Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

124. Memorandum From the Head of the Delegation to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Talks (Kampelman) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research (Abramowitz)¹

Washington, January 2, 1986

SUBJECT

• “Red Team” Analysis on NST Round IV

With respect to the very fine Red Team analysis on Round IV which has just crossed my desk, I certainly agree with its essence. Round IV is likely to be relatively uneventful and certainly not one during which we will receive any serious concessions from the other side. I will give copies of the paper to John and to Mike.²

The reason for this memorandum is to inject an additional rationale not spelled out in the analysis. Gorbachev has demonstrated that when he takes over a ministry, he does so with his own people and has no hesitation in removing incumbents on a number of working levels. Other than Shevardnadze, he has not done this in the Foreign Ministry. He will want to control that ministry with his own people as will Shevardnadze. I suspect that significant changes in personnel at the Moscow level will take place following the 27th Party Congress.³ There will be no significant change in policy until the new people have an opportunity to get their feet wet and develop that policy with Gorbachev.

Attachment

Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research (Abramowitz) to Acting Secretary of State Whitehead⁴

Washington, January 2, 1986

SUBJECT

• “Red Team” Analysis on NST Round IV

As we had informed you, INR has led a “Red Team” to analyze what we can expect from the Soviets at the NST negotiations. Our first analysis focuses on Round IV, which commences on January 16.

In brief, we expect Round IV to be an interim round. Round III appears to have been an unusually active round; Round V will presumably be dominated by the impending summit, should that remain scheduled for June. At this next session we believe that both Parties will be seeking greater details on the other’s proposals. We do not expect much movement from the Soviets, certainly not until the latter stages of the round if at all.

—In START, the Soviets will likely stress the superiority of their proposed 50% reduction, arguing that it results in deeper cuts of current forces and controls more types of weapons.

—In INF, we expect them to pursue discussions on a separate interim agreement but not to make additional concessions at least in the early stages of the Round.

—On SDI, while at some point the Soviets will try to “draw the line” on acceptable SDI activity, we expect them to hold fast on SDI hoping that European and US domestic pressure will constrain the program.

We hope this analysis will be useful to those responsible for formulating NST policy. We will be making this analysis available to the Delegation Ambassadors, as well as to Ambassadors Nitze, Rowny, Ridgway, and Holmes. INR analysts have worked closely with members of these offices, and have benefited from their contributions. These offices are in basic agreement with the views in this analysis.

Soviet Tactics in NST Round IV

Summary

The attached paper was put together by State’s Red Team to examine likely Soviet tactics at the next round in Geneva. In brief we conclude that:

—The Soviets are not likely to make any significant changes in their current proposals although we should expect an active dialogue in all three areas. To the extent that they do introduce new ideas, it would likely occur later rather than early in the round given the upcoming Party Congress and Soviet interest in first sounding out the US.

—On START, the Soviets will likely stress the superiority of their proposed 50% reduction, arguing that it results in deeper cuts of current forces and controls more types of weapons. There may be some movement on FBS or INF inclusion in START, but this remains highly dependent on how the Round goes overall, especially the INF talks.

—Regarding INF, we expect the Soviets to pursue discussions on a separate interim agreement but not to make additional concessions at least in the early stages of the Round.

—While at some point the Soviets will try to “draw the line” on acceptable SDI activity, we expect them to hold fast against SDI in toto, hoping that European and US domestic pressure will influence Washington or that the program will run into budgetary or political constraints.

—While the latest compliance report and any US decision to abandon interim restraint could serve to reheat Soviet rhetoric toward the US, we do not expect them to change the Soviet approach to the NST talks. Nevertheless, a US decision to abandon interim restraint would raise Soviet concerns about the worth of the NST process, and might create domestic political problems for Gorbachev.

* * *

Introduction

In the wake of the summit, Gorbachev has clearly tried to put the burden for further arms control progress on the US. At the upcoming NST round, the Soviets will likely reinforce this posture, probing the US side for any changes in the US proposals tabled at the end of Round III rather than introducing any significant changes of their own. At the same time, the Soviets will likely argue that their proposals are more equitable and suited to genuine arms control. The Soviets will not want to appear intractable or responsible for blocking progress, however, and are thus likely to engage in an active dialogue. They might also push for movement on peripheral subjects, such as Krasnoyarsk or a token dismantlement of 300 ICBMs.

