Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

253. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 10, 1987, 11:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Marshall Akhromeyev
• Ambassador Karpov
• Ambassador Nitze
• Ambassador Kampelman
• Ambassador Lehman
• Colonel Linhard
• (Later joined by Secretary Shultz
• Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
• Secretary of Defense Carlucci
• Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Powell)

Akhromeyev began by saying he would like to present a brief report. Mr. Karpov and Akhromeyev have been asked by Gorbachev to meet with the U.S. Working Group to present the Soviet ideas with respect to the text² that was produced by the Working Group and clarified by a conversation between Shultz and Shevardnadze³ in the presence of Karpov and Nitze. He proposed to first present their suggestions and then to discuss them. After discussion it would be up to the U.S. side what to do with the General Secretary’s wishes which Akhromeyev was conveying to us.

Akhromeyev had no comments on page 1. He wished to address the suggestions on pages 2 and 3 together. There were brackets around “nuclear-armed” in paragraph (B) on ALCMs. He suggested we remove the brackets. At the same time he proposed to remove the brackets in paragraph (D) on page 3 concerning SLCMs. He summarized the proposal as: he was prepared to remove the brackets on page 2 if the U.S. was prepared to remove the brackets on page 3.

On page 4 he had no comments. On page 5, paragraph 9 concerned the ABM Treaty. He suggested reducing the text to “Taking into account the preparation of the Treaty on strategic offensive arms, the leaders also instructed their delegations in Geneva to work out an agreement which would commit the sides to observe the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, for a specified period of time.” He proposed a second change later in the paragraph which he withdrew when it became clear it was redundant with the words “after which” in the U.S. text.

He concluded that these are the suggestions of Gorbachev. In the START text there were two brackets. His suggestion was to remove both brackets, from “nuclear-armed” in the ALCM section and from the words “to establish ceilings on such missiles on certain types of submarines and surface ships, and” in the SLCM section. In paragraph 9 the words “while conducting their research, development and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty” and “in order to deploy defensive systems currently prohibited by the ABM Treaty” would be deleted.

Linhard said he would like to ask a question about the START material. He would like to understand as precisely as possible the concern on SLCMs. The bracketed language reads “to establish ceilings on such missiles on certain types of submarines and surface ships.” As we talked yesterday, your most fundamental concern was captured in the phrase “to establish ceilings on such missiles.” Is that correct?

Akhromeyev responded “Not really.” There were two concerns. Linhard was right that we want to establish ceilings on the number of SLCMs on submarines and surface ships. We propose 400, you do not agree, and we have to find a number that you agree with. The second concern is verification. If there were no constraints on the classes of submarines and surface ships carrying SLCMs, they could be spread all over very broadly. This would affect all ships, all the Navies, and would not be good. If only certain classes carried SLCMs, there would be no basis to verify all ships. Narrowing down the scope of deployment would narrow down the basis of verification.

Nitze said that as you explain your concern, you say your concern about types of submarines and ships is part of verification. Would it not therefore be adequate if we put into the text the first words now in brackets, and go on to seek mutually acceptable and effective methods of verification.

Akhromeyev said let us consider paragraph 9, and come back later to this question. Linhard asked for a 5-minute break.

After the break, Nitze said let us begin with paragraph 9. We would be prepared to drop the language in the second bracket if you will drop your brackets around the language “while conducting their research, development and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty.” Let me go on to the other points. On SLCMs we propose to remove the brackets from the words “to establish ceilings on such missiles” and strike the balance of the bracketed words. He expected the Soviets would drop the bracket on “nuclear-armed.” Finally, Nitze said this package was acceptable if we had a reference to 4800 in paragraph (A) on the ballistic missile warhead sublimit.

Akhromeyev objected that para. (A) has already been agreed upon. He was prepared to report to the General Secretary this U.S. idea but first wished to consult with his colleague.

After the break Akhromeyev said he took note of our suggestion with respect to paragraph (D) which speaks of certain types of submarines and surface ships. He also takes note of the proposal to strike the brackets in paragraph (B) on ALCMs. And of course he agrees to strike the second bracketed portion of paragraph 9. In paragraph (A) the sides established a sublimit within the 6000 warhead total, and we could set a sublimit of 5000 or 4900. In paragraph 9 what we suggest is to delete both the phrase beginning “while conducting their research . . .” as well as the phrase beginning “in order to deploy . . . .”

Nitze responded we cannot agree to that. We have gone as far as we can go. We agreed to drop the second bracket in paragraph 9 in return for retaining the language in the first bracket. How should we report to our leaders?

Linhard said the first bracket contained language you have seen before at Reykjavik and since. The only way we can accept “observe the ABM Treaty” is with the following phrase: “while conducting their research, development and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty.”

Akhromeyev said he too cannot agree. He could not agree to “while conducting their research, development and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty.” So if this is the end, there are two trade-offs. There is the warhead proposal for para. (A) and the paragraph 9 proposal. You can report to Shultz or the President. It is up to them to decide what to do next.

