The attached paper summarizes the relevant material on this issue in a
format that should support your decision making. Areas of agreement and
disagreement are identified. Alternative views and options are provided,
with a set of pros and cons for each. Four options are provided for your
decision. A supporting alternative draft NSDD is provided for each (Tabs 1–4 corresponding to the
options)2 for your signature.
The idea of approaching the negotiation in phases builds on the
“compromise” proposal offered by Al
Haig, but it changes some of the substance to enhance
U.S. leverage in a second phase of negotiations and to better protect
our slow-flying, second-strike systems.
Tab A
Paper Prepared in the National Security
Council5
START—THE UNIT OF ACCOUNT ISSUE
Areas of Agreement
The US proposal should focus on the most threatening aspect of the
nuclear equation, the growing instability of nuclear forces. It
should address on a priority basis significant reductions in the
most destabilizing elements of the nuclear balance, ballistic
systems, and especially ICBMs.
The US proposal should include reductions on both the number of
ballistic weapons and the overall destructive potential of ballistic
systems.
The asymmetry in throw-weight between the US and the USSR must also be reduced, both to
control/limit “breakout” potential and to avoid real or perceived
“inequalities” in the resulting balance.
The US will continue to require the essential contribution of
effective US strategic nuclear forces to meet our own legitimate
security requirements and, given the advantage in non-nuclear forces
enjoyed by the Soviet Union and its allies, to fulfill our
commitments to allies and friends.
We will need relatively increased emphasis on an improved bomber leg
of the TRIAD, which is clearly a second-strike capability and not
destabilizing, to: (1) maintain a level of nuclear capability
required for US security while (2) permitting significant reductions
in destabilizing strategic nuclear systems. This explains the
“looser” constraints proposed for bombers. It also provides an
avenue for the Soviets to likewise meet their legitimate
requirements for strategic nuclear capability and maintain their
deterrent, but in a less destabilizing manner.
Specific Points of Agreement
The United States should call for a significant reduction (25–30%) in
the number of ballistic missile warheads. The agreed goal for these
START negotiations is a
reduction to an equal level of 5,000 total ballistic warheads for
each side. Further levels of reductions could be possible at some
later time, but lower equal levels of ballistic warheads [Page 48] would clearly hinge on the
overall strategic environment at that time and a reassessment of US
security requirements in light of that environment.
The United States is prepared to accept equal limits on the total
number of bombers permitted to both sides, provided that BACKFIRE is
included. As progress is made on the issue of ballistic systems, the
United States is prepared to accept reductions in the total equal
number of bombers permitted to each side from current US levels (343
B–52 and 62 FB–111) to as few as 250 modern bombers.
Areas of Disagreement
The chief area of disagreement involves how best to contain
throw-weight and the breakout potential it provides. Some (OSD, ACDA, and the Chief, US START Delegation) favor direct limits on throw-weight
(with some technical differences about how those limits are
applied). Others (State and JCS)
favor capturing throw-weight by limits on the numbers of ballistic
warheads and missiles. The positions are summarized and the Pros and
Cons of each provided on the next page.
There is also disagreement on whether the US should call for a
sublimit on the total number of ICBM warheads (set at 50% of the total limit, or
2,500). This is, to some extent, linked to the decision on the
throw-weight issue. Most who oppose such a sublimit do so because
they prefer a direct limit on throw-weight. They feel that if such a
direct limit is used, the ICBM
sublimit is unnecessary, cuts US flexibility, and adds complexity.
This same group, however, also feels that if a direct limit on
throw-weight is not applied, they would prefer the additional
indirect constraint applied on Soviet throw-weight by the proposed
ICBM sublimit.
Specific Points of Disagreement
View A—Apply a direct
constraint on throw-weight calling for an equal limit of 2
Mkg of ballistic missile throw-weight on each side.
This is above current US levels [less than 1 line
not declassified] and would be above the US ballistic
throw-weight total in a force complying with the warhead limit of
5,000 ballistic missile warheads [less than 2
lines not declassified]
PRO
• Clearly different from SALT II
approach, less opportunity to slip into old, ineffective SALT patterns criticized by
Administration and Congress.
• Directly attacks Soviet advantage in throw-weight.
• Simple, no complex network of ceilings and subceilings.
• Avoids tendency to trade-off systems for systems, thus creating
“bargaining chips” out of systems like MX and D–5.
[Page 49]
• Constraint on throw-weight indirectly constraints Soviet
improvements in yield, accuracy, terminal guidance, penetration
aids, maneuvering RVs, orbital
trajectories, depressed trajectories, large missile footprints,
etc.
• Keeps US flexibility and “freedom to mix” systems.
• Meets legislative and Congressional requirements.
CON
• More uncertainty in verification, [less than 1
line not declassified]—enough for 130 SS–18s.
• Not a mutual reduction; Soviets must do all cutting.
• Could cause Soviets to call for restriction on bomber payload which
we could not accept.
• Would cause us in the near term to negotiate a level that the US
would never reach.
• If negotiated, would provide for a legitimized Soviet advantage
[less than 1 line not declassified] while
permitting only cosmetic equality.
• Hard for public to understand.
