Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

255. Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts¹

Washington, December 11, 1987, 0617Z

384489. Subject: Joint U.S.-Soviet Summit Statement.

1. Transmitted below is the joint statement issued by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev on December 10, 1987 at the conclusion of the General Secretary’s visit to the United States (December 7–10). Posts should draw on it fully in briefing host governments and public audiences. Additional points for briefing the media and host governments will be transmitted septels.

2. Begin text of joint statement.

Ronald W. Reagan, President of the United States of America, and Mikhail S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, met in Washington on December 7–10, 1987.

Attending the meeting on the U.S. side were Vice President George Bush; Secretary of State George P. Shultz; Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci; Chief of Staff Howard H. Baker, Jr.; Acting Assistant to the President Lieutenant General Colin L. Powell; Counselor of the Department of State Ambassador Max M. Kampelman; Ambassador-at-Large and Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters Paul H. Nitze; Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters Ambassador Edward T. Rowny; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr.; Ambassador of the U.S. to the USSR Jack F. Matlock; and Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Rozanne L. Ridgway.

Attending on the Soviet side were member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Eduard A. Shevardnadze; member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Alexander N. Yakovlev; Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Anatoly F. Dobrynin; Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Vladimir M. Kamentsev; Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergei F. Akhromeev; Assistant to the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Anatoly S. Chernyaev; Head of the General Department of the CPSU Central Committee Valeriy I. Boldin; Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh; Ambassador of the USSR to the United States of America Yuri V. Dubinin; Member of the Collegium of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Victor P. Karpov; and Ambassador-at-Large Aleksey A. Obukhov.

During the course of the official visit, which had been agreed during the two leaders’ November 1985 meeting in Geneva, the President and the General Secretary held comprehensive and detailed discussions on the full range of issues between the two countries, including arms reductions, human rights and humanitarian issues, settlement of regional conflicts, and bilateral relations. The talks were candid and constructive, reflecting both the continuing differences between the two sides, and their understanding that these differences are not insurmountable obstacles to progress in areas of mutual interest.

They reaffirmed their strong commitment to a vigorous dialogue encompassing the whole of the relationship.

The leaders reviewed progress to date in fulfilling the broad agenda they agreed at Geneva and advanced at Reykjavik they took particular satisfaction in the conclusion over agreements in some areas of this agenda.

The President and the General Secretary affirmed the fundamental importance of their meetings in Geneva and Reykjavik, which laid the basis for concrete steps in a process intended to improve strategic stability and reduce the risk of conflict. They will continue to be guided by their solemn conviction that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. They are determined to prevent any war between the United States and the Soviet Union, whether nuclear or conventional. They will not seek to achieve military superiority.

The two leaders recognized the special responsibility of the United States and the Soviet Union to search for realistic ways to prevent confrontation and to promote a more sustainable and stable relationship between their countries. To this end, they agreed to intensify dialogue and to encourage emerging trends toward constructive cooperation in all areas of their relations. They are convinced that in so doing they will also contribute, with other nations, to the building of a safer world as humanity enters the third millennium.

I. Arms Control

The two leaders signed the treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles. This treaty is historic both for its objective—the complete elimination of an entire class of U.S. and Soviet Nuclear arms—and for the innovative character and scope of its verification provisions. This mutual accomplishment makes a vital contribution to greater stability.

Nuclear and Space Talks

The President and the General Secretary discussed the negotiations on reductions in strategic offensive arms. They noted the considerable progress which has been made toward conclusion of a treaty implementing the principle of 50-percent reductions. They agreed to instruct their negotiators in Geneva to work toward the completion of the treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms and all integral documents at the earliest possible date, preferably in time for signature of the treaty during the next meeting of leaders of state in the first half of 1988. Recognizing that areas of agreement and disagreement are recorded in detail in the joint draft treaty text, they agreed to instruct their negotiators to accelerate resolution of issues within the joint draft treaty text including early agreement on provisions for effective verification.

In so doing, the negotiators should build upon the agreements on 50-percent reductions achieved at Reykjavik as subsequently developed and now reflected in the agreed portions of the joint draft START Treaty text being developed in Geneva, including agreement on ceilings of no more than 1600 strategic offensive delivery systems, 6000 warheads, 1540 warheads on 154 heavy missiles; the agreed rule of account for heavy bombers and their nuclear armament; and an agreement that as a result of the reductions the aggregate throw-weight of the Soviet Union’s ICBMs and SLBMs will be reduced to a level approximately 50-percent below the existing level, and this level will not be exceeded by either side. Such an agreement will be recorded in a mutually satisfactory manner.

