278. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Carlucci to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell)1
SUBJECT
- The PFIAB Letter on START (U)
(S) The President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board’s (PFIAB) letter2 is an excellent compendium of many of the very difficult issues we must resolve as we are completing our draft START agreement.
(S) The PFIAB’s concern about the limitations in our monitoring capabilities is widely shared, including by the Senate. No one would quarrel with its judgment that there will be greater incentive and probably opportunity for the Soviets to cheat under a START agreement than under the INF Treaty. It is not surprising that we are hearing admonitions from Senators on both sides of the aisle that we not move hastily on START.
(S) The PFIAB is correct in stating that we need to consider carefully the implications of the counting rules outlined in the December U.S./Soviet Joint Summit Statement. These rules count several Soviet systems as carrying fewer warheads than they are actually capable of carrying. The Board is concerned that the Soviet Union—undetected by NTM and unconstrained by whatever on-site inspection scheme might have previously applied—could easily and rapidly “upload” these systems in time of crises or war. This would give them about 50 percent more than the permitted warheads and a potentially significant military and political advantage.
(S) The Board’s concern about the RV breakout is borne out by the latest NIE and the assessment of Larry Gershwin, the National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Forces. In his January memorandum to SACG principals,3 Dr. Gershwin noted that “by exploiting the RV counting rule for ballistic missiles, the Soviets could field 7,800 warheads and by additionally exploiting an ALCM counting rule of six per aircraft they could deploy 8,800 warheads under a limit of 6,000 accountable warheads.” He also said that “It is also important to note that although highly intrusive inspection regimes, such as on-demand or short-notice inspections of deployed weapons (even pulling the shrouds and counting RVs) would reduce the chances of the Soviets [Page 1243] actually deploying prohibited warheads in peacetime, such measures could not prevent the Soviets from doing so in a crisis or war. The potential for such an increase over the number of permitted warheads is, in my view, a significant issue.” (Emphasis in original.)
(S) The PFIAB’s concern about the implications of permitting mobile ICBMs is also well founded. The latest NIE supports the Board’s view that we cannot confidently monitor a numerical limit on mobiles on the basis of NTM alone. The PFIAB also states that on-site inspection “cannot overcome these uncertainties,” and notes that “there are limits to the compliance gains that can be hoped for from any inspection regime,” as well as security and counterintelligence interests that require protection. The Intelligence Community has concluded that we need unlimited suspect site inspection to have a chance of detecting covert mobiles. But even such a regime will not be able to eliminate the risk of undetected Soviet cheating.
(S) The START work program requires us to develop suspect site inspection schemes and come to grips with mobiles over the next several weeks. I fully agree with the Board that the details must be carefully worked out and the risks carefully weighed before we table our SSI proposal and resolve the mobile issue.
(S) I also agree with the PFIAB’s suggestion that, as part of the USG’s risk assessment of our completed START agreement, we must consider the threat posed by Soviet strategic air and ballistic missile defenses and ASW capabilities against reduced U.S. strategic forces, including the possible technological advances in these capabilities.
(S) At the conclusion of its letter, the PFIAB raises a number of what might be called “big picture” questions that bear, in one way or another, on whether our draft START Treaty will meet the President’s criteria of deep, equitable, stabilizing, and effectively verifiable reductions. The Board suggests that the Joint Chiefs and I prepare a detailed analysis of the net effect on the strategic balance under the possible breakout and cheating scenarios mentioned above. In this connection, the Board asks for an evaluation of the post-START U.S. deterrent forces. To predetermine the exact post-START U.S. force prior to the completion of a START agreement would be counter-productive as it might be interpreted as the “official” or “desired” force structure. An analysis of generic U.S. force capabilities allowed under the treaty could be accomplished without prejudicing our post-START force structure decisions.
(S) Our START Work Program does not expressly call for this kind of comprehensive analysis, but I think all would agree that it should be done before the completion of our draft Treaty. Right now the Program calls for resolving issues and tabling the relevant Treaty text sequentially so that as much progress can be made in the negotiations [Page 1244] as possible. The “big picture” questions raised by the PFIAB will come into focus when we resolve the suspect site and mobiles issues in the latter stages of the Work Program. I believe it is imperative that we have the necessary analyses completed before we table the critical final portions of our Treaty text.
- Source: Reagan Library, System IV Files, 1988 SYS IV RWR INT 40051-40073. Secret.↩
- See Document 265.↩
- Not found.↩