• Could permit an increase in the number of smaller missiles.
• Given improvements in accuracy, some feel throw-weight is no longer
a good indicator of strategic capability.
View B—Capture throw-weight
by limits on the number of ballistic missiles and ballistic warheads.
Rough estimates are that limits on 5,000 ballistic missile warheads
and 850 total missiles would reduce Soviet throw-weight to between
3.3 to near 2 Mkg.
PRO
• Easily understandable; most people think of missiles and
weapons.
• Would represent a mutual reduction vice only
a call for Soviet reductions, therefore be perceived as fairer.
• Would provide a substantial reduction in throw-weight.
• Would cut Soviet advantage in total number of missiles.
• Could be verified with high confidence, aid overall
verification.
CON
• Too close to SALT II approach,
would lead to a slip into the pattern of ineffective constraint
developed in SALT.
• Moves US in the wrong direction by less effective limit on total
throw-weight and pressure to reduce the number of US missiles—fewer
aimpoints for Soviets to strike.
[Page 50]
• Constrains US option to proliferate small missiles to solve ICBM vulnerability problem.
• More complex agreement, requires network of ceilings and
subceilings.
• Will erode during negotiations as limits get higher, thus not
imposing the intended indirect constraint on throw-weight.
• Doesn’t consider all factors, not all missiles and warheads are
alike.
• Will lead to trading specific systems, making “bargaining chips”
out of needed systems like MX and
D–5.
• Poor constraint on breakout since if large throw-weight missiles
are retained, they can rapidly be armed with more weapons.
• Lets Soviets retain throw-weight and replace weapons with
penetration aids and other devices to improve overall missile
performance.
Options for Decision
Option 1—Direct constraint on throw-weight
• Limit at 2 Mkg—direct OSD and ACDA to work out their differences on specific
approach.
• ICBM
Sublimit—direct the Interdepartmental Group to reevaluate
the need for sublimit in light of decision.
• Data Base—direct Interdepartmental Group to
develop specific system data base provisions to permit adequate
verification to support throw-weight limit.
PRO & CON: Already provided, on page 2.
IF THIS IS YOUR CHOICE, SIGN TAB 1.
Option 2—Use missile and weapon limits to capture
throw-weight.
• Limit total ballistic missiles to 850.
• Limit total ICBM warheads to 2,500.
PRO & CON: Already provided, on page 3.
IF THIS IS YOUR CHOICE, SIGN TAB 2.
Option 3—Use both direct and indirect
constraints. Do not use a phased approach.
• Limit throw-weight directly at 2 Mkg.
• Limit total ballistic missiles to 850.
• Limit total ICBM warheads to 2,500.
PRO:
• Adds flexibility in negotiations.
• Avoids identifying an interdepartmental “loser.”
[Page 51]
• Picks up advantages of both Options 1 and 2, while avoids most of
the disadvantages of selecting one or the other.
• Builds consensus over selection of Options 1 or 2 (indications are
that State and JCS could accept
throw-weight add-on, and OSD would
prefer this to a clear selection of Option 2).
CON:
• Adds complexity to initial position.
• Allows Soviets to gain negotiating leverage by trading elements of
the direct throw-weight constraint for lower missile totals; could
permit Soviets to erode commitment to direct throw-weight
constraints over time.
• May simply defer interdepartmental disagreement until the Soviets
react to the initial US position.
IF THIS IS YOUR CHOICE, SIGN TAB 3.
Option 4—Use both direct and indirect
constraints, but use phased approach.
Phase I: (Focus clearly on ballistic missiles,
as in INF.)
• Limit ballistic missiles to 850.
• Limit total ICBM warheads to 2,500.
• Set internal US negotiating goal of ensuring a
reduction of Soviet throw-weight in this phase to below 2.5 Mkg through these indirect
limits. State this in NSDD but do
not make this specific goal public nor directly negotiate it with
Soviets.
• Set down the principle that we expect the limits on missile
warheads and missile numbers to result, in effect, in a significant
reduction in the total missile throw-weight available to either side
as a result of Phase I, and that we intend to negotiate direct
throw-weight limits at equal and further reduced levels during the
second phase of negotiations.
• Explain to Soviets our intent to focus on ballistic systems during this phase.
Agree to equal limits on bombers at roughly
current levels, but defer reductions on slow flying systems
(bombers, cruise missiles) to later phase. (This will ensure
leverage to get at throw-weight later.)
• Declare our intent in the second phase of
negotiations to seek: (1) further reductions in
ballistic systems, (2) direct equal
limits on throw-weight, and (3) reductions and further constraints on slow flying
systems.
• Agree on effective verification procedures.
Phase II: (Negotiations begin as soon as Phase
I is complete.)
• Seek equal, reduced limits on
throw-weight.
• Accept reductions to equal ceilings on bombers at
250 on each side.
[Page 52]
• Security requirements permitting, seek further
reductions in ballistic missile warhead levels.
• Be prepared to discuss direct constraint on
SLCM.
PRO:
• Cuts initial complexity of negotiations.
• Keeps initial focus on ballistic systems.
• Consistent with INF approach,
could permit combined negotiations.
