Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

109. Memorandum From Edward Ifft of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks in Geneva to the Assistant Secretary of State for Political and Military Affairs (Holmes)¹

Geneva, July 17, 1985

SUBJECT

• ROUND II ASSESSMENT

The Delegation is preparing various reports and summaries of Round II. Attached is a brief memo containing my personal appraisal of the discussions with the Soviets on strategic offensive arms, together with some thoughts on where we might go in both Round III and the Summit.

I am also attaching a short paper on the status of the negotiations which I prepared for the Delegation. You might find it useful in presenting briefings on the state of play. Also attached are the rather interesting recent comments of a Soviet adviser made to Sid Drell, who conveyed them to me.

I would be happy to discuss these and any other matters with you in greater detail at your convenience.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State²

Geneva, July 16, 1985

NEGOTIATING GROUP ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS ROUND II

Atmosphere

Overall relations between the U.S. and Soviet components of the Negotiating Group continued to be good. A reasonable degree of rapport has developed at all levels as people have more or less settled in with regular “partners” from the other side. The atmosphere within the U.S. Negotiating Group continues to be excellent and work is accomplished efficiently. Given the generally low expectations most people had for Round II, we made a modest amount of progress.

Substantive Developments

The Soviets continue to stand on their double linkage to both space weapons and INF. The price on space weapons which they will demand for progress on START is unclear, but appears to be dropping somewhat. The INF outcome appears actually to influence what START levels they will accept, but exactly how the Soviet calculus connects INF and START is still a mystery. Some form of merger could still be the ultimate solution. It is interesting that the Soviets emphasized the need to resolve the INF situation much more than they talked about space weapons during the last two weeks of the round.

In the final Tower-Karpov meeting on July 15, the authority to accept “associated limits” on SNDVs was implemented. This is the only actual change to the 1983 U.S. position we have made thus far. Now that the Soviets are hinting at SNDV levels below 1800, we should get authority to accept any level in the range 1500–1800, so as to avoid the awkward position of advocating higher levels than the Soviets.

The major new development in Round II was, of course, the Soviet offer to accept an obligation that no single component of the Triad could exceed an agreed sublimit in the weapons aggregate. This was a rather clever move on their part. It responds to U.S. concerns that they will place too great an emphasis on one leg (ICBMs) rather than having the more “balanced” Triad we prefer. It also avoids the pejorative nature of sublimits which single out a particular component for special limits because it technically treats all components equally.

Of course, whether the proposed sublimit has any teeth in it depends upon the number—70 percent would be almost meaningless. In addition, a sublimit on a single component is not a sufficient answer to U.S. concerns about ballistic missile warheads, which involve two components. However, the concept provides an important opening which could lead to the agreed common framework we have been seeking. It is important to note that the Soviets have stated informally that they would consider U.S. counterproposals for additional sublimits, as well as on the specific numbers involved.

Next Steps

In my opinion, our major effort during the recess should be directed toward figuring out how to turn this Soviet offer into a framework we can accept, rather than agonizing over exactly what numbers the Soviets may have in mind. An outline of how we might approach this might be as follows:

—We accept the basic concept of separate aggregates on SNDVs and weapons.

—The SNDV aggregate consists of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers (the missile limitation could be expressed in terms of either launchers or deployed missiles with a 1-to-1 correspondence between the two established by counting rules).

—The Soviets drop cruise missile carriers per se from the SNDV aggregate.

—The SNDV ceiling is set in the range 1500–1800.

—The SNDV aggregate contains a sublimit on heavy ICBMs. This is set as low as possible—150–250 seems a logical goal. We might also want to preserve the option for additional SNDV sublimits until we see how the weapons side comes out, but this is probably not necessary.

—The weapons aggregate consists of ballistic missile warheads and ALCMs only (the Soviets drop attempts to include gravity bombs and SRAMs in the aggregate).

—The weapons aggregate ceiling is set in the range 7000–9000.

—The weapons aggregate contains either a sublimit on ballistic missile warheads (set at about 75 percent) or separate sublimits on any one and any two components of the Triad (set at perhaps 55 percent and 75 percent), respectively. An alternative even closer to the old State framework would be to have a single sublimit on MIRVed ballistic missile RVs set at about 75 percent.

—The Soviets would agree to let SLCMs run free or to limit them separately somehow.

Such a framework would involve a balanced set of compromises from where the two sides stand today. It is a logical extension of the opening the Soviets have provided and could be portrayed, for negotiating purposes, as a major move in their direction. At the same time, it is remarkably close to the “State framework” we have advocated for some time. The detailed numbers and whether we need one or two sublimits in the weapons aggregate require some careful analysis.

As usual, we face a potential conflict between seeking tight constraints on Soviet forces and allowing sufficient flexibility for our own forces. The current Soviet weapons percentages are roughly 65 percent ICBMs, 27 percent SLBMs and 8 percent heavy bombers. We might be able to achieve a more balanced 1995 force of something like 55 percent-25 percent-20 percent. Projected 1995 U.S. forces are highly sensitive to a number of factors, especially the number of MX and the counting rules used for ALCMs. However, attempts to drive the percentage of weapons in any two components of the Soviet force below about 75 percent would conflict with our own projected force.

