Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

221. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, October 30, 1987

SUBJECT

• Discussion among Karpov, Kampelman, Nitze and Adelman (and others, at times)—October 30, 1987

ON INF

Karpov said he had a list of 36 unresolved issues. I said we had some 25–30. There was some discussion as to how to proceed to resolve them, but no consensus on a procedural recommendation emerged.

Karpov said the issues of principal concern to him were:

(a) Our attempt to inspect ICBM facilities;

(b) A non-circumvention clause; and

(c) Inspection of facilities on allied territory.

During the discussion of (a), we explained why we were particularly concerned with the SS–25 facilities, the SS–25 final assembly facilities and the SS–25 operating bases. He confirmed that on-site inspection at the portal and around the perimeter of the SS–20/25 production facility could be continuously conducted. He indicated continued Soviet reluctance to permit inspection at SS–25 operational sites.

(b) We reviewed our proposed language with respect to non-circumvention. He said they were dissatisfied with the word “obligation.” This would permit an informal arrangement circumventing the provisions of the treaty. I asked whether he would be satisfied with a commitment not to enter into any new “pattern of cooperation” in conflict with the provisions of the agreement. He toyed with that formulation but ended up by not accepting it. We then emphasized the coupled thought of no agreement to their proposal for future negotiations. I think we persuaded him that this was a non-starter but he would not formally drop their proposal.

(c) We asked him whether he would be prepared to limit their insistence on challenge inspection of formally declared facilities on allied territories with the proviso that these be restricted to those that continue to be under U.S. control, that the period of time is limited, and that the inspections not be concentrated on any one country. He continued to insist that inspections should still apply after the U.S. turns the facility over to the host country. We explained that they would have the opportunity for a close-out inspection prior to our turning it over. He remained unsatisfied.

DISCUSSION ON START

We began the discussion by assuming that the letter² solved the sublimits question; it appeared to suggest that they could live within our 4800. Karpov said that was an error. We had asked for sublimits and they were agreeing to sublimits for each of the three legs. There was a certain freedom to choose within the flexibility indicated by the differences between the upper and higher numbers suggested for each of the three legs. They were not prepared to accept the 4800 because they had no need for 1200 ALCMs plus bombers. This resulted in a long and inconclusive debate.

ON SPACE DEFENSE

Karpov confirmed the language in the working group report³ of the September Shultz/Shevardnadze meeting. He had no explanation for Kuznetsov’s adamancy on a different interpretation. He said that if a device is tested in a manner, the results of which are doubtful as to whether they are within the agreed capabilities, the other side can ask for information or for the right to inspect. I commented that the test device would have been destroyed and would be uninspectable. He conceded that this would be a problem where a test was a single unique test, but if it were a part of a series of tests of a device, their right to inspect should be helpful.

There was extended discussion about how to understand the words “as negotiated and ratified.” Cooper had asked whether they had in mind the March 1985 OSD report to the Congress. Cooper believed that it would be the fullest definition of the narrow interpretation. Mr. Gorbachev had referred to the 1983 situation. Karpov did not clarify the Soviet position on this point.

We discussed the 10-year period of non-withdrawal. I asked whether this might be broken down into two periods, one being the period of START reductions, i.e. 5–7 years, the second being a period for negotiating an intercession regime. Karpov agreed, provided the sum of the two was 10 years with the further proviso that if agreement were reached on an intercession regime, that would govern when the intercession would begin and how long it would last.

1. Source: Department of State, Lot 90D397, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Box 3, 1987 Oct. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Nitze, who did not initial the memorandum.
2. See footnote 2, Document 220.
3. Not found.