Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

235. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State¹

10700.

Belgrade, December 19, 1985, 1346Z

SUBJECT

• Secretary Shultz’ Visit to Yugoslavia: Talks With Foreign Minister Dizdarevic.

1. C—Entire text.

2. Summary: On December 17, the Secretary and Yugoslav Foreign Minister Dizdarevic discussed at some length U.S.-Yugoslav relations particularly economic relations and possibilities for further cooperation on combatting international terrorism. The two Secretaries and their colleagues also exchanged views on the Geneva Summit² and prospects for U.S.-Soviet relations. End summary.

3. On December 17, the Secretary held a two hour-long formal session with Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs Dizdarevic. The Secretary was accompanied by Ambassador Scanlan, Counselor Derwinski, Assistant Secretaries Ridgway and Kalb, S/P Director Rodman, Deputy Assistant Secretary Palmer, NSC officer Dobriansky, EUR/EEY Director Kuchel and Embassy Pol Counselor Miles (notetaker). The Yugoslav side included Ambassador Rakic, Assistant Secretaries Strbac, Cerovickc and Pejic, Division for Planning Director Job, Chef D’Cabinet Hornjak, North American Countries Office Director Pjanic, North American Countries Deputy Director Crnjak, and North American Countries officer Paic.

4. On Dizdarevic’s invitation the Secretary spoke first on the subject of U.S.-Yugoslav relations. Describing these relations as basically good, the Secretary emphasized that U.S. policy reflected respect for Yugoslavia’s independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty—as sell as for its “critical faculties,” its independent viewpoint.

5. The Secretary first addressed the economic aspect of the relationship noting that the U.S. was very much impressed with the progress Yugoslavia had made. Last year had been a good one. This year had begun with a slow start for reasons beyond Yugoslav control, i.e., the weather; but was beginning to show an improvement. The Secretary said that we salute Yugoslavia for standing up to its difficulties and for trying to deal with future problems. In that context, he said, we would like to be helpful as Yugoslavia continued to meet its problems head on.

6. The Secretary discussed Yugoslav exports to the U.S., describing the U.S. market as the largest one in the world and one open to Yugoslavia. He then discussed two categories of problems which might cause Yugoslavia some difficulties.

A. Steel and textiles. These are particular commodities, said the Secretary, which have special arrangements around the world. On textiles, the Secretary said that we have been able to negotiate an agreement³ which should serve our mutual purposes. Steel, he noted, was even more difficult, but we were prepared to work on this. The Secretary said that he understood that the Yugoslavs had a VRA proposal to look at and he noted that this would be one way of proceeding.

B. Dumping and counter-vailing duties: This, said the Secretary, was part of the rules of the game and was fundamentally consistent with fair trade. As cases arose, they would be handled specifically and in a fair manner. As regards steel and textiles, this applied on a world-wide basis. It was not directed against Yugoslavia.

7. The Secretary said that the basic point on which he wanted to assure Dizdarevic was that Yugoslavia had open access to the U.S. market. The concept used in the U.S. was one of a level playing field for everyone. This applied also to Yugoslavia—with one exception, and that one was in Yugoslavia’s favor. Yugoslavia benefitted from GSP arrangements.

8. The Secretary also emphasized our interest in trade to Yugoslavia. In the field of nuclear energy, he said he wanted to put in a particular plug for Westinghouse as a supplier. With regard to military aircraft engines, the Secretary noted that there were two competitors from the U.S. Both products were very good. The Secretary asked only that these decisions be made on a competitive basis. We seek no special political favor, he emphasized and we hope we will not lose out because of some political favor to someone else.

9. The Secretary noted in passing our intention to work with Yugoslavia in the new GATT round and in the preparatory committee.

10. The Secretary then turned to the problem of terrorism. This world-wide problem had become close to the number one concern of the American people. We think, he emphasized, that people engaged in terrorist activity are a threat to civilized government and to our citizens. The Secretary noted the connection, particularly in Latin America, between terrorists and drug smuggling. He described the tendency for international terrorists to target U.S. citizens and installations abroad. The Secretary noted that we were developing our intelligence, our capability, our defensive arrangements and, in a sense, we had shifted philosophical gears in the U.S. on this issue. On the whole, he said, we had acted with great restraint, but our patience was wearing thin.

