored.

—A limited (agreed) number of dedicated mobile resupply vehicles for road-mobile ICBMs would be permitted for the purpose of repair.

—There would be a limit on the number of road-mobile training launchers; these training launchers would not be capable of launching ICBMs and would be distinguishable from commercial road-mobile vehicles and from road-mobile ICBM launchers by NTM.

—For rail-mobile ICBMs, the regime would be as follows:

—The missiles and their launchers would be confined to a limited number of rail garrisons, specified in the MOU. Each rail garrison would contain a limited number of missiles and launchers.

—Within each garrison, the number of unique shelters for trains would be limited to no more than the number of trains specified for that garrison in the MOU. No shelter would be capable of holding more cars than the number on a standard train.

—Each garrison would have no more than a specified number of rail entrances/exits.

—Missiles and launchers would be allowed to depart rail garrisons, subject to notification requirements and limitations comparable to those for departure of road-mobile ICBMs from restricted areas.

—While in the garrison, trains with missiles and their launchers would be maintained in one standard configuration, as specified in the MOU, except for changes for the purpose of routine maintenance and repair.

—During notified transit to declared maintenance and training facilities, and during routine movement for training, trains with missiles and their launchers would be allowed to vary from their standard configuration, provided that such variations were reported upon completion of the movement.

—There would be no restrictions on the configuration of trains during dispersals.

—Non-deployed rail-mobile missiles and launchers, resupply vehicles and training launchers would be limited in a manner similar to that for the comparable road-mobile items.

—(Included in Soviet paper but not read by Akhromeyev: The sides would have the right to implement continuous perimeter portal monitoring at all facilities producing mobile ICBM launchers and missiles for them.)

This concluded the Soviet mobile ICBMs paper. Akhromeyev added that the Soviet side had done its utmost to follow the U.S. proposal as closely as possible. There was much common ground, so he thought the sides should now address the number of warheads to be allowed on mobile ICBMs.

NITZE said the U.S. side had a few technical questions on ALCMs and mobile ICBMs.

LINHARD said there had been one point he did not understand in Akhromeyev’s presentation on mobiles. In discussing enhanced NTM measures after a dispersal, the Soviet side had suggested either having missiles halfway out of shelters or having roofs opened. Which side would choose between these options?

AKHROMEYEV replied that the choice would be made by the inspected side.

LINHARD noted that the U.S. side had proposed banning both conversion of SLBMs to mobile ICBMs and use of liquid-fueled mobiles. Was the Soviet dropping of reference to liquid-fueled mobiles intentional?

AKHROMEYEV responded that the Soviet proposal would ban conversion of SLBMs to mobile ICBMs. The type of fuel for a mobile ICBM was of no importance whatsoever. What difference did it make if a missile was liquid-fueled or solid-fueled? Why should the sides ostracize liquid-fueled ICBMs?

NITZE said he had a question regarding the ALCM issue. The Soviet side had used the phrase “functionally related, externally observable difference.” Would the Soviet side consider the difference between a B-52H and a B-52G to satisfy that criterion?

AKHROMEYEV replied that he did not think he could answer that question right away; the Soviet side should have a look at the aircraft.

In the long run, the sides would have to arrive at the same approach for each element of the triad. It would not be feasible if U.S. officials could visit each Soviet ICBM base to verify all missiles there, while Soviet officials could not verify U.S. heavy bombers and SLBM assets. The sides could not be guided by the opinion of Secretary Carlucci, and Akhromeyev would tell him that. Carlucci had said in an interview with Der Spiegel on May 2 that strict verification in the USSR was wonderful, whereas the same verification regarding the U.S. and its allies would require consideration of national security. This attitude denied the USSR the right to account for its national interests. The sides could not complete the negotiations if the U.S. side remained on this stance. The sides should inspect the heavy bombers of both sides the way they were going to inspect ballistic missiles.

NITZE responded that the experience of the sides in trying to negotiate arms control agreements had indicated that each type of weapon system required a unique kind of verification regime.