It is not too early to begin to think about what might be realistic goals for the November Summit. Although numbers are obviously crucial, my own feeling is that getting a common framework in place will (and probably should) precede agreement on specific numbers. An agreed framework is precisely the sort of thing that could be achieved by the Summit. This could be embodied in a relatively short document along the lines of the Vladivostok Aide-Memoire. The Delegations would then fill in the details, which would be no small task, during 1986. An immediate issue is how the Helsinki meeting between the Secretary and Shevardnadze could begin to lay the appropriate groundwork.

Two other important questions arise which are beyond the scope of this brief report:

1. What role should be played by the Delegation (as opposed to a back channel) in Round III to support the Summit goals and what instructions does this require?

2. What is it desirable or necessary to do in the space and INF areas at the Summit in order to achieve the breakthrough we seek in strategic offensive arms?

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State³

Geneva, July 12, 1985

STATUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

Modalities

—Round I ran from March 12 to April 23

—Round II began May 30 and ends July 16

—Pursuant to the January 8 Joint Statement worked out by Shultz and Gromyko, each side has one Delegation divided into three Negotiating Groups:

—Strategic Nuclear Arms

—Intermediate-Range Nuclear Arms

—Defense and Space Arms

We call the overall negotiations the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms or the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) for short.

Developments to Date

—Atmosphere thus far has been businesslike—many veterans of earlier negotiations on Soviet side.

—Few surprises so far in Soviet approach—heavy stress on need to ban “space-strike arms,” and on linkage between this, an INF solution and possible reductions in strategic offensive arms.

—In Round II, the opening and closing plenary meetings, plus a mid-round session, were organized as meetings of the overall Delegations. Seven formal plenary meetings of the Negotiating Group on Strategic Offensive Arms—essentially one per week—were held. In addition, there were occasional meetings of Heads of Negotiating Groups and other informal contacts.

U.S. Position

—1983 Draft Treaty remains on the table and the United States is prepared to build upon this approach.

—In addition, U.S. Delegation has broad authority to explore alternative means of achieving greater stability at substantially reduced levels. We made clear to the Soviets that what matters most is deep and real reductions carried out in a manner which enhances stability. To achieve that outcome, we are prepared to be quite flexible.

—We believe trade-offs between areas of U.S. and Soviet interest and advantage provide most promising approach to a mutually advantageous compromise (e.g., U.S. heavy bomber capabilities vs Soviet ballistic missile capabilities). We have sought to initiate a dialogue with Soviets on this idea, making clear that our concept of trade-offs encompasses a broad range of issues, including the structure of an agreement and specific levels.

—In Round II, we presented discussions of specific issues, such as the deployment of mobile ICBMs, methods of constraining ALCMs and ballistic missile throw-weight. On all of these issues, we suggested that various approaches are possible and sought Soviet ideas and proposals.

—We have also pressed the Soviets to get down to dealing with specifics such as numerical limitations, rules for counting systems, verification provisions, etc. We have also sought, with little success, to learn the details of the Soviet approach, especially the specific numbers they propose.

Soviet Position

—While not formally withdrawing their 1983 Treaty, the Soviets have made clear it does not apply to these new negotiations.

—In Round II the Soviets began to reveal elements of their position, while continuing to insist that an agreement on strategic offensive arms is contingent upon a ban on space weapons. They also claim that such an agreement must take into account the situation regarding INF systems, implying that the levels to which they will be willing to reduce intercontinental systems will be influenced by the level of U.S. INF deployments.

—As in 1983, Soviets propose two aggregates—one on SNDVs and another on weapons on these SNDVs. The most original development in this position during Round II was an offer to accept an obligation not to have more than an established percentage of any one “kind” of strategic arms. Informally, this was explained as a sublimit in the weapons aggregate which could not be exceeded by any one of three components—ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads or heavy bomber weapons. No numbers were offered, so this remains an unknown percentage of an unknown aggregate number of weapons.

—Thus their “model of an agreement” contains three important numbers—an SNDV aggregate, a weapons aggregate and a sublimit on any one of the three force components in the weapons aggregate.

—Just as Round II began, Gorbachev expressed a willingness to go “even deeper” than the one-quarter reductions offered previously (apparently a reference to the 1983 Soviet position of reducing to 1800 SNDVs). Karpov echoed this Gorbachev formulation. Extensive probing by the U.S. Negotiating Group produced little additional hard information, but there were informal hints that “deeper than one quarter” may mean 30–40% reductions. This would translate into an SNDV total in the range 1500–1750; the implications for the weapon total they have in mind are not clear. It is important to bear in mind that these numbers are thus far only informal hints, not a formal proposal.

—Soviets claim that both ICBMs and throw-weight would be reduced under this approach, but extent and predictability of these reductions remain unknown.

—Soviet proposal for a ban on all cruise missiles over 600 km remains on the table.

