32. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armacost) to Secretary of State Shultz1
Washington,
October 19,
1984
SUBJECT
- Policy Toward Eastern Europe
EUR has come up with a detailed action plan for Eastern Europe2 which has evoked some strong reactions from Peter Rodman and Ed Derwinski. Given the importance of the subject and the strong feelings that surround it, it would be worthwhile, I believe, to convene the key players to consider next steps. I don’t have great problems with EUR’s specific suggestions, though some could use fine tuning. But we do need to do some consciousness-raising on the same policy guidelines.
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- Our general objective remains: to nurture greater Eastern European independence from the USSR in relation to their external conduct and their domestic arrangements.
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- We should not repeat the detente period era mistake of disdaining or neglecting Eastern Europeans out of excessive sensitivity for the Soviet’s views. A key issue will be how hard to push the more visible initiatives toward Eastern Europe—particularly your trip—over the next six or eight months. Soviet power has to be taken into account, and we will need to assure that our efforts in Eastern Europe are in sync with our broader strategy vis-a-vis Moscow.
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- Differentiation should consist of negative as well as positive incentives. In this connection we must be particularly attentive to the actions of Eastern European countries in support of wider Soviet objectives (e.g. acting as surrogates for the USSR in the provision of arms to trouble makers).
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- While it may be useful on occasion to remind people publicly of our reservations about the Yalta Agreement, we should watch our rhetoric, and avoid raising questions about fidelity to the post war territorial agreements and the Berlin Accords.3 We should conduct our diplomacy the way a duck swims—placid on the surface, but paddling efficiently underneath.
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- We should talk less in public about “differentiation,” and more about “Europeanizing” Eastern Europe. This means generally increasing links to the West. We can afford to let the Western Europeans take the lead in the visible contacts; there is plenty of room for everyone to play.
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- Our relations with the GDR pose special challenges, since the German question touches Soviet and FRG nerves. Bonn need not monopolize the relationship with the GDR; We need to continue pressing them for more openness about their own contacts; but we also need to keep Bonn well informed about our own activities. I would go slow on high profile activities there, leaving it to Roz Ridgway to work the claims issues for now.
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- Your trip to Eastern Europe will require very careful planning. A separate trip to Eastern Europe—particularly before we have sorted out where we are going with the USSR—could have substantial—and possibly unintended—effects. Stopovers in several Eastern European capitals either enroute or returning from a Moscow trip might be one means of handling some of these risks.
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- Vis-a-vis the Eastern Europeans on the lower end of the differentiation spectrum, we should sustain diplomatic contact, but avoid the visible gestures. It is for that reason I have not been particularly keen about Bill Luers’ suggestions to invite a Deputy Foreign Minister from Czechoslovakia in the absence of any evident movement on either the foreign policy or domestic front in Prague.
Michael H.
Armacost4
- Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, 1984–1989, Lot 92 D 52, ES Sensitive, October 13–21, 1984. Secret. McKinley initialed and dated the top of the memorandum on October 19.↩
- See Document 31.↩
- The Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin was signed on September 3, 1971. For the text, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 1135–1143.↩
- Armacost initialed “MA” above his typed signature.↩