AKHROMEYEV said he agreed, but the approach should be the same. All assets should be subject to verification with the same degree of detail and the same scope of inspection. Of course, specific methods would differ with the type of weaponry.

NITZE replied that the sides needed to take account of the points important to both sides. He did not think they could adopt the philosophy that everything was the same. They did have to take account of the fact that weapons systems differed.

AKHROMEYEV again agreed, saying that there were specific features for each type of system, but this specificity argument should not be developed to the point where it killed any chance for verification at all. The sides had had very detailed discussions in INF about verifying IRMs and SRMs, both ground-based missiles. In these talks, verification should include SLBM assets and aviation assets.

NITZE asked if it was the Soviet intent to omit reference to the U.S. suggestions on tagging and PPM.

AKHROMEYEV responded that the Soviet side did not believe tagging could take the sides far, because the tags would not be identifiable by NTM. The Soviet side had a proposal for PPM, which it had inadvertently omitted; this proposal would be provided at the next meeting.

NITZE suggested that Akhromeyev proceed with the Soviet position on linkage.

Reading from a paper subsequently passed to the U.S. side (Tab 3),⁴ AKHROMEYEV stated the following:

1. The basic issue which had to be decided was the approach to the strategic offensive arms-ABM problem from the point of view of taking into account the objective interrelationship between strategic reductions and ABM limitations. For the USSR this was of fundamental importance. A 50 percent reduction of strategic offensive arms was possible only if the ABM Treaty was preserved as it was signed in 1972 and if there was non-withdrawal from it during an agreed period of time.

Proceeding from this formula, the Soviet side had included in the text of the START agreement a provision on the interrelationship between compliance with the ABM Treaty and compliance with the START Treaty. The U.S. side was attempting to resolve the questions of reducing strategic offensive arms and the questions connected with the ABM Treaty independently of each other.

At the negotiations, the U.S. side had proposed (on May 18, 1988) to exclude the Soviet formulation on the interrelationship from the draft Treaty on strategic offensive arms, removing in return its provision on the termination of the agreement on compliance with the ABM Treaty and of the ABM Treaty itself in case of violation of the agreement on strategic offensive arms. The Soviet side was against the artificial separation of organically interrelated problems. In 1972, the USSR and U.S. had indicated this interrelationship in the ABM Treaty.

In creating an ABM defense of the territory of a country, including a space echelon, a side would acquire the ability to deliver a first nuclear strike in the hope of doing so with impunity. Creation of an ABM defense of the territory of the country would invariably require not a reduction of strategic offensive arms, but rather their improvement and even an increase of their number. Negotiations on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms would become pointless. The deployment by both sides of an ABM defense of the territory of the country, including space systems, would not add to stability. On the contrary, the threat of war would increase.

2. With regard to the ABM Treaty, the basis for reaching a mutually acceptable agreement on compliance with the Treaty was the Washington formula codified at the Summit on December 10, and the agreement of the sides to implement this formula as a separate agreement with an attached protocol. The Soviet side proposed to have an agreed text of the agreement in strict conformity with the formulation in the Washington agreement and had proposed a corresponding draft at the negotiations of the delegations. Questions of verification, predictability of the development of the strategic situation and other necessary provisions should be included in the protocol to the agreement.

(Included in paper but not read by Akhromeyev: The U.S. side proposes to include provisions in it or to indicate understandings which change the meaning of this formula: about the right of withdrawing from the agreement and the ABM Treaty during the period of non-withdrawal; about the deployment of a large-scale ABM system immediately after the non-withdrawal period; about conducting any tests which are necessary, including tests in space, during the non-withdrawal period. These proposals do not correspond to the Washington agreement.)

