Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

95. Telegram From Secretary of State Haig to the Department of State¹

Secto 3100.

February 14, 1982,

0200Z

SUBJECT

• Memorandum for the President: Visit to Bucharest.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. We have just concluded four hours of extensive discussions with Romanian President, Ceausescu, focusing largely on the Polish question, disarmament, the Middle East, and especially Romanian concerns about their economic difficulties. I found Ceausescu outwardly confident but clearly concerned by what he referred to as powerful strains on the situation in Europe. He appeared to take pains to disassociate himself from the Soviet Union, never once mentioning the Warsaw Pact. In fact, in his statement on international political, economic, and disarmament issues, he sounded more like the leader of a Third-World, non-aligned country than a Soviet ally.

3. I handed Ceausescu your letter on Poland² which replied to his letter to you of December 25.³ This opened a lengthy discussion of Poland during which Ceausescu agreed that our goals coincided and required an immediate lifting of martial law and normalization. He emphasized, however, that our third condition, which emphasized the need for a dialogue between the union, the Church and Solidarity, created internal problems in Poland which we should avoid. This was a reflection of the threats to his incumbency. He agreed that the Polish Government had created the problem with its own political mistakes and emphasized that he personally saw no justification for the emergency measures that had been taken. On the other hand, he considers that Jaruzelski acted to head off civil strife and outside military intervention. His most important point involved economic sanctions against Poland which he fears will drive Poland into the arms of the Soviet Union.

4. I emphasized that we had intimate knowledge of the deep Soviet involvement starting as early as March 1980, adding that you did not wish to punish the Polish people but considered that sanctions against Poland serve as an inducement for early normalization as well as pressure on the USSR. Ceausescu did not dispute this point.

5. Ceausescu avoided any discussion of sanctions against the Soviet Union, indicating that such action is appropriate. Nor did he challenge in any way the evidence provided on the Soviet role in the crackdown. Notwithstanding, he is clearly concerned about the likelihood of a further deterioration in the situation and the possibility that this might lead to Soviet military intervention. Perhaps based on wishful thinking, he expressed the view that a compromise is likely and sooner than the West expects.

6. On arms control, Ceausescu said that although he favored our initial zero option position,⁴ we should clearly be ready to accept a solution at the lowest possible level, adding that he hoped for a program with a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans.

7. On the Madrid Conference, I pointed out that you were interested in preserving the Helsinki process but, because of the Polish situation, you believed a cooling-off period would best serve this objective.

8. He agreed with our assessment that the Middle East is increasingly dangerous. Ceausescu emphasized his earlier idea of an international conference and the need for a Soviet role. I told him that you considered this to be out of the question since the Soviets have historically appeared interested in controversy rather than solutions. Using his long-standing influence with the PLO, I warned that continued terrorism against Israel would immediately generate an Israeli military response against PLO strongholds in Lebanon.

9. Ceausescu is desperate about Romania’s economic situation but appears to be scantily knowledgeable. Clearly, his main objective is to survive in an environment in which his incumbency is in jeopardy. He recognizes clearly that he is dealing with a new mood in America which will not rubber-stamp additional credits unless he demonstrates independence from Russia and concern about the excesses in Poland.

10. I believe strongly that Romania is not on the Russian wavelength, that we must encourage its independent spirit, and not pursue policies which will drive it, under a new leader, back into the Soviet embrace. This is an issue of growing significance here at home and one which I hope to discuss with you at greater length on Monday.⁵

11. All in all, the Romanian stop confirmed my own judgments of what is truly happening in Eastern Europe and the wisdom of the course you have been pursuing.⁶

12. Warmest regards. Al.

Haig

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820002–0297. Secret; Niact Immediate. The telegram was sent from the Secretary’s aircraft.
2. See Document 91.
3. See Document 83.
4. In remarks at the National Press Club on November 18, 1981, Reagan first proposed the zero option for intermediate-range nuclear forces: “The United States is prepared to cancel its deployment of Pershing II and ground-launch cruise missiles if the Soviets will dismantle their SS–20, SS–4, and SS–5 missiles.” (Public Papers: Reagan, 1981, p. 1065) The full text of his remarks is printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 69.
5. February 15. Haig met with Reagan and Clark from 1:58 to 2:36 p.m. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) No record of the meeting was found.
6. Telegram 1033 from Bucharest, February 15, conveyed the draft text of a memorandum of conversation between Haig and Romanian Foreign Minister Andrei. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820002–0303)