Linhard said he wished to confirm that we understand the situation. The phrase “while conducting their research, development and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty” was bracketed by the Soviet side. He also sought confirmation that the SLCM language proposed by Amb. Nitze was acceptable.

Akhromeyev replied that we came here with certain deadlines and instructions. As this conversation continues, his instructions change. He had assumed a certain responsibility. He would need to obtain either approval from higher authority or reproach for lack of discipline.

Kampelman said it was the same on our side.

Akhromeyev said we could report back. We could set in subpara. (A) a sublimit of 5000 or 4900 warheads, in exchange for deleting the phrase in paragraph 9 “while conducting their research, development and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty.” But then we would also report that we could delete brackets in paragraph (B) and delete proposed language that specifies certain classes of submarines and surface ships on which SLCMs can be deployed.

Linhard said there was one problem. There was no way the U.S. would agree to some level other than 4800 in return for sacrificing a point of principle. You have said in the past that diplomatic matters are slow, but we shouldn’t waste time. You came in with brackets and we tried to resolve the problem with our suggestions.

Akhromeyev said he had given the general view of the General Secretary. If he decides to give further instructions to Shevardnadze, that was up to him.

Kampelman drew attention to the heading of the portion of the Joint Statement we are dealing with, which read “START.” He asked what the heading of the Soviet text was. Karpov responded their language also says strategic arms reductions. Kampelman said that what we have called paragraph 9 does not really concern START. We should change the heading to “Nuclear and Space Talks.” Akhromeyev agreed that instead of START we could label this section talks on nuclear and space arms.

Nitze proposed to address the issues again. Let us drop the 4900 or 5000 and concentrate on paragraph 9. He saw no reason why we couldn’t agree that you remove brackets around “nuclear-armed” and we agree to the first part of the SLCM language. This will simplify the issue for the Ministers. The issues to concentrate on are the brackets in paragraph 9.

Akhromeyev said to forget that we discussed paragraph (A). He said he had experience with dealing with Ambassador Nitze and noted he had put forth this proposition only in the context of deleting both phrases in paragraph 9. We have not made a proposal. We have forgotten that. As for the brackets on page 3, we together agree that in paragraph (D) we meet your request for removing the phrase on certain types of submarines and ships, leaving “to establish ceilings on such missiles.” On paragraph 9, you delete what was in brackets. There is only one unresolved issue in the entire text, the phrase “while conducting their research, development and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty.”

Nitze said you have misunderstood me. We would remove language in the second brackets only if you agree to include “while conducting their research, development and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty.”

Akhromeyev said he suggested something only to simplify matters for our leadership. The Ministers, President and General Secretary can decide.

Linhard said he can understand why you have made this proposal. We have also made a proposal. Last night, “nuclear-armed” was not bracketed at all. You were also prepared to accept “while conducting their research, development and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty.” We are prepared to remove the language in the second brackets, but there is no way we can say, “observe the ABM Treaty” without the phrase “while conducting their research, development and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty.” The leaders understand this.

Akhromeyev said he understood, that this was a repetition of Reykjavik. The significance of this phrase is understood by them and by us. Only the President and the General Secretary can decide. We can refer the proposal as formulated by the Soviet side at the beginning of this meeting, this conversation can be forgotten. Or mutually remove everything else and retain only this phrase in brackets and let the leaders decide.

Nitze said we should retain both brackets in paragraph 9. We should consider as agreed everything except paragraph 9. There we have two brackets, yours and ours.

Akhromeyev said he had no objections. We can remove everything else. Nothing in (A), the formulations we have discussed for (B) and (D), two brackets in 9. It is up to the leaders to decide.

Nitze said he assumes you will give us the numbers missing for SLBM warheads. Akhromeyev replied that if there is agreement on paragraph 9, they will give the numbers immediately. If there is no agreement, there will be no text, and they would make the numbers available in Geneva at a future date.

Linhard summarized the situation as follows: the title would be changed from “START” to “Nuclear and Space Talks,” no change to paragraph (A), the brackets removed from paragraph (B), “to establish ceilings on such missiles” would be retained in paragraph (D), assuming we have agreement on numbers of SLBM warheads, and two brackets are at issue in paragraph 9. (At this point, Linhard left to get the Ministers.)

Kampelman asked Akhromeyev if there is a way to get our START people in Geneva to focus on verification. There was much to do on that subject. Akhromeyev said we would need to rethink what is included in the brackets. He was referring to testing within the framework of the ABM Treaty. Without this there would be no headway in Geneva, trifles only. 4-½ years have passed since SDI was announced. Now this problem has turned out to be the principal and paramount problem. If we do not resolve the problem of testing ABM components in space, this exposes a threat to USSR security. No more and no less. He was not telling us this for us to convince him it won’t come to pass. He simply wanted to express the importance of testing. He had talked with Crowe, not on this but on the need for US and Soviet professional military people to meet and talk. Kampelman asked how did he respond. Akhromeyev said Crowe outlined his position and he outlined his. But returning to testing, a wall has emerged between the US and the USSR. This wall must be taken down. How, he personally does not know. Absolutely nothing has been done on this in Geneva.