The Soviet side was in favor of an obligation on non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty within an agreed period of time. Taking into consideration the position of the U.S. side, it had proposed compromise solutions of issues on which the sides had a difference and it had proposed a set of measures to prevent and resolve situations which would be considered by a party to be a threat to its supreme national interests:

1. Exchange of data related to work in the ABM area, meetings of experts, mutual visits to test ranges where final work (testing) was conducted in this area.

2. Exchange of information for the purpose of preventing and eliminating ambiguities from the point of view of complying with the obligations which the sides had adopted.

3. Verification of compliance with the obligations undertaken (including inspections at facilities about which the sides had a concern).

4. Immediate consultations to examine and resolve situations which, in the opinion of one of the sides, threatened its supreme interests. During the consultations the sides would use all available means to resolve situations on a mutually acceptable basis.

The Soviet side proceeded from the premise that after the end of the non-withdrawal period, the right of the sides to withdraw from the ABM Treaty would be restored and each of the sides, unless otherwise agreed, could determine its own course of action in accordance with the procedures provided for in the ABM Treaty. In order that such a possibility, provided for in the agreement on compliance with and non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, be legally binding after the end of the non-withdrawal period (i.e., the end of the period during which the agreement was in force), the Soviet side proposed that the sides make corresponding statements on such a right together with the signing of the agreement.

The question of testing during the period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty had been unequivocably resolved by the Washington formula on compliance with the ABM Treaty as it was signed in 1972.

The Soviet side agreed to continue discussing the question of testing “data sensors” in space, in order to determine the boundaries of permitted and prohibited activity under the ABM Treaty.

With regard to SLCMs, one of the main obstacles to completing work on the treaty on strategic offensive arms was the fact that the question of SLCMs had not been resolved. A solution had to be found and it could be found, since there was a basis for this—the Washington understanding of December 10, 1987, which indicated the obligations of the sides to set limits on the number of long-range nuclear-armed SLCMs and to search for mutually acceptable and effective measures to verify the implementation of these limits. Both sides had stated their desire to implement this obligation, including at the May meeting between FM Shevardnadze and Secretary Shultz in Geneva.

The U.S. side was aware of the specific proposals of the Soviet side both on the SLCM limits and on their verification. The Soviet side proposed having not more than 400 nuclear-armed SLCMs and not more than 600 non-nuclear-armed SLCMs. If such a solution was unacceptable to the U.S. side, the Soviet side was prepared for another version—to have an overall limit of 1,000 for nuclear and non-nuclear SLCMs. Within this limit, each side would determine the ratio between nuclear and non-nuclear SLCMs.

The Soviet side had also proposed a set of verification measures:

—Use of NTM, including remote monitoring at the discretion of the sides. The Soviet side had proposed to conduct a joint experiment of such verification;

—Inspection of surface ships and submarines of each side at their basing stations;

—Verification of production and arming of SLCMs (inspection on a permanent basis at SLCM production plants and at specially designated arming areas);

—Prohibition of loading of missiles onto submarines and surface ships outside of basing stations and on the high seas;

—Locating SLCMs on specific types of submarines and surface ships.

These proposals were in accordance with the Washington Summit understanding. They did not impinge on the security interests of either party and they formed a basis for reaching a mutually acceptable understanding.

The proposed solution of resolving the SLCM issue on the basis of unilateral declarations about SLCM production programs without any verification could not lead to an understanding.

At this point, Akhromeyev read the PPM proposal that he had omitted from his mobile ICBM presentation.

NITZE passed to the Soviet side the Russian-language versions of the U.S. papers on ALCMs and mobile ICBMs.

AKHROMEYEV thanked Nitze, and noted that it had taken the Soviet side all of the previous night to translate the English versions of the U.S. papers and prepare a response.

Turning to the U.S. position on Defense and Space, NITZE stated that the U.S. side wanted to see what could be accomplished over the next few days to add to the elements that were already agreed. The central elements were, of course, referred to in the Washington Summit Joint Statement, which both sides had agreed to “build on” in formulating an agreement. Since the Washington Summit, the sides had achieved some progress in building on the Joint Statement:

—They had agreed to include in a protocol, which would be an integral part of the agreement, predictability measures.

