Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

151. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Romania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia¹

138929.

Washington, May 7, 1987, 2015Z

SUBJECT

• CSCE Commission Hearing/Hungarian Minorities.

REF

• State 134330.²

1. DAS Thomas Simons testified, May 5, at CSCE Commission hearing, chaired by Congressman Steny Hoyer,³ on the Hungarian minorities in Romania and Czechoslovakia. At Hoyer’s request, Simons read his entire opening statement (text provided reftel). Appearing with Simons on a panel of witnesses were Geza Szocs, ethnic Hungarian poet and human rights activist, George Schopflin, London School of Economics, and Robert Robertson, Occidental Petroleum. In addition to Hoyer, Commission members in attendance for the opening of the session were: Senator DeConcini⁴ and Congressmen Edward Feighan⁵ and Chris Smith.⁶ Congressman Lantos,⁷ not a Commission member, also participated. Commissioners’ questions focused exclusively on the situation in Romania.

2. Hoyer opened the hearing with a statement noting that the Commission had received reports of increasing repression of the Hungarian minority in Romania. He also said he had learned of several anti-Hungarian incidents—such as vandalism of Hungarian cultural monuments—which had taken place in Slovakia in recent months. He said that he shared the “pessimism” of many of his colleagues in the Congress on the Romanian situation, and that when he has raised the Hungarian minority issue with Romanian officials, they inevitably have responded with charges of irredentism and chauvinism. He said that it has been nearly impossible to engage the Romanians’ attention on the specific concerns of the Hungarian minority. Hoyer noted that he and other Commission members were planning to visit Romania in August or September.

2. In the question period, Hoyer stated that the Commission had no intention of dealing with the matter of territorial boundaries; this was beyond its charter. But the Commission was concerned, he said, about the exercise of individual human rights regardless of national boundaries. He pointed to the April 30 House vote to suspend Romanian MFN for six months as a significant, bipartisan expression of the Congress’ concern that our policy of seeking influence with Romania through the MFN relationship had lost its utility and no longer was producing satisfactory results. He continued that he personally had voted against the Wolf Amendment⁸ (the Commission did not take a position on it), explaining that he was reluctant to undercut the annual Jackson-Vanik review process. However, he maintained that the House vote sent a clear message to the GOR that substantial action on our human rights concerns is necessary if our bilateral economic relationship is to continue.

3. Simons, in response to Hoyer’s question about “cultural genocide” in Romania, said that he was not persuaded that total assimilation is the actual policy of the Romanian leadership. He noted that, as in the U.S., the assimilation of minorities to a large degree was an inevitable side effect of development, regardless of the national leadership’s intentions. However, he said that he was satisfied that local authorities in Transylvania were indeed engaged in practices that suggested a policy of assimilation, and that we objected to this. He added that at the lower levels of the social and economic scale, it was possible for individuals to remain within a minority culture but that those seeking mobility and advancement faced a genuine danger of losing their ethnic identity.

4. Simons said that the situation of the entire Romanian population was deteriorating as a result of the government’s drive for industrialization and rapid retirement of external debts, and that our reports suggest that the Hungarian minority bears a disproportionate share of the burden. But he maintained that with regard to a national policy of systematic discrimination against the Hungarian minority, the evidence was mixed.

5. Hoyer asked about the administration’s upcoming decision on Romanian MFN renewal, and how Simons would respond to those who advocate a suspension of MFN. Simons replied that there was a full range of views within the administration on Romanian MFN, and he did not want to predict the President’s decision. He said we had opposed the Wolf Amendment because it interfered with the orderly review/renewal process set up under Jackson-Vanik. Simons continued that since 1975, all administrations had determined that, despite Romania’s poor human rights record, the MFN relationship was worthwhile because it provided leverage to make incremental improvements in conditions there. He went on to cite our use of MFN as a tool to stimulate emigration, the release of political prisoners and religious activists and other actions such as assurances re the preservation/replacement of church buildings and the printing of Protestant Bibles. He added that for over a decade, the MFN relationship had produced results but that the question this year, as in previous years, was whether it was producing enough.

6. Hoyer asked about the adverse effects of suspending MFN. Simons replied that either suspension or termination of MFN would result in a severe decline of U.S. influence on Romania with respect to a broad range of human rights issues; that the GOR would no longer be open to a dialogue on these matters, and that emigration to the U.S. would dwindle down to practically nothing. (He noted it was unclear what the effect would be on emigration to the FRG and Israel). Our capacity to work to improve conditions in Romania would be severely impaired, he said.

7. The other panelists all made brief statements. Szocs, a former editor of “Ellenpontok” who emigrated last August and is now living in Switzerland, detailed the GOR’s policy of “denationalization and forced assimilation.” He said the Romanian population looked to the United States as the guardian of democracy and freedom and was “disillusioned and demoralized whenever it is constrained to witness any recognition or support granted by the United States to the very dictatorship which oppresses them.”

8. London School of Economics Lecturer Schopflin gave a brief historical overview of the Hungarian minorities. He said it is still an open question whether the Romanian and Slovak leaderships were aiming unequivocally at “ethnic homogenization,” as both needed the minority as “a way of underpinning their nationalist credentials.” Any post-Ceausescu government, he said, “will need support wherever it can find it, at home or abroad,” and this meant “finding accommodation with as many social groups as possible and this includes the Hungarian minority.”

9. Schopflin also said that the “Hungarian Government uses the minority issue to mobilize support at home, as a way of distracting attention from a deteriorating economic situation and, more broadly, deflecting attention from Hungary’s greatest national problem: subordination to the Soviet Union. In the short term, much of the Hungarian’s national identity has come to be identified with the Romanian question. The minority in Slovakia has an analogous though less salient role to play:” Gorbachev, he said, appeared to have little patience for nationality questions, viewing them as distractions from the real task of ensuring that the USSR and its allies maintain their position in the world. Hence, Gorbachev is perfectly capable of putting pressure on Ceausescu to moderate his anti-Hungarian policies in order to defuse tensions.

10. Robertson, who said he was appearing on behalf of American Businesses for International Trade (ABIT), an organization of U.S. firms that do business with Romania, told of his recent travels in Romania. He said he saw no pattern of discrimination against ethnic Hungarians and maintained that MFN leverage was paying off in a better Romanian track record on human and religious rights. During the question period, he pointed out that, in March, he had had an opportunity to raise several specific human rights issues directly with Ceausescu, and that such access would be lost if MFN were withdrawn.

11. Full statements of panelists have been pouched to addressee posts.⁹

Wallis

1. Source: Department of State, Records from Ambassador Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Lot 03 D 256, Chron, May 1987. Unclassified; Immediate. Sent Priority for information to Munich. Drafted by Schlamm; cleared by Robert Perito (EUR/EEY); approved by Simons.
2. Telegram 134330 to Bucharest, Budapest, and Belgrade, May 4, contained the text of Simons’s statement at the CSCE Commission hearing on the treatment of Hungarian minorities in Romania and Czechoslovakia. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870343–0488)
3. Steny Hoyer (D–MD).
4. Dennis DeConcini (D–AZ).
5. Edward Feighan (D–OH).
6. Christopher Smith (R–NJ).
7. Tom Lantos (D–CA).
8. The Wolf Amendment (H. Amdt. 64) to the House revision of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness bill (H.R. 3) would suspend Romania’s MFN status and provide for a review every 6 months. Following the review, the President could reinstate MFN status if he determined and certified to Congress that Romania had made significant progress in granting freedom to emigrate and other political and religious freedoms. The House of Representatives approved the amendment.
9. Not found.