11. So we did take action, said the Secretary, when we saw the prospects of the Achille Lauro hijackers escaping justice.⁴ Despite the dissatisfaction of our Italian and Egyptian friends we were successful and four of the hijackers will be brought to trial. The Secretary said that the U.S. and Yugoslavia had discussed the Abu Abbas matter and that he did not want to belabor this now. Abu Abbas had been judged by the Italian authorities to have had some involvement in the affair. We see no excuse, said the Secretary, for hijackers to seize a ship and to kill and harass innocent passengers. We believe, he emphasized, that such terrorists should have no place to hide and that no quarter should be given them.

12. The Secretary noted Ambassador Oakley’s recent, successful visit to Yugoslavia.⁵ The Secretary said that he just wanted Dizdarevic to know how seriously the U.S. took this problem. The Secretary concluded by expressing our readiness to work with Yugoslavia on this problem.

13. Federal Secretary Dizdarevic said that he shared the Secretary’s assessment of our stable relations and prospects for further development. The Yugoslav view was that bilateral relations were good as was the general atmosphere. Dizdarevic said that the Secretary’s visit was regarded as a continuation of the ongoing U.S.-Yugoslav dialogue on matters of mutual interest. Dizdarevic emphasized that Yugoslav intentions were to build good and stable relations with the U.S. on the basis of principles of full mutual respect for independence, equal rights and non-interference in internal affairs. There had to be complete respect for the different system of the two countries which caused different viewpoints. This was normal even when it led to sharp differences and undesirable developments from time to time. Our experience, said Dizdarevic, was that it was best not to dramatize these differences. With a reliance on the principles of the relationship and with mutual respect it was possible to overcome difficulties which appeared. Even in difficult international conditions, said Dizdarevic, we had managed to develop and to maintain our good relations and cooperation. This was important not only for our two countries, but had a broader international significance. Dizdarevic repeated his comments about the importance of the Secretary’s visit in the context of high-level political dialogue between the two countries and he reminded the Secretary of the standing invitation for President Reagan to visit Yugoslavia. Dizdarevic described Yugoslav hopes for visits by Mr. Baker and Mr. Baldrige and for a visit to the U.S. by Federal Executive Council Vice President Zemljaric. Dizdarevic noted Yugoslav satisfaction with the exchange of visits between Congress and the Yugoslav Federal Assembly. He expressed the hope that this sort of intensive exchange would continue.

14. Dizdarevic said that while Prime Minister Planinc would concentrate on the economic side of the relationship and on the world economic situation, he wanted to mention one area: we want cooperation in the military-economic sphere to continue, he said. This was in our mutual interest even though this cooperation had decreased. The GOY, he said, believed there were great possibilities in this area. The Secretary responded positively noting the Joint Military Commission meeting scheduled for 1986.

15. Dizdarevic picked up the Secretary’s earlier comment about aircraft engines. We are interested, he emphasized, adding that there was no doubt of Yugoslavia’s intent to build its own military aircraft for which cooperation would be needed on the engine.

16. Dizdarevic said that he could corroborate what the Secretary had said about GATT. U.S.-Yugoslav cooperation in the preparatory commission was useful and should continue, despite differences.

17. As for terrorism, said Dizdarevic, we regard this as a very difficult (“tezak”) problem in the modern world. It was absolutely necessary to have the entire international community solve it and to combat it through international cooperation. Dizdarevic described Yugoslavia’s effort to reconcile the three anti-terrorist resolutions currently before the UNGA so that one could be passed by consensus. Dizdarevic said that the GOY was aware of the general feeling in the U.S. on this issue. He described the long history of violent acts by anti-GOY terrorists since 1945 and noted that only this year the authorities had rounded up a large group of anti-GOY terrorists who were preparing to carry out terrorist attacks in the FRG and in Yugoslavia.

18. Dizdarevic described the difficulties Yugoslavia faced in dealing with the terrorist threat. It had open borders for its own citizens and for foreigners. Visas had been abolished with over 70 countries. Over 15,000 Arab students (sic) were resident in Yugoslavia. Dizdarevic then described the expulsion a few years ago of a group of Arab students who had been surveilling the American Embassy.