—The JDT of this protocol included the agreement on regular and reciprocal exchanges of information and visits, meetings of experts, and observation of tests.

—They had agreed to use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers for transmission of the information provided for in the protocol, and normal diplomatic channels to confirm plans and resolve disagreements.

—And they had agreed that the Defense and Space agreement would be a separate agreement.

In implementing the instructions to further build on this progress, the U.S. side proposed to focus the discussions on the form of the agreement, supreme interest rights, rights after the nonwithdrawal period, and the U.S. proposal that neither side object to the other’s space-based sensors. The U.S. side also wanted to concentrate on any other issue that the Soviet side felt was ripe for resolution.

On the form of the agreement, the sides had agreed at the Washington Summit that the Defense and Space agreement would have the legal status of a treaty. At that time, the Soviet position had been that the agreement should be a protocol to the START Treaty, so there had been a reason for using the neutral word “agreement” in the Joint Statement.

Since then, the sides had agreed to work toward a separate Defense and Space agreement; given the agreement that it would have the legal status of a treaty, the sides should call the separate agreement a treaty. This would clear up a number of brackets in the JDT, and would represent tangible progress from this Summit.

Another issue that seemed ripe for resolution was that associated with the standard right a sovereign nation had to protect its supreme interests. The U.S. side had made clear its views on the necessity of recognizing this right accorded both sides by international law, as the sides had done in all other arms control agreements between the two nations. And the U.S. side had explained why this meant it could not agree to the Soviet proposal for an “unconditional” nonwithdrawal commitment. Soviet negotiators had acknowledged that supreme interest rights were maintained in any agreement; the question then was just one of recording this point.

The Soviet proposal for consultations if there were concerns regarding threats to supreme interests did not go far enough; an agreed commitment to consultations was helpful, but the sides must recognize the right of each side to take appropriate action to protect its interests, should such consultations take place and fail to resolve the associated concerns.

The Soviet side had objected to the lengthy provision on withdrawal rights included in the US working paper, so the U.S. side had responded to that concern with a compromise proposal at the last Ministerial meeting and in Geneva. This compromise had incorporated the following elements:

—A standard supreme interests provision in the treaty.

—An agreed statement providing that international law rights were to be retained.

—An agreed statement clarifying that, notwithstanding the supreme interests provision, the sides would not exercise their rights under it on the grounds that the ABM Treaty restrictions on deployment and acquiring capability were, in and of themselves, extraordinary events jeopardizing supreme interests.

—Acceptance of Article I without the currently bracketed language.

—Elimination of the US-proposed provision relating to termination rights if there was a failure to reduce strategic offensive arms according to the START Treaty, in return for elimination of a Soviet-proposed provision in the START JDT that was its mirror image.

The U.S. side continued to believe that this compromise proposal offered the best solution, in a manner responsive to the concerns of both sides, to the disputes regarding Article I of the Defense and Space agreement.

The U.S. side had also proposed at the last Ministerial meeting a compromise package for resolving the issue of the rights of the sides after the nonwithdrawal period. This package was based on the Soviet proposal for a joint statement clarifying that the rights of the sides after the nonwithdrawal period to decide their course of action unless agreed otherwise, as embodied in the Washington Summit Joint Statement, would remain in force after the nonwithdrawal period.

The U.S. side had stated that, for this proposal to be of interest, such a statement would have to have the legal status of a treaty, as agreed in the Washington Summit Joint Statement. Furthermore, it would have to include a clarification that, if a side decided to deploy, it must provide 6 months’ notification, after which all ABM Treaty provisions would be considered terminated, unless the parties agreed otherwise. This notification provision would, in this event, supersede Article XV of the ABM Treaty.

