224. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci) to President Reagan1
SUBJECT
- Non-deployed Missiles in START
In September 1982 you signed NSDD–53,2 establishing the position that in START we should require a numerical limit be applied to the total number of non-deployed ballistic missiles in the inventories of both sides. Non-deployed missiles above the allowed limit would have to be dismantled and destroyed under agreed procedures.
While this has been our formal position for five years, we have never established exactly what such numerical constraints would consist of. Our current draft treaty says non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs shall be constrained using criteria to be agreed. The current U.S. draft treaty does contain a number of non-numerical constraints relevant to non-deployed missiles, such as limits on the number of ICBMs and SLBMs at test ranges or restriction on locations where [Page 951] non-deployed missiles may be stored. Under our draft treaty no missiles would be required to be destroyed, and no limit would be placed on the number of ICBMs and SLBMs a side could possess, only on the number of launchers.
An interagency review of our position has been completed. State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the representative of the Director of Central Intelligence all recommend that we drop the requirement for a specific numerical limit on non-deployed missiles. They believe that (a) such a limit cannot be monitored, (b) it is impossible to predict with precision what U.S. requirements will be, and (c) the additional threat such missiles pose is limited. In contrast, Defense and ACDA favor tabling a specific numerical limit in Geneva. They argue that (a) only in this way can we actually ensure destruction of missiles, rather than launchers, and (b) allowing non-deployed missiles to run free offers the Soviets significant breakout potential.
In my view numerical limits on non-deployed missiles provide only limited constraints on the Soviet threat and are of only limited benefit from a military standpoint. Because of the manner in which the United States procures weapons systems, the limits will have to be set quite high to protect our own programs. If the Soviets choose to use even their legal number of non-deployed missiles as reloads or for breakout, they could gain a significant military capability, especially should we alter our position in the future to allow mobile ICBMs. Further, if they intend to gain such a capability, the limits on non-deployed missiles are almost certainly not sufficiently verifiable for us to prevent such a step.
Despite these arguments, I believe we should not fall off a five year position requiring numerical limits on non-deployed missiles. While the arguments in favor of such a limit are slightly more persuasive than those against it, my judgment is based primarily on domestic political reality rather than strategic nuclear considerations. Given the high probability that we are going to fall off a ban on mobile ICBMs, it is the wrong time to eliminate other constraints strongly supported by Secretary Weinberger and by your conservative supporters on the Hill. I have therefore reaffirmed your 1982 decision and directed our negotiators to propose an aggregate numerical limit on non-deployed missiles. Pending JCS review, we will not specify the actual number, but will simply table the concept.
- Source: Reagan Library, Linhard Files, START After Shevardnadze, October 31, 1987 (2). Secret. Sent for information. Copied to Bush and Howard Baker. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that Reagan saw the memorandum on November 10. Reagan initialed the top of the memorandum.↩
- See Document 36.↩