(At this point, Shevardnadze, Shultz, Carlucci and Powell joined the meeting.)

Shultz began: Mr. Foreign Minister, as I understand the situation, subject to all things being agreed, language on strategic arms has been worked out. We are not agreed on defense and space language. You have bracketed “while conducting their research, development and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty.” You have also bracketed “in order to deploy defensive systems currently prohibited by the ABM Treaty.” I must say we are astounded. Because the first language has been there for a very long time, and until this morning had been agreed. For us it is essential, because we believe in it, and if we were to take a START Treaty to the Senate with terms that ended the SDI program, there is not the slightest chance it would be ratified. This is necessary language. Until this morning it wasn’t bracketed by you.

Shevardnadze said he understood about your concerns regarding retaining the second part. If you want to retain the second part, it is necessary to add “as it was signed and ratified.” If this is not satisfactory, then we should delete the language in both brackets. (He read the text with both bracketed portions deleted.) We are laying the groundwork, establishing fundamental principles. There is much work to be done in Geneva. Although I had another view when I was working with you, when I worked with specialists and experts we found we could not agree. We should confine ourselves to “observe the ABM Treaty.” This would simplify the problem. Otherwise there can be no instructions. If we insert “as it was signed and ratified,” then we would also be able to retain the second part of paragraph 9.

Shultz said he had a different suggestion. We were willing to drop “in order to deploy defensive systems currently prohibited by the ABM Treaty” on the understanding you are willing to drop your other brackets. So it would read “commit the sides to observe the ABM Treaty, while conducting their research, development and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, for a specified period of time.”

Shevardnadze said he agreed. We can restore it, but we can add the elementary requirement that the Treaty is as it was signed and ratified. This does not mean we cannot continue to argue. We are familiar with your approach.

Shultz replied that as you know, there is an internal debate about the ABM Treaty. This is a confusing debate. It is part substance and part Senate prerogatives. We are fairly well along in resolving this question. Such language would involve the Senate. We are prepared to accept “as it was signed” but it would be better to just refer to the ABM Treaty. Shevardnadze said this was just elementary.

Shultz said we were in the middle of a political controversy. We don’t want to inject this agreement into it. Shevardnadze replied why do you think that we do not have debates. I often must debate with Marshall Akhromeyev. Shultz noted that Marshall Akhromeyev shouldn’t want to inject himself into the politics of the Senate. Akhromeyev said all he thinks about is the security of the USSR.

Carlucci said that this is going to play on our internal debate, that you are making a mistake. But I will make a proposal. We will put that language in, if you settle for a 4900 sublimit.

Akhromeyev said Mr. Nitze and he had agreed they would forget that subject. That would be a long conversation.

Carlucci said we accept your “as it was signed and ratified” language after “the ABM Treaty,” in return for 4900. Akhromeyev explained to Shevardnadze that what has just been said calls for further clarification. He had outlined Gorbachev’s suggestions. He had gone on to assume responsibility to see what could be done, and did not know whether he would be punished or approved. In paragraph (A) he had suggested a sublimit of 4900 to 5000, and in paragraph 9 all bracketed words would be deleted. This approach was not agreed and he asked that it be forgotten. Now Carlucci was repeating it. If paragraph 9 would be adopted as it is: “commit the sides to observe the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, for a specified period of time,” then he would be ready to give his head to be cut off and propose that this be accepted.

Shultz said we will take the Akhromeyev language precisely as you read it off.

Akhromeyev asked “and add 4900?” Shultz replied “and add 4900.” Shevardnadze said he will report this to his leader. Shultz said exactly as read out.

Carlucci continued that yesterday the General Secretary said: “If the U.S. wanted to reduce strategic arms, it would have to accept a 10-year period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. At the end of that period, the U.S. could decide what it would do. The Soviet side could accept that, although it was definitely against SDI.” Now we have this in paragraph 9, “each side will be free to decide its course of action.” We want to make sure you understand, that means either side has the right to deploy. Otherwise, the phrase is meaningless. Akhromeyev replied that the Secretary of State had said that if we put 4900 in paragraph (A), the language in paragraph 9 was acceptable word for word as he had read it.

Carlucci said all he wanted to do was ensure we understood what that language means. The Marshall was not in the room when Gorbachev used the phrase: “the U.S. could decide what it would do.”⁴ He went on to talk about what their response would be to US deployment, so he was talking about the right to deploy. Now we have this language in the Joint Statement, “each side will be free to decide its course of action.” We understand that to mean the right to deploy.

Shevardnadze said that is exactly what the General Secretary had said. The context was in the two or three years from the end of the period there would be discussions. The sides could agree to adhere to the Treaty, because it was of unlimited duration. If there was no agreement, either side could take any course of action. Akhromeyev said the next phrase of the text responds to the concerns you have raised.

(At this point the Ministers departed to report to the leaders.)

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Washington Summit. Secret. Drafted by Timbie. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room of the White House.
2. See Attachment, Document 250.
3. See Document 252.
4. See Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 112.