As priority tasks, they should focus on the following issues:

(A) The additional steps necessary to ensure that the reductions enhance strategic stability. This will include a ceiling of 4900 on the aggregate number of ICBM plus SLBM warheads within the 6000 total.

(B) The counting rules governing the number of long-range, nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) to be attributed to each type of heavy bomber. The delegations shall define concrete rules in this area.

(C) The counting rules with respect to existing ballistic missiles. The sides proceed from the assumption that existing types of ballistic missiles are deployed with the following numbers of warheads. In the United States: Peacekeeper (MX):10, Minuteman III:3, Minuteman II:1, Trident I:8, Trident II:8, Poseidon:10. In the Soviet Union: SS–17:4, SS–19:6, SS–18:10, SS–24:10, SS–25:1, SS–11:1, SS–13:1, SS–N–6:1, SS–N–8:1, SS–N–17:1, SS–N–18:7, SS–N–20:10 and SS–N–23:4. Procedures will be developed that enable verification of the number of warheads on deployed ballistic missiles of each specific type. In the event either side changes the number of warheads declared for a type of deployed ballistic missile, the sides shall notify each other in advance. There shall also be agreement on how to account for warheads on future types of ballistic missiles covered by the treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms.

(D) The sides shall find a mutually acceptable solution to the question of limiting the deployment of long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs. Such limitations will not involve counting long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs within the 6000 warhead and 1600 strategic offensive delivery systems limits. The sides committed themselves to establish ceilings on such missiles, and to seek mutually acceptable and effective methods of verification of such limitations, which could include the employment of national technical means, cooperative measures and on-site inspection.

(E) Building upon the provisions of the treaty on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, the measures by which the provisions of the treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms can be verified will, at a minimum, include:

1. Data exchanges, to include declarations by each side of the number and location of weapon systems limited by the treaty and of facilities at which such systems are located and appropriate notifications. These facilities will include locations and facilities for production and final assembly, storage, testing, and deployment of systems covered by this treaty. Such declarations will be exchanged between the sides before the treaty is signed and updated periodically after entry into force.

2. Baseline inspection to verify the accuracy of these declarations promptly after entry into force of the treaty.

3. On-site observation of the elimination of strategic systems necessary to achieve the agreed limits.

4. Continuous on-site monitoring of the perimeter and portals of critical production and support facilities to confirm the output of these facilities.

5. Short-notice on-site inspection of:

(I) Declared locations during the process of reducing to agreed limits;

(II) Locations where systems covered by this treaty remain after achieving the agreed limits; and

(III) Locations where such systems have been located (formerly declared facilities).

6. The right to implement, in accordance with agreed-upon procedures, short-notice inspections at locations where either side considers covert deployment, production, storage or repair of strategic offensive arms could be occurring.

7. Provisions prohibiting the use of concealment or other activities which impede verification by national technical means. Such provisions would include a ban on telemetry encryption and would allow for full access to all telemetric information broadcast during missile flight.

8. Measures designed to enhance observation of activities related to reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms by national technical means. These would include open displays of treaty-limited items at missile bases, bomber bases, and submarine ports at locations and times chosen by the inspecting party.

Taking into account the preparation of the treaty on strategic offensive arms, the leaders of the two countries also instructed their delegations in Geneva to work out an agreement that would commit the sides to observe the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development, and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, for a specified period of time. Intensive discussions of strategic stability shall begin not later than three years before the end of the specified period, after which, in the event the sides have not agreed otherwise, each side will be free to decide its course of action. Such an agreement must have the same legal status as the treaty on strategic offensive arms, the ABM Treaty, and other similar, legally binding agreements. This agreement will be recorded in a mutually satisfactory manner. Therefore, they direct their delegations to address these issues on a priority basis.

The sides shall discuss ways to ensure predictability in the development of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship under conditions of strategic stability, to reduce the risk of nuclear war.

[Omitted here is a discussion not related to START.]

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D871015–0592. Unclassified; Immediate. Also sent Immediate to Moscow, Leningrad, and Kabul. Sent Priority to Baghdad, Malabo, Port Au Prince, and Beirut. Drafted in the White House; cleared by Parris and Burton and in S/S-O and S/S; approved in S/S.