19. Dizdarevic listed three points on this issue. The GOY, he said:

— Clearly distinguished between terrorism and the national liberation struggle.

— Believed that the same standard should be applied to all terrorism. It did not believe in a double standard regardless of who or what was involved.

— Was convinced that in the struggle against terrorism, the causes which led to terrorist activities also had to be dealt with.

20. In conclusion, Dizdarevic said that he believed that the GOY should cooperate in this area. The GOY had very positively evaluated the talks Ambassador Oakley had conducted in Belgrade and a team of Yugoslav experts would soon visit the U.S. in response to Oakley’s invitation. We are prepared for their cooperation, he repeated, but it was important to give the professionals some scope and to avoid politicizing things. Dizdarevic agreed with the Secretary however when the latter said that nonetheless things quickly came to the political level when someone was killed.

21. In response to Dizdarevic’s invitation, the Secretary described his view of U.S.-Soviet relations in the wake of the Geneva Summit. The Secretary began by noting that, with all the support of the bureaucracy, the summit was essentially a meeting between the two leaders. Both in the lengthy private meetings and in the plenary sessions, this was so. The talks were conducted without any acrimony, but with candor and frankness. Both the President and Gorbachev came to Geneva with a desire to engage on real issues and not to avoid them.

22. The President, the Secretary continued, came away feeling the exchange was quite worthwhile. He felt he had learned something about Soviet views. The discussion showed, said the Secretary, that there were many issues of deep difference between us. There was a hard road ahead before these would be resolved. But, the Secretary continued, there were also clear areas of common interest. And there was a capacity at Geneva to agree on things when that was possible.

23. The Secretary told Dizdarevic that we were working hard on the post-Geneva follow up. We had started immediately. This was so not only within the USG, but also in our interactions with the Soviets through our Ambassadors in Moscow and Washington. The Secretary said that his impression was that the Soviets were taking the follow up as seriously as were we. The Secretary said that Geneva had caused some motion in almost all areas of arms control and we were following up on this. A variety of things in the bilateral area had been agreed to and we would try to get them in place and working. This, said the Secretary, was of great significance. The Secretary observed that much of the tension in the relationship came from activities in various flash points around the world. These were described to Gorbachev, and we hope to follow up, both by a continuation of the experts’ talks but also by more frequent meetings at the Foreign Minister level.

24. The Secretary said that human rights was an area of immense importance to us. The President had decided that the best way to handle this was privately between himself and Gorbachev and, without saying any more about it, that was the way it was done.

25. As a general proposition, said the Secretary, we approached the summit in a constructive spirit. We like to have predictable, stable relations, but these must be founded on good agreements. We are not interested in one-sided agreements.

26. The Secretary asked Assistant Secretary Ridgway and Deputy Assistant Secretary Palmer if they would like to add a few comments. Ridgway mentioned two points: the personal relationship between the two men and the problem of managing expectations. On the former, she noted the establishment of the ability of the two leaders to deal with different issues on a personal basis. This did not make our differences easier to resolve, but it did add a new and important dimension to the process of resolving them. With regard to managing expectations, she noted the appreciation from many quarters that expectations were dealt with in a measured and appropriate way. The outcome was appropriate for a first meeting. There was now a sense that the second meeting contained particular challenges. If expectations were too high, there would be disappointment: if too low then perhaps we would not achieve all that we might. So, Ridgway concluded, as we organized our work looking toward the second meeting we were trying to take full advantage of the personal relationship which had now been established and we faced the very real challenge of managing expectations and accomplishing that which could be accomplished.

27. Palmer said that given Yugoslavia’s direct interest in the Third World and the Non-Aligned Movement, he would like to say a few words about the summit discussions on regional issues. It was important, he said, that the two leaders recognized that the U.S. and the Soviet Union were not alone and could not solve these problems alone. There was also a strong desire on the part of both leaders to move from exchanging very different opinions on these issues to actually doing some work on them. The Secretary had mentioned, said Palmer, the important role these issues had played in causing the U.S.-Soviet relationship to go off track. This also affected our arms control efforts. If we, with the participation of the non-aligned and other countries, could make progress on these regional issues, that would positively influence our overall relationship. In particular, said Palmer, Afghanistan and Southern Africa were two issues on which Yugoslavia could help. This would have a beneficial effect on the problem areas themselves but also on a broader international spectrum.

