Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

115. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, undated

[Omitted here is discussion of the U.S. and Soviet drafts of a Geneva Summit communiqué.]

The gentleman on Shevardnadze’s right observed that the Soviet side had not yet seen the revised and completed U.S. draft; nor had the U.S. side seen the Soviet draft. He said it would be counter-productive to read the drafts out point by point. He said the Soviets were prepared to discuss substantive matters and to start as the U.S. had proposed by talking about the Geneva negotiations. Each side could outline its considerations. There would be an opportunity perhaps at a second meeting today or even tomorrow. In sum he suggested not to read the texts, noting that from the start the Soviet side had thought to approach things in this way.

Shultz observed that this was their first agreement.² He said perhaps it would be possible to present briefly U.S. thoughts on the Geneva negotiations. U.S. negotiators had presented proposals there, and the U.S. believes they offer a real opportunity to make progress. U.S. negotiators in Geneva have presented a new and comprehensive proposal designed to build upon positive elements in the Soviet Union’s recent counter-proposal, to bridge the positions of the two sides. That, he observed, was how the U.S. had worked. Shultz pointed out that at the same time, he wanted to emphasize that previous U.S. negotiating positions remain on the table for Soviet consideration as well. He said that as had been noted, the U.S. proposal deals with all three areas under discussion in the Geneva talks, because the U.S. believes a relationship exists between the areas. The U.S. proposal has been shaped to achieve deep reductions. The U.S. agreed and agrees to focus on areas and weapons which are more de-stabilizing. In the area of strategic offensive arms, the U.S. focused on the 50 percent reduction principle contained in the counterproposal of the Soviet side. The U.S. proposal also incorporates reductions which would result in a total of 6,000 ballistic missile warheads and ALCMs. The U.S., too, attempted to use that number, and like the Soviet side, to address itself as well to re-entry vehicles on land-based ballistic missiles.

Shultz said he had been speaking about what the U.S. agreed with. Now, he would address things the U.S. did not agree with. He said the U.S. must insist that numbers and percentages to which reductions would apply be used for the correct categories. The U.S. side could not agree with a definition of “strategic delivery systems” that includes a category of delivery system on the U.S. side while it excludes that system on the Soviet side.

Further, the U.S. cannot agree to limits on the number of gravity bombs and SRAMs on heavy bombers in light of the sizeable and unconstrained Soviet air defenses which the U.S. retaliatory bomber force must face.

Moreover, the U.S. cannot agree to aggregate under a common ceiling such dissimilar items as ballistic missile warheads, which arrive at their targets in minutes and which are at present, at least, unhampered by defensive systems, with cruise missiles, which take hours to arrive at their targets and face sizeable defenses on their way.

Moreover, the U.S. cannot agree to make limits on offensive systems contingent on restrictions on the U.S. SDI program beyond the limits imposed by the ABM treaty. He noted that the President has seen that the U.S. SDI program proceed on the basis of a relatively narrow definition of the ABM treaty, despite the fact that the U.S. believes that a broader definition of that treaty is justified given the history and wording of the treaty.

Shultz said that the U.S. has proposed to apply the 50 percent reduction to the strategic weapons of the two sides in the following way: Each side would reduce the number of re-entry vehicles carried on its ICBMs and SLBMs to a level of 4,500, i.e., a reduction of roughly 50 percent by each side in this category of weapons. Each side would reduce the number of RVs on its ICBMs to 3,000, i.e., about a 50 percent reduction from the current Soviet level and this more or less splits the difference between the limit of 2,500 previously proposed by the U.S. side and the limit of 3,600 previously proposed by the Soviet side.

This would also include a 50 percent reduction in the maximum throweight of strategic ballistic missiles of ICBMs of either side, i.e., 50 percent of the Soviet ICBM and SLBM throweight.

Then, if this were agreed, the U.S. would be prepared to agree to an equal limit of 1,500 on long-range ALCMs on the heavy bombers of each side. This would represent about a 50 percent reduction of the ALCMs currently planned by the U.S.

On the basis of arithmetic, it is possible to come to the conclusion that the sum of the numbers of ballistic missiles RVs and ALCMs on each side would be the 6,000 figure proposed by the Soviet Union.

Concerning strategic nuclear delivery vehicle reductions, it is somewhat less than the reductions proposed for weapons in order to encourage both sides to rely more on single-RV systems which are more stabilizing.

U.S. proposes that each side reduce its number of ICBMs and SLBMs to a level between 1,250 and 1,450, which would be a reduction of about 40–45 percent from the current Soviet level.

In the context of agreement on ballistic missiles reduction, the U.S. could agree to reduce the heavy bombers of each side to equal levels of 350. That would represent about a 40 percent reduction from the current level of U.S. SALT-accountable heavy bombers.

The U.S. cannot agree to aggregate under one common limit heavy bombers and ballistic missiles. However, it is possible to mention that arithmetic shows a sum of between 1,600 to 1,800 ballistic missiles and heavy bombers, if agreement were reached on the delivery vehicle reductions that the U.S. proposes.

Concerning constraints on modernization, the U.S. has two other points to propose: First, since heavy ICBMs are especially destabilizing because of the threat they pose to the retaliatory capabilities of the other side, the U.S. proposes to ban all new missiles of this category. This would include a ban on modernization of existing SS–18 ICBM forces. Second, to reflect the difficulty of verifying the number and status of mobile ICBMs, the U.S. proposes a ban on all land-mobile ICBMs.

Shultz noted that the President had been struck by Shevardnadze’s emphasis on verification, and Shultz noted the problem of verification is a particularly difficult one.

