Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

65. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Romania¹

87201.

Washington, April 7, 1981, 0240Z

SUBJECT

• Romanian and Polish Situation.

1. (S—Entire text).

2. We would like you to call on the highest official available on Tuesday² and make the following points to him or her:

— It is clear to us that military activities around Poland have taken on a new dimension,³ and that the Soviet Union is making contingency preparations for possible military action in Poland. We have also noticed an increasing tendency in the Soviet press to depict the situation in Poland as deteriorating and as reflecting attempts by “opponents of socialism” to create “chaos and anarchy”. We view this as a possible Soviet attempt to provide justification for Soviet violation of Polish sovereignty. (Note: You might draw on other passages from the Soviet press, summarized in Moscow 4643 and 4696.)⁴

— We note with additional concern the statement by Husak at the Czechoslovak Party Congress (Prague 1400)⁵ that “the protection of the socialist system is the concern of each socialist state but also the joint concern of the states of the socialist community.” This, too, has an ominous ring in the context of the Polish situation.

— It is also clear that the Poles are having extremely serious economic and financial difficulties. These difficulties will take a considerable time to resolve. We approach Poland’s problems from a sympathetic point of view, and as the visit to Washington last week of Deputy Prime Minister Jagielski demonstrated, we want to develop our relations with Poland further on the basis of mutual respect, reciprocity and nonintervention in internal affairs. We are of course concerned that others too should follow a policy of strict nonintervention.

— If we understand the Romanian position correctly, it is that Poland should be able, and should be permitted, to resolve its own problems. Such a position of principle on the part of Romania will be much appreciated in the United States and in the West generally. It will make it easier to bolster our own bilateral relations.

— Since we put a high value on our relations with Romania, we would like to continue our confidential exchanges. In particular, should the Soviet Union begin to threaten Poland more directly, we would wish to consult Romania urgently on a most confidential basis. As DAS Barry told Ambassador Ionescu last December (State 325178)⁶ in the event of Soviet action against Poland the United States would want to be as supportive of Romania independence as possible, assuming of course that Romania did not involve itself even formally in any intervention. If there was Romanian participation, US-Romanian relations would be adversely affected.

3. You should use the occasion of this call to get Romanian views on the situation in Poland and the current Soviet attitude toward events there.⁷ Of particular interest would be Romanian insights on Brezhnev’s attendance at the Czechoslovak Party Congress and the possibility of a Warsaw Pact summit in Czechoslovakia or in connection with the GDR Party Congress beginning April 11.

Clark

1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, Romania (01/31/1981–05/14/1984). Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent Immediate for information to Moscow, Warsaw, and the White House. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.
2. April 7.
3. In the spring of 1981, several members of Solidarity were brutally beaten by the Polish security services. In protest, Solidarity planned a national strike to bring attention to the violence. At the end of March, a four-hour national warning strike took place, which many Poles participated in, essentially bringing the country to a halt for those four hours. In August 1980 in Gdansk, 16,000 Polish laborers in the Lenin Shipyards went on strike. The strike quickly spread throughout the country and led to the collapse of the Polish economy. In response, the communist government permitted the establishment of trade unions independent of the Polish Communist Party. These trade unions joined together to create the Solidarity movement. For documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VII, Poland, 1977–1981.
4. Telegram 4643 from Moscow, April 5, described Brezhnev’s departure for Prague to attend the Czechoslovak Party Congress and summarized Pravda’s coverage of the events in Poland. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810161–0378) Telegram 4696 from Moscow, April 6, contained more of Pravda’s coverage of the events in Poland. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810162–0125)
5. Telegram 1400 from Prague, April 6, contained Husak’s statements on Poland. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810162–0181)
6. Telegram 325178 to Bucharest, December 9, 1980, reported on the meeting, including Ionescu’s views on the current situation in Poland. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P870104–0547)
7. Aggrey’s report of delivering the U.S. démarche to Andrei is in telegram 2630 from Bucharest, April 7. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, Romania (01/31/1981–05/14/1984)) A Romanian response to the démarche delivered by Andrei is in telegram 2770 from Bucharest, April 11. (Ibid.)