• Avoids letting Soviets choose between US Option 1 and 2 approaches
(by letting the Soviets emphasize what they choose in
negotiations).
• Does not defer interdepartmental disagreement while providing the
seeds for consensus.
• Changes from State “consensus” position both avoid the impression
of simply selecting State solution and, in fact, improve basic State
proposal by adding substantial leverage to US Phase II position.
• Provides a way to handle the SLCM
issue—defer to Phase II.
• Gets throw-weight asymmetry down to closer levels before demanding
equal limits.
CON:
• May never get to second Phase.
• Largely deferring bombers may cause Allies concern over the
treatment of BACKFIRE—only initial constraint, little initial
reductions.
IF THIS IS YOUR CHOICE, SIGN TAB 4.
Military Sufficiency
The Joint Chiefs of Staff were directed to evaluate the various
approaches to ensure that they provided the US the opportunity to
develop and deploy sufficient military force, relative to that
permitted to the Soviet Union, to execute the national military
strategy with reasonable assurance of success.
The JCS evaluation6
concludes that to fully execute the national strategy outlined in
NSDD 13, Nuclear Weapons
Employment Policy (which was recently revalidated in the NSSD 1–82 strategy review),7 a force composed of
approximately 8,000 ballistic missile warheads and
350 modernized bombers (carrying an
additional 7,000 weapons) will be [Page 53] necessary to achieve the degree of deterrence
associated with even moderate confidence damage goals. Additionally,
this force must be fully modernized to
include MX
and the TRIDENT II D-5 ballistic missiles and
a modernized bomber force capable of employing Air-Launched Cruise Missiles.
The JCS further concludes that
“therefore, negotiated outcomes at lower levels of
ballistic missile warheads would involve a degree of risk, even
with the corresponding reductions in Soviet systems.”
Having provided this assessment, the JCS did, however, support a proposal of reductions of
ballistic missile warheads to the 5,000 level, and an ultimate
reduction of bomber forces to an equal 250 bomber ceiling (providing
an additional 5,000 weapons).
The NSC Staff draws the following
conclusions from the above:
• While there is some risk involved in proposing reductions in
ballistic missile warheads to the 5,000 level, the risks are
acceptable, if in an environment of mutual constraint. While further
reductions may be possible at some future time, we should not stress
this point without adding the caveat,
“providing our security requirements and world conditions
permit.”
• Modernization of a smaller US total force is absolutely essential.
The early deployment of the MX (late
FY 86/early FY 87) must be maintained. B-1B,
Advanced Technology Bomber, ALCM
and TRIDENT II D–5 are all critical to assuring that the reductions
proposed can be made within acceptable bounds of risk.
• As we attempt to reduce destabilizing ballistic systems, especially
ICBMs, the contribution of the
bomber force and planned ALCM
deployments will become much more important. As a result:
—We must avoid grouping these clearly second-strike systems into
aggregate limits with ballistic systems, and must continue to stress
the critical differences between slow flying and ballistic
systems.
—We must not be pressured to make corresponding reductions in slow
flying systems to match the reductions made in ballistic missiles
and missile warheads.
—Direct limits on total bomber weapons or payload, or constraints on
the planned ALCM program must be
avoided.
—For the foreseeable future, an equal limit of 250 bombers must be
regarded as the lowest long-term bomber force
acceptable to the United States.
Discussion
Based upon all of the above considerations, Option 4, which combines
direct and indirect limits on throw-weight in a phased approach to
negotiations, appears to be the best available approach for the
United States.
[Page 54]
• This phased approach, which largely defers discussion of slow
flying systems, allows us to establish the distinction between
second-strike systems and those more destabilizing ballistic systems
which should be of primary concern. It protects the US bomber force.
It keeps discussion focused on the area of primary concern.
• The approach provides an easily understandable rationale for
largely deferring the discussion of slow flying systems. It protects
us from Soviet charges that all we want to do is force reductions in
their area of strength, ICBMs.
• It provides that since both direct limits on throw-weight and
treatment of reductions of slow flying systems (to include
constraints on SLBM) are to be
addressed in Phase II, the Soviets have an incentive to move into
Phase II and negotiate in good faith.
• It exactly parallels our approach in the INF negotiations, where discussion of aircraft is also
deferred. This will provide us the option of combining START and INF talks, should this be in our interest, without
undercutting our own positions in either arena.
Recommendations
(1) That you choose Option 4.
• Combines both direct and indirect constraints on throw-weight.
• Approaches negotiations in phases.
• Largely defers discussion of slow flying systems to second
Phase.8
(2) That you sign the NSDD provided
at Tab 4 to record and implement your choice.9
Attachments
Tab 1 Draft NSDD supporting a
choice of Option 1, direct limits on
throw-weight.
Tab 2 Draft NSDD supporting a
choice of Option 2, indirect limits on
throw-weight by limiting numbers of missiles and missile
warheads.
Tab 3 Draft NSDD supporting a
choice of Option 3, combining direct and
indirect limits on throw-weight.
Tab 4 Draft NSDD supporting a
choice of Option 4, combining direct and
indirect limits on throw-weight in a phased approach to
negotiations.