The Soviets probably see this as an interim round and are likely to reserve any significant concessions for Round V, which they probably calculate will be more pressured if the next US-Soviet summit is still held in June. To the extent that the Soviets do come forth with any new ideas or changes in their proposals during Round IV, it would likely occur later rather than early. One consideration in this regard will be the February Party Congress, which is likely to occupy most of Gorbachev’s attention. To the extent that there appears to have been some skepticism from conservative party elements and the military about Gorbachev’s venture into summitry, he would be reluctant to force a policy debate on the eve of the Congress, or to force internal Soviet power centers to swallow significant, albeit necessary, concessions at this time.

The areas of movement analyzed below are based on Soviet perceptions of US movement they wish to encourage, or fertile areas for propaganda. As noted, we would expect them to come in the latter part of the round, if at all.

START

The Soviets consider a possible START agreement as giving them the most leverage at NST, as they have linked a START agreement to resolution of INF and space issues. In general, we expect the Soviets to stress that their 50% reduction is superior to ours, i.e., that it results in deeper cuts and helps stop the arms race by stricter controls on modernization. The Soviets will benefit here from the way in which they have structured the forces in their proposal, allowing them to claim that more forces are limited and therefore better arms control results. They will presumably try to exploit this in and beyond Geneva. On the other hand, they must eventually deal with the fact that their proposed inclusion of US INF systems in the strategic balance (while excluding equivalent Soviet systems) has received no significant political support in the West and has been widely criticized as inequitable. However, this realization will not necessarily translate into changes in the Soviet position at Round IV. They will also show that their proposal is more inclusive and seeks to ban more destabilizing systems, such as long-range cruise missiles.

Potential areas for some limited movement include:

—Removing some INF systems from the START aggregate, but only if they can somehow be captured in INF.

—Hinting at the removal of some FBS systems (carrier aircraft, FBS aircraft) from the aggregate, but implying that they will be captured in the overall framework of any eventual agreement. (However, they will probably remain adamant in their demand for compensation for British and French systems in INF.)

—They may suggest a willingness to reduce their heavy ICBM (SS–18) force, but probably without offering any specific numbers. Rather, they would hope to elicit further US concessions before getting specific on SS–18. However, major and concrete proposals on the SS–18 will remain linked to the status of SDI—both at NST, and in Washington and Western Europe. The Soviets are unlikely to reduce a force that is then subject to interception by a US SDI defense.

—One potential “major” Soviet concession would be to agree to the deployment of ALCMs. While this undercuts the strength of their overall ban on cruise missiles, they could give in here without heavy cost. Their own Bear H/ALCM deployments suggest as much, and they have previously hinted at counting rules that imply acceptance.

Their earlier positions in SALT II and the initial START talks also suggest eventual acceptance of some ALCM deployment. The issue of how to count ALCMs would remain. If included in the Soviet aggregate of 6000 weapons, ALCM deployment would simply force the US to reduce further other systems. If the total were raised as a result of ALCMs, the Soviets could charge that these higher levels were the fault of the US. However, concessions on gravity bombs and SPAMs are not expected in this round.

The Soviets likely want to see signals of US responsiveness to their START concerns before going too far in hinting of Moscow’s flexibility.

—The Soviets are extremely unlikely to accept a ban on mobile ICBMs; they have developed two such systems, one of which is already deployed. They may attack what they view as a US negotiating inconsistency on mobile missiles. Among other things, the new US START proposal bans mobile ICBMs because of verification, yet the US has been negotiating on the SS–20 IRBM for years, a system that has virtually the same verification requirements as the SS–25 ICBM. Further, the US opposes limits on SLCMs because of associated verification problems.

—If the Soviets are willing to make any specific moves within START on the SS–18, they may suggest compensating areas of Soviet concern, such as the US Trident II/D5 hard-target capable SLBM system. At present the SS–18 is the only Soviet hard-target capable system.

—The Soviets would like to see the US clarify and soften its position on the modernization of heavy missiles. They have been working on an upgrade to the SS–18 for several years, probably to improve its accuracy and overcome some range limitations.

INF

The Soviets are likely to reiterate their November 5, proposal for a separate interim INF agreement, although it is still unclear exactly how “separate” or “interim” such an agreement would be. While the joint statement at the summit made reference to such an agreement, the Soviets appeared reluctant to include it and did not reiterate that an agreement would be separate.