28. Dizdarevic thanked the Secretary and his colleagues for their comments. Noting the great interest with which all the world had followed the summit, he said that no matter how much was said or written in public, one remained apprehensive that things were really as firm as they appeared. The Yugoslav position was clear, he said. Yugoslavia had very positively assessed the summit and its results and gave full support to the renewal of the U.S.-Soviet dialogue. Dizdarevic expressed appreciation for the Secretary’s personal involvement and for the visit to Belgrade of Ambassador Tower immediately after the summit. He said that, in comparing Ambassador Tower’s information with that received from the Soviet Government, the GOY had concluded that there were quite a few points in common. The GOY felt the results exceeded what the “realists” had expected—taking into account, he added, Assistant Secretary Ridgway’s comments. Dizdarevic then recounted an anecdote in which President Tito had said that the one thing most needed in the U.S.-Soviet relationship was trust. The GOY, said Dizdarevic, knew how much effort was needed to build confidence and trust when they were lacking. Nonetheless, the GOY hoped that the two countries would soon be able to take specific steps at least on those issues where common interests were expressed.

29. Dizdarevic said that the GOY assessed Gorbachev as being very firm in his orientation in favor of dialogue, negotiation, reaching agreements. His policy and that of his team was aimed in that direction. If one looked at what Gorbachev had achieved in only nine months, one had to see that he had brought a certain dynamism to Soviet policy. Surely, said Dizdarevic, he can achieve even more in a longer period. The GOY, emphasized Dizdarevic, was certain that Gorbachev was a reliable partner. He would not make any concessions on the basic strategic interests of the Soviet Union, but would seek equal treatment. He would try to carry out that which had been written at Geneva, i.e., neither party would seek supremacy. The GOY had also noted that in Gorbachev’s report to the Supreme Soviet, he had rejected anything “one-sided.” Dizdarevic commented that the Secretary had made a similar comment.

30. Dizdarevic said that he was going to Moscow in early January and would be most interested to hear Soviet views.

31. Dizdarevic reminded the Secretary of their interrupted conversation in New York on regional problems. He repeated the support—and the “demands”—of the Non-Aligned Movement for U.S.-Soviet negotiations and for relaxation of tension and added that he wanted to describe also the “fears” of the other countries of the world. The world suffers, said Dizdarevic, when there was confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and that was why there were calls and demands for talks and on easing of tension. But, he went on, there was also fear of “bipolarization” when U.S.-Soviet talks were progressing and agreements were being reached. Such fears were present now, emphasized Dizdarevic. Quite a few non-aligned countries, he said, had noticed that in contrast to previous summit documents, the Geneva Summit statement had mentioned bilateral but not multilateral talks. Dizdarevic gave his view that in any discussion of regional problems and crisis points, there should be broader participation—by those concerned and those who could contribute. People were afraid, said Dizdarevic, that these problems were being approached only from the standpoint of the two superpowers or the two blocs. There can be no relaxation of tensions in the world without relaxation of tensions between the two superpowers. But, asked Dizdarevic rhetorically, can relaxation of tensions between the two superpowers be durable if not accompanied by a broader relaxation of tension and a better international atmosphere on the whole.

32. Finally, said Dizdarevic, there was the positive element. The Non-Aligned Movement of over 100 nations could be an enormous bridge to understanding. It can help to overcome confrontation and can offer broad support for an easing of tension. It has no other position.

Scanlan

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D850913–0156. Confidential; Immediate. Shultz visited Belgrade December 17–18.
2. Reagan and Gorbachev met in Geneva November 19–21. See Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Documents 150–159.
3. See KAV 2164, which amended TIAS 9447.
4. See footnote 4, Document 233.
5. Telegram 8256 from Belgrade, September 30, provides an overview of Director of the Office for Combating Terrorism Robert Oakley’s meetings during his trip to Yugoslavia. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D850696–0060)