—Soviet proposal for a moratorium was raised by them several times in Round II, but in a rather pro forma way.

Prospects

—Soviets clearly holding back in our area, hoping to put pressure on SDI and, to a lesser extent, INF. However, compared to Round I, there was some forward movement in their position and they appear to view their linkages to space and INF less rigidly.

—Soviets appear sensitive to the criticism that they are establishing preconditions, that they have regressed from their 1983 position, that they are not making specific proposals, and that they are not meeting U.S. concerns.

—We expect that Soviets will drop their ban on ALCMs and return to some method of counting ALCMs and ALCM carriers in the weapon and SNDV aggregates. They have stressed the need to deal with SLCMs, but recognize, at least informally, the formidable verification problems inherent in constraints on SLCMs.

—Thus far it is not clear to what extent Soviets are prepared to address substance of U.S. concerns on strategic offensive arms until U.S. accommodates their position on space arms. In our view, this is not recognition of “interrelationships,” but attempt to impose preconditions.

—Round III will begin September 19 and continue until just before the Summit. How next round unfolds is obviously strongly dependent upon the Summit and what both sides see as its goal in terms of arms control. It should clearly be a very busy and important session.

Attachment

Memorandum for the Record⁴

Geneva, July 12, 1985

SUBJECT

• Comments of V.P. Pavlichenko

I had lunch with Professor Sidney Drell at his initiative on Friday, July 12, 1985. He was in town for a few days visiting CERN. Mr. Pavlichenko had become aware of this visit and had invited Drell to lunch on July 11. The following reports the comments of Pavlichenko which Drell conveyed to me:

—It is now a new ball game because of the U.S. deployment of Pershing II missiles in Western Europe. What we will now see from the Soviet Union is “confrontation everywhere.” This is the reason why Gromyko was “kicked out.” (Comment: I asked Drell whether this meant that Gromyko had been removed because of a failure to prevent the deployment of Pershing IIs or because he opposed a policy of “confrontation everywhere.” Drell replied that Pavlichenko had not made this clear.)

—The Soviet Union will decide following Round III and the Summit whether to walk out of the negotiations. Thus Round III and the Summit will be crucial.

—Drell raised the issue of the Krasnoyarsk radar with Pavlichenko. Pavlichenko apparently gave the usual response but also mentioned the difficulties associated with constructing a radar in the permafrost region. He then said that the United States is violating its commitments in three areas:

First, it is violating its commitment to equal security.

Second, it is violating its commitments through deployment of the Pershing II.

Third, it is violating its commitments because of the massive deployment of cruise missiles. In this connection he mentioned the familiar number of 18,000 nuclear weapons (5,000 ballistic missile warheads, 8,000 ALCMs and 5,000 SLCMs).

He then said that the Soviet Union knows what President Reagan said to the Prime Minister of Canada. It will be “very devastating” to the U.S. position on compliance issues.

—Although the Soviet Union went along with the United States in listing the SS–18 as having 10 RVs in the earlier data exchange, as the United States knows very well, the SS–18 is deployed with many fewer warheads. Some are deployed with one RV, some with 2 RVs and so on. The highest number mentioned by Pavlichenko was 8 RVs.

—The point which seemed most important to Pavlichenko concerned a recent interview given by General Abrahamson to the “Frankfurter Allgemeine.” According to Pavlichenko, Abrahamson said that, even if the Soviet Union were to reduce its strategic offensive arms by 50 percent, it would make no difference as far as the U.S. SDI program is concerned. Pavlichenko said that the Soviet Union is prepared to offer 30 percent reductions in strategic offensive arms. However, if even 50 percent reductions would have no effect on the U.S. position regarding space-strike weapons, there seems little point to such an offer, and the situation seems hopeless.

—Pavlichenko was anxious that the United States understand how helpful the Soviet Union had been during the recent hostage crisis.

As a separate matter, which apparently did not come up in the conversation with Pavlichenko, Drell reported that Academician Velikhov had called his attention to the recent letter from Gorbachev to the Union of Concerned Scientists.⁵ This letter contains the following sentence: “At the Soviet-U.S. Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms in Geneva we are striving to reach agreement on completely banning the development, testing and deployment of space-strike systems.” Velikhov especially called Drell’s attention to the fact that the word “research” was not mentioned. Velikhov said this was significant and stated that he personally had played an important role in this formulation.

Drell said that he would report his conversation with Pavlichenko in full detail through the usual channels upon his return to California.

1. Source: Department of State, Lot 06D436, Verification, Compliance and Implementation, Subject Files, 1983–2005, Box 9, NST/START Round II July 85. Secret; Sensitive. Copied to Burt.
2. Secret; Sensitive.
3. Secret. Drafted by Ifft.
4. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted on July 15 by Ifft. Copied to Kampelman, Tower, Giltman, and Zimmermann.
5. For the text of Gorbachev July 6, 1985 letter to the Union of Concerned Scientists: Limits on Outer Space Weapons, see Documents on Disarmament, 1985, pp. 376–443.