We expect them to at least pursue discussions on a interim agreement. They are probably not, however, ready at this stage to make further concessions and instead will be probing US thinking on the subject, particularly regarding UK/French nuclear forces, SRINF and PIIs. They are likely to cite Gorbachev’s recent announcement that they have fulfilled their promise to remove from operational status SS–20s to a level of 243 as evidence of their sincerity. They could also express renewed interest in the global warhead limit concept, perhaps reverting back to the 1983 US proposal.

In addition, the Soviets are likely to intensify their out-of-Geneva INF agitation and diplomacy. However, NATO’s success in getting positive decisions from all five basing nations may temper Soviet efforts in this area.

—The Soviets will likely resume SS–4 and perhaps SS–N–5 dismantlements, low cost gestures of goodwill.

—They will continue to probe Britain and France for separate negotiations.

DST

The President’s steadfastness on SDI at the summit undoubtedly disappointed the Soviets. Nevertheless, their decision to give a positive assessment to the meeting and to commit themselves to continued negotiations suggests the Soviets still hope to use the arms control process to pressure the President into compromising on SDI and to encourage opposition to funding it. The Soviets probably calculate that public expectations for progress on arms control will grow with future Gorbachev-Reagan meetings and are trying to reinforce in the public’s mind that only SDI is stopping progress.

With regard to the negotiations, they have essentially two options at this point:

1. They could continue to hold fast on a ban on all SDI, including research, hoping that European and US domestic pressure will influence Washington or that the program will run into budgetary, political or technological constraints.

2. The Soviets may at some point seek to negotiate a compromise that would trade Soviet acceptance of certain research, development, and limited testing activities as permissible in return for a US commitment that both parties would have to consent to full-scale testing and SDI deployment. In view of the recent US legal interpretation of the ABM Treaty regarding limits on systems based on “other physical principles,” (which diverges from the Soviet interpretation), the Soviets could seek mutual clarification of the ABM Treaty as it affects SDI. The Soviets could also craft a deal involving acceptance of SDI research in return for an ASAT ban and ABM Treaty reaffirmation.

Of the two courses, it seems unlikely that the Soviets would move at this early stage to negotiate a “line” better defining permitted and prohibited SDI activities, since that would imply Soviet acceptance of a degree of legitimacy for the program at a time when they still hope to limit the program through political pressure. This is more likely to change in Round V or at the next summit. On the other hand, Embassy Moscow was recently informed by a US journalist that Soviet NST negotiators were about to receive new instructions on SDI. Whether or not they change their official position in Geneva on SDI, they are likely to stress publicly that they do not seek to ban fundamental research but only out-of-laboratory work.

External Factors

The 1986 Presidential compliance report and any US decision on whether to continue interim restraint are worth noting because of the public effect they may have. While, we do not believe these would significantly alter the Soviet position at Geneva, tension evident within the Soviet delegation—and presumably in Moscow—could be exacerbated by US decisions.

If the US decided not to continue interim restraint in the next few months, the Soviets would attack the change in policy as undermining the progress of the NST negotiations, and would try to bring world pressure upon the US. They might view such as decision as tantamount to a US walkout from the negotiations. Soviet actions beyond NST, such as halting compensatory dismantlements for new ICBM and SLBM deployments, thereby exceeding SALT limits, also would be likely.

As in the past, the Soviets will be unlikely to react at NST to the President’s Report on Compliance. They will probably keep their responses at the public propaganda level and print a reciprocal list of alleged US violations. If the subject were raised at NST, they would almost certainly defer it to the next SCC session (beginning in March) as a more appropriate forum for such discussions.

Beyond Round IV

Round IV may prove to be only a way station between an unusually active Round III and Round V. A number of extraneous events—the latest Compliance Report, the February Communist Party Congress, the upcoming US decision on interim restraint, congressional activity—will all influence Round V, as will the Summit that follows it.

1. Source: Department of State, Lot 93D592, Executive Secretariat, Program Files for Delegation to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms, Box 8, Soviet Tactics (Secret). Secret; Noforn.
2. Tower and Glitman.
3. The 27th Party Congress was held February 25–March 6, 1986.
4. Secret; Noforn. Drafted by Lowenthal, Walpole, and Puschel; cleared by Hawes, Palmers, Thomas, and Zimmerman; approved by Kahan. Abramowitz did not initial the memorandum.