He said the U.S. believes there should be an agreed build-down schedule which shows how to achieve the reductions.

The U.S. believes that the aggregate result of its proposed reductions and limitations would be a more stable world, where the number of arms would be radically reduced to comparable levels on both sides, and the threat to the retaliatory capabilities of each side would be significantly diminished; there would also be better opportunities and prospects for verification.

Turning to the area of intermediate range nuclear arms, Shultz said the U.S. proposed an interim step toward the goal of complete elimination of U.S. and Soviet LRINF missiles. Here, U.S. proposal develops further certain ideas advanced by the Soviet side.

The U.S. is prepared to cap U.S. LRINF missiles in Europe at 140, i.e., the number employed as of 31 December, 1985, in return for Soviet agreement to reduce Soviet LRINF missile launchers within range of NATO Europe to the same number. Under this approach, there would be freedom to mix systems of the types deployed on 31 December, 1985. The exact mix of these systems would be subject to discussion.

The U.S. would also need Soviet agreement to reduce the number of SS–20s launchers located in Asia in the same proportion as the reductions of SS–20 launchers within range of NATO Europe.

The end result would be that both sides would agree to equal numbers of LRINF missiles on a global basis.

It would also be necessary to agree on constraints on INF missiles with shorter range. After achieving agreement on such an interim stage, the U.S. envisages follow-on negotiations leading toward the complete elimination of this type of missile worldwide.

In the area of defense and space, the U.S. is committed to conduct its strategic defense programs as permitted by and in full compliance with the ABM treaty.

As is known to the Soviet side, the U.S. is fully aware of extensive research programs and of massive efforts conducted by the Soviet Union in the area of strategic defense.

So, the U.S. would expect a reciprocal commitment from the USSR regarding its strategic defense programs. Furthermore, the U.S. would also expect the USSR to take action to correct those instances where the Soviet SDI program is not in compliance with the ABM treaty.

Regarding the area of compliance with the ABM treaty, the U.S. urges the Soviet Union to join it in an “open laboratory” initiative, whereby the two sides would provide each other briefings similar to the one the U.S. gave the Soviet side in Geneva in the summer of 1985.

In addition, each side would also give the other an opportunity to visit laboratories and research facilities connected with strategic defense research, so each side would know what the other was doing in that area.

The U.S. furthermore proposes that the two sides begin exploring new means for a cooperative transition to greater reliance on defensive systems. If the research of either side should indicate that defensive systems are feasible, the sides should begin to plan now for a cooperative transition to more reliance on defensive systems.

These are the elements of the U.S. approach to bridging the past positions of the two sides.

Critical considerations here are the issues of verification and compliance, which will require particular attention and effort in the future.

Shultz again noted that the President had been impressed during Shevardnadze’s visit by the Soviet Foreign Minister’s emphasis on questions of verification.

Shultz continued that activities which corrode the confidence necessary for the arms control process must stop if existing accords are to be preserved, and if new arms control agreements are to be created between the U.S. and the USSR. Verification and compliance are today pacing elements if the sides are to achieve progress. The U.S. believes that more effective and meaningful approaches to verification are necessary. This may mean putting up technical devices and on-sight inspection on Soviet and U.S. territory.

The U.S. is prepared to work diligently with the Soviet Union to develop such approaches as are necessary.

Regarding compliance, the U.S. must continue to insist that the Soviet Union take the necessary steps to correct those of its actions which do not correspond to existing agreements. The U.S. has identified those actions for the Soviet Union in the SCC and in demarches in diplomatic channels.

For example, the Soviet Union should alter its current practice with regard to telementary encryption and revert the practices that it followed at the time of signing the SALT II Treaty.

In sum, the U.S. has designed an approach which could provide for a mutually acceptable resolution of a range of nuclear and space-arms issues, taking into account the relationship between offense and defense, and while also addressing those areas which the Soviet side has described as having great significance for it.

If acceptable to the Soviet Union, this approach could provide the basis for an understanding between the sides that could provide direction to the future efforts of the two delegations in Geneva to work out effective and durable agreements on all these issues.

Shultz said that in the new draft communique, the Soviet side would find language implementing all this, and he added jocularly that if the Soviet representatives would initial the document immediately, it would then be possible to go on to other business.

There was considerable joking at the table from the Soviet side to the effect that they would initial the U.S. draft if the U.S. would initial the Soviet draft.

Shultz continued that there were many other issues concerning security and bilateral and regional issues, but he said he believed both sides agreed that the Geneva negotiations are of central importance to this cause.

He noted that the U.S. would be willing to discuss whatever subject the Soviet side should desire. He noted that the U.S. regarded as constructive the fact that the Soviet side had agreed to prolong the third round of the Geneva talks so there could be consideration in Geneva of the U.S. proposal by those Soviet representatives who work directly with these issues.

Shevardnadze suggested that perhaps Shultz would continue and present U.S. views on all the relevant questions so as to know how much time would be necessary for discussions.

Shultz poured himself more water so as to continue, and Shevardnadze observed that the situation in the USSR was fine with mineral water, but otherwise with wine.³

[Omitted here are discussions not related to START.]

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Box 1, Secretary’s Conversations in Moscow Nov. 4–5, 1985. No classification marking. The meeting took place on November 4 at the MFA Guest House. Shultz visited Moscow November 4–5 to discuss the upcoming Geneva Summit. The complete memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 134.
2. Reference is to the suggestion that Shevardnadze and Shultz not read aloud the U.S. and Soviet draft Geneva Summit communiques.
3. The meeting concluded at 2:05 p.m.