U.S. negotiators in Geneva had provided a working paper suggesting how such a document might look as a protocol. As the U.S. side had said at the last meeting, if the Soviet side would accept the US formulation of Article III, either in a treaty of unlimited duration or a free-standing document with the same legal status, the U.S. side could then accept the Soviet formulation of Article II. If the sides could resolve this issue and that of supreme interest rights, they would have cleared up the major disputes that had prevented the completion of a conformed JDT; this would represent a significant and concrete result in the Defense and Space area from the Summit.

On activities during the period, the sides had to reach some understanding on what constituted “research, development and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty.” They were making progress in working on the protocol, and that would help. The U.S. side had noted in the past Soviet statements of concern that, by having a large number of test objects in space at one time, a side might actually have deployed a de facto system with some ABM capability. The U.S. side agreed that this should not occur and would be receptive to Soviet suggestions as to how the sides might utilize the predictability measures protocol to address this concern.

The U.S. side had also proposed that the sides agree not to object to each other’s space-based sensors. It believed the rationale was compelling: these satellite sensor systems were vitally important to both sides and to stability, and it was increasingly difficult to distinguish between the capabilities of various space-based sensor systems.

Trying to limit satellite sensors with some ABM capability while allowing the rest would pose an unsolvable verification problem, a headache both sides should want to avoid. The provision the U.S. side had in mind would state that neither Party would object, on the basis of the ABM Treaty, to the development, testing or deployment by the other Party of any space-based sensor, and that, accordingly, each Party could develop, test and deploy space-based sensors without restriction.

In the last meeting, the Soviet side had suggested that sensor testing in space be limited to those sensors that did not have the capability in technical terms for performing ABM missions. But this would create exactly the problem the U.S. side thought both sides would want to avoid—that of distinguishing which space-based sensors would have the capability to perform ABM missions, when in fact almost any space-based sensor could be of some use to an ABM system. To repeat, this would create an unsolvable verification problem and headaches that neither side wanted. Therefore, the sides should agree not to have disputes about space-based sensors, whatever their purpose. The U.S. side hoped the Soviet side would reconsider the U.S. proposal and join in putting this looming problem behind.

Turning to SLCMs, Nitze said the U.S. position could be summarized as follows:

—The Soviet-proposed SLCM verification regime would not allow a side reliably to detect and count nuclear SLCMs, and would cause unacceptable interference with operations, and exposure of sensitive facilities to intrusive inspection.

AKHROMEYEV interrupted to ask why a comparable regime was acceptable for ground-based ballistic missiles.

NITZE said the sides could come back to this question.

AKHROMEYEV argued that the sides should scrutinize in great detail the verification questions and the linkage of verification to different types of weapons. They could not speak openly with the mass media, but in these confidential talks they could get into details. He and Nitze had been present together at the last meeting of Gorbachev with Shultz. The two had talked in a very straightforward way. Shultz had said that U.S. sailors did not want verification. Akhromeyev had asked if that meant the U.S. did not want U.S. officials to interfere with Soviet operations, and the answer was no. The U.S. attitude was that the USSR could have no secrets from the U.S., that the U.S. was entitled to verify everything on Soviet territory, but the Soviet Union did not get a reciprocal right. This could not be accepted. Verification measures should be equally applicable to any type of strategic weapon. Otherwise, no matter how ardently the sides sought agreement, they would not succeed.

LEHMAN, referring to the Carlucci interview with Der Spiegel, said Carlucci had made precisely the point that one could not place demands on the USSR and not understand that the same demands would be made on the U.S. He had been making the point that the verification provisions would apply equally to the U.S. and USSR. But this was with full recognition that verification requirements and difficulties with regard to specific systems could be quite different. The measures the U.S. side had proposed for verification of ICBMs were the same for both sides. The measures it had proposed for SLBMs were the same for both sides. Similarly for heavy bombers. Carlucci had not been speaking to the Soviet people but rather to audiences in the West, to those saying that there should be tighter constraints on Soviet ICBMs than on U.S. ICBMs. That was the approach he had been criticizing.

