Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

212. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Undated

Insert to 9/24 Memcon:² Arms Control, Moscow Ministerial portion

Shevardnadze joked that last week in Washington he had transmitted to the Secretary a proposal for a Defense Ministers’ meeting, so there was a good reason to cancel the trip.

The Secretary answered that we are looking at the Soviet suggestion that the Defense Ministers meet. As Shevardnadze was aware, an invitation from Secretary Weinberger to the Soviet Defense Minister had been on the table for sometime. The Secretary felt it would be constructive for Defense Ministers and some of their senior military men to get together.

Shevardnadze said he agreed. He wanted to confirm October 22–23 as the dates for the Secretary’s visit to Moscow, and said the agreement on dates could be publicized. With regard to Iran-Iraq, Shevardnadze said that if the ministers could not “quell this fire” in their New York meetings, then they could continue their discussion in Moscow.

He went on that they should instruct their Geneva delegations to produce a finalized text so that the ministers did not have to waste time on INF, and could “really concentrate on START and the ABM Treaty.”

The Secretary said his orientation was exactly the same. He had been checking daily with Ambassador Glitman. U.S. demolition experts would be in Geneva the following week. Other materials we needed to get to the INF delegation were getting there rapidly. He understood that the delegations were working through the draft treaty, removing brackets and so forth. So the Secretary hoped he and Shevardnadze would not have to spend any appreciable time on INF.

Regarding START, the Secretary said, both sides agreed it was the key, the root problem. We had made great progress at Reykjavik. He did not want to talk too much about it today, but he did want to give Shevardnadze a thought. At one point in the negotiations, the Soviet side had suggested an agreement that no two legs of the triad add up to more than 80% of the warheads. Obviously, that would yield, from the 6000 warhead limit, 4800 warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs. The Secretary had noticed that the Soviet Union seemed to prefer to express such limits in percentages. If this were a formula that fit the Soviet Union’s way of thinking—and the fact the Soviet side had suggested it that way indicated that that kind of distribution was desirable—the Secretary just wanted to plant the idea. The U.S. would come to Moscow prepared to discuss START in all its aspects, including the numerical aspects. Of course, he continued, there was a huge verification task, and he knew we both had thought of it. Both sides had expressed being in favor of very strong verification regimes, so he had some optimism.

Shevardnadze said, “Let’s say priority attention will be given to strategic arms and questions relating to the ABM Treaty.” He also proposed that the two sides exert joint efforts in Moscow to finalizing the mandate on conventional arms in Europe; this was a priority task, since the Vienna meeting should be concluded. The Soviet side had presented some ideas; he did not want to discuss them now but they should be discussed in Moscow. The two sides could also finalize their approach on chemical weapons.

On regional issues, the two ministers should discuss the Iran-Iraq War and subjects they could not get to in their meetings in Washington. He recounted that Prime Minister Peres had expressed surprise that there had been no discussion during Shevardnadze’s Washington visit of the Middle East peace conference.

The Secretary said they should say they would review all areas—arms control, bilateral; and human rights, which they had discussed extensively in Washington. The Secretary would be prepared to talk about the Middle East peace process and Iran-Iraq. In addition, he and Shevardnadze had agreed in Washington that they would set dates in Moscow for a summit.

Shevardnadze interjected, “It goes without saying.”

The Secretary then gave Shevardnadze a draft statement announcing dates for the Moscow visit (text attached).³ The Secretary read the statement aloud; Shevardnadze said he accepted.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz-Shevardnadze—Wash—9/87. Secret; Sensitive.
2. Shultz and Shevardnadze met in Walters’s office from 3 to 4:24 p.m. on September 24 at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations. The memorandum of conversation for that meeting is printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 78.
3. Not attached.