Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

93. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, September 19, 1985

SUBJECT

• Preparing for Gorbachev

Early this week I gave you my views on the attitude we should take toward your meeting with Gorbachev in Geneva.² And I put down my thoughts on organizing our approach to the American people and our allies.

This memo is about substance. That means arms control. We have a wide range of issues on the agenda and we do not want to encourage the perception that arms control is the be-all and end-all at Geneva. The reality, however, is that the meeting will not be seen as a success without some progress in that area.

Media and Congressional attention to the arms control issue at Geneva is building up fast. As usual, it is not helpful and distorts the reality. But we should not let it distort our preparations.

As always, the Soviets are saying that arms control negotiations can go nowhere unless we make unilateral concessions. It’s the same old line:

• In the 1970’s they said no progress was possible unless we abandoned the cruise missile.

• Then they said no progress was possible if we deployed PII’s and GLCMs in Europe.

• When we did deploy, they said no progress until we dismantled them.

• Then MX was designated as the obstacle to progress.

• Now, of course, SDI is supposed to be the mortal enemy of arms control.

So the debate at the moment, in the press and on the Hill, is over whether we should “bargain away” SDI in order to get substantial offensive cuts on the Soviet side.

This, of course, is nonsense. We have to resist it. There can be no question of our deviating from going ahead with SDI. Only if a strategic defense system is seen to be deployable within the next decade or so, and only if our will to deploy it is proved credible, can we expect to change the basis of global security and stability for the better.

But even our own internal debate—especially as it appears in the press—seems to assume that the choice we face is either to go full speed ahead with SDI without reference to Geneva or to somehow “bargain it away.”

That’s not the way we should define the question.

As I see it, the point is (1) how to ensure that we get the full benefit of SDI’s enormous potential—not only in terms strategically significant to our security, but in negotiations as well; and (2) what is the best way to ensure that SDI becomes a permanent fixture of our strategic posture, and not another costly program under perpetual attack by the media and voted on by Congress every few months, under constant threat of emasculation or cancellation.

There is one key reality that we must face: SDI will not be deployable before the end of your Administration.

So at the time in 1989 when we must hand over the SDI program to your successors in office it will be a fact that:

—the research program will not yet have achieved the necessary criteria of effectiveness;

—effective deployed defenses will still be a long way off;

And, as circumstances develop, it may well be that:

—the program then will be under attack by Congress and the media for its cost, for its alleged violations of the ABM treaty, and for having undermined the traditional arms control regime based on the concept of deterrence through the threat of massive destruction.

—and the Soviets could be well into a program of offensive buildup designed to saturate our defenses.

We want to avoid this situation. We want to protect SDI against its enemies and ensure that it will be a sustained program over the next several decades. To do so, we need to shape it so that by 1988 it will be in the form of a legacy that your successor will want to honor and be able to sustain.

And this, in turn, will depend upon whether SDI is part of an arms control process which the Soviets are locked into or is a “U.S.-only” program going forward while arms control efforts are going nowhere.

So the best way to keep SDI alive and widely supported may be to demonstrate that it is the key to real arms reductions heading toward a future of no nuclear weapons.

This suggests that we need to use the enormous leverage provided by the SDI program now, while it is at its maximum, to produce an agreement serving our goals of reducing the risk of war by radically reducing the number and effectiveness of offensive nuclear weapons. This is what Margaret Thatcher advocated in her September 12 message to you—“We would maintain and strengthen the existing arms control regime while building a better one for the future.”³

The agreed reductions would in no way foreclose but would facilitate a jointly managed, phased transition to greater reliance on defenses.

Our approach also would include these aspects:

• The ABM Treaty would be retained.

• The deep cuts would have to be tailored to be strategically significant. Numerical reductions alone would not necessarily solve the problem.

• We would demand that the Soviets come into compliance with all existing arms control treaties.

• SDI research, with the development and testing permitted by a fully clarified ABM Treaty, would continue to preserve the long-term option of SDI deployment and to hedge against Soviet non-compliance with the agreement.

Admittedly, this approach seeks to get the best of both worlds for us: SDI goes forward as the wholly new development that it is but at the same time we use it to try to get the kind of real reductions in offensive weapons that have been sought for years.

So by proceeding to research SDI and holding its deployment over the Soviet’s heads, we provide it with the best chance for long-term existence and effectiveness—yet at the same time making the most of it in terms of short-term progress and increased Congressional and allied support.

This is the context of the attached talking points, prepared in the format of something for your use with Gorbachev at Geneva.⁴

1. Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron September 1985 (4/6). Secret; Sensitive. In a handwritten note on the attached routing slip, Poindexter wrote: “Route to: Jack Matlock. Ron Lehman (share with Bob Linhard) Hold close—don’t acknowledge that you have it. JP.”
2. See Document 88.
3. On September 12, Thatcher wrote Reagan to convey her thoughts on the upcoming meeting with Gorbachev. Thatcher’s letter and Reagan’s response are in the Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1985 September Mtg w/ E. Shevardnadze. The letter is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. VIII, Western Europe, 1985–1988.
4. Attached but not printed at Tab 1 are the talking points. In his memoir, Shultz noted: “I put together talking points to show the president how he might express these matters to Gorbachev. I had long since learned that the president’s mind was engaged not so much through briefing books as through an active process that involved him in give-and-take and a feel for his operational role. My talking points included the idea that we ‘cannot excise from men’s minds the knowledge of how to make nuclear weapons, particularly nuclear missile systems. Unless you and we have nonnuclear defenses capable of countering such delivery systems, there would exist an enormous temptation for men to build them clandestinely in the hope this would enable them to exercise immense power in the world.’ The talking points helped to engage President Reagan actively, to set him thinking about his personal role. But the occasion itself was a long way off. I wanted to see him get involved, but I didn’t want him to leave his fight in the dressing room.” (Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 576)