AKHROMEYEV retorted that he had read Carlucci’s comments, and he did not think the sides should waste time discussing them. Carlucci had said that verification measures applied to the USSR were a wonderful thing, but those applied to the U.S. should not undercut national security.

Lehman was right in saying that verification measures for ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers were equal for both sides. But ICBMs of both sides would be verified thoroughly, while verification of the heavy bombers of both sides would not be that profound. There would be no verification at all of the SLCMs of either side. The problem was that the Soviet share of ICBMs in the mix of strategic arms was much larger than that for the U.S. The share of heavy bombers and SLCMs was larger for the U.S. That was the injustice. All strategic assets should be subject to the same degree and scope of verification. The Soviet side could not agree to anything else.

LEHMAN suggested that the Carlucci statement might have lost its irony in translation. But the intent was clear: For each type of system, the U.S. side had in mind that provisions that applied to the USSR would apply to the U.S. as well. The sides could discuss further the Soviet argument that differences in force structures might result in different levels of verification burdens, but he did not think this was at all self-evident, given the extensive verification proposals made by the U.S. side.

HOWE added that what was important was that there be the same level of effectiveness or result from each verification scheme, not necessarily the same measures, since the sides were looking at different systems with different problems. But the end result should be the same degree of confidence that the verification measures were effective. He noted that Akhromeyev had not mentioned SLBMs; the procedures almost agreed in that area were quite extensive and posed an equal burden on both sides. SLCMs, on the other hand, presented unique problems that perplexed the U.S. side in its attempt to find an effective verification scheme.

AKHROMEYEV rejoined that it was easier for him and Howe to talk as professionals. The Soviet side could not agree to determining the number of cruise missiles carried by heavy bombers as some number, e.g. 10, unless it was sure that that was the number for which the heavy bombers were actually equipped. It needed to scrutinize the heavy bombers themselves to make sure how many missiles they could carry, and to look at the aircraft control systems to make sure how many cruise missiles could be launched and guided by the heavy bombers. Unless the sides were well aware of these technical characteristics on both sides, it would be hard to agree.

This approach could also be applied to the SLCMs of both sides. Submarines should be inspected to see how many cruise missiles they could carry. Then the sides could agree on specific numbers for the missiles.

Everything was provided for in the case of ICBMs; there were no secrets. But it was a secret when the sides tried to deal with heavy bombers and submarines for cruise missiles. That was where the Soviet side saw injustice. President Reagan said to trust, but verify. The Soviet side agreed.

Akhromeyev asked how the sides should proceed at the next session.

NITZE suggested the sides pick up their current discussion. At some time, they would need to discuss their report to the Ministers.

AKHROMEYEV agreed. The sides could continue their discussion, but they might instruct some of their officials to get down to language, because some agreement on ALCMs and mobile ICBMs was taking shape. By 6:00 pm, these officials should be ready with something. In the meantime, the larger group could continue its discussions.

NITZE agreed, adding that the U.S. side had more questions on the Soviet ALCM and mobile ICBM positions. In addition, he wanted to deal with compliance.

AKHROMEYEV said that, at the next meeting, the Soviet side would pass over the NST portion of its draft Joint Statement.

NITZE replied that the U.S. side would also have a draft; the sides could establish a subgroup to work on these drafts. There was indeed greater convergence now between the positions of the sides.

AKHROMEYEV agreed, and said the subgroup could address that.

The meeting adjourned at 12:05 pm, with the next session scheduled for 3:00 pm.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memorandum of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow Summit 5/29–6/1, 1988. Secret. The meeting took place in the Foreign Ministry Guest House.
2. Attached but not printed is an undated paper, marked “Official Translation” and titled “Working Paper of the Soviet Side on ALCMs.”
3. Attached but not printed is an undated paper, marked “Official Translation” and titled “Mobile ICBM Verification Provisions.”
4. Attached but not printed is an undated paper, “On the Interconnection Between Strategic Offensive Arms and ABM.”