25. Paper Prepared in the Soviet Foreign Ministry1

The letter of L.I. Brezhnev to President Ronald Reagan2 states the position of principle held by the Soviet Union with regard to the negotiations on limitation and reduction of strategic arms.

Having in mind what was said by the Secretary of State in the conversation with the Soviet ambassador on May 7, 19823 we would like to present some additional considerations on the substance as well as on the organizational aspects of the matter.

As should be clear from L.I. Brezhnev’s letter, the Soviet side cannot agree with the assertion that the U.S. proposals on the substance of the problem of limitation and reduction of strategic arms, as formulated in the President’s speech of May 9,4 are of a realistic nature and that they are feasable and suitable as a subject of negotiations.

We gather a quite definite impression, and so do others, that the administration is approaching the negotiations with a clearly unacceptable, one-sided position. Although it must be understood that to declare a slogan of “radical” reductions is not enough, what is required is such a basis for the negotiations which would ensure achieving lower levels of opposing nuclear forces—and this is precisely what we stand for—but without upsetting the existing balance, without disrupting the strategic stability. In other words the sides must be strictly guided by the principle of equality and equal security, and must take into account the interests of each other.

We are convinced that the interests of both sides would be served if from the very beginning the negotiations were set on the right track, if they opened a realistic way for reaching a mutually acceptable agreement. And it would be erroneous to believe that one side were more interested than the other in having such an agreement. The issues involved here are too great and sensitive for that. Their resolution will determine not only the state of future Soviet-American relations but [Page 92] also the prospects of preserving peace throughout the world. We are for the negotiations to be conducted in a serious manner and not to become a cover for continuing the policy of the arms race.

We are prepared to agree on the organizational aspects of the Soviet-American negotiations. We find Geneva acceptable as the venue for such negotiations. We propose to begin them on June 29, 1982.

The USSR delegation will be led by Ambassador V.P. Karpov.

As to how these negotiations should be referred to, we propose to call them “negotiations on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms”. This reflects in a more complete and correct way the subject of the negotiations since they will deal not only with quantitative reductions but qualitative limitations as well.

We propose that the following draft text of a joint statement on the beginning of the negotiations be published on June 1, 1982:

“On the Soviet-American negotiations.

In the course of the exchange of views between the USSR and the USA the question of holding negotiations on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms was discussed.

It was agreed that the specially designated delegations of the USSR and the USA will begin such negotiations on June 29, 1982 in Geneva. The Soviet delegation will be led by Ambassador V.P. Karpov, the U.S. delegation will be led by . . .”

It is also necessary to agree to inform the Swiss authorities on the forthcoming negotiations one or two days prior to the announcement thereof, as was done on similar occasions in the past.

  1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretary, S/S–I Records: Walter Stoessel Files, Lot 82D307, Memoranda of Conversation. Secret. A handwritten note in the upper right–hand corner reads: “From Soviet Charge Bessmertnykh to Stoessel, 5/25/82.” For a record of the conversation for the meeting at which Bessmertnykh stressed this document, see Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981–January 1983, Document 175.
  2. Brezhnev’s May 20 letter to Reagan is printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981–January 1983, Document 171.
  3. See Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981–January 1983, Document 167.
  4. See Document 17.