Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

85. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, September 13, 1985

SUBJECT

• Billington’s Letter: Further Thoughts on Strategy for Geneva²

Flowing out of the meetings this week and our previous discussion, here are some thoughts about how to structure our public and private approach to the Geneva meeting:

1. We must regain the public diplomacy offensive by mid-October, and reach a peak as the President goes into the meeting in November.

2. To be and seem serious, we need to lay the private groundwork (with the Soviets) during the Shevardnadze meetings.

3. We should be prepared to present first to the Soviets, then to the public a comprehensive vision of the future, stated in as positive terms as possible, which shifts the focus to our strengths and Soviet weaknesses.

a. The greatest Soviet weakness (in world public opinion) is their policy of building, then using military force. It is what underlies all the other problems.

b. We have to get this point across to them, and not be deflected by other issues in concentrating on it. The point to them should be the hard-headed one that it is dangerous and it won’t work—not that it is immoral (the latter point is for the public).

c. Proceeding from this issue leads naturally into a discussion of the virtues on both sides of an evolving posture based more on defense, both conventional and nuclear.

d. Simply talking to the Soviets about it is, of course, not enough. We need an eye-catching proposal that we can put out in public—discuss it with Shevardnadze in some (perhaps not complete) fashion, then make it part of the President’s “vision” in his UN address.³

e. Another basic Soviet weakness, as seen by everybody, is their closed society. We can exploit that best by making positive proposals which have the effect of opening the closed society or forcing the regime to defend its indefensible stance on the matter.

4. Though a proposal to deal with the use of force in practical terms would help put matters in the proper context, we also need a more striking public—and private—enunciation of our arms control goals. This need not (indeed should not) embody “concessions” but should be a redefinition of what we have been saying all along, but presented in a way that it seems new, and captures the heart of the President’s vision.

5. These can then be buttressed by additional proposals in the area of cooperation, communication, contact and dialogue. Some of Jim Billington’s ideas are relevant here. It would fit the vision as steps which promote understanding and peaceful interaction. Some should be very ambitious, and not seem trivial or belittling.

6. All of the above is easier said than done. Whether it really works will depend on whether we can come up with a coherent package soon enough. As a very tentative, and purely illustrative, first stab, I would envision it as having elements like the following:

a. Propose that the U.S. and Soviet Union commit themselves not to use their own military forces or support military intervention of other outside powers in civil struggles in other countries, with the proviso that any forces now engaged in such struggles will be withdrawn within 18 months, at which time the pledge will become operative. (Obviously, it would have to be worded so that it does not impinge upon the right to collective self defense against external aggression, and would be dependent upon strict agreed definitions of what constitutes a civil struggle and what constitutes support to interventionist surrogates.)

We may find in trying to draft this one that it is too tricky to work. Certainly, I have no illusions that the Soviets would agree to the sort of conditions which would be acceptable to us. But if we could find a way to phrase it, such a proposal could give us a lot of high ground. After all, they are fighting in Afghanistan and we don’t have our own troops in combat anywhere. We would be saying, if you knock it off, we will not be constrained to counter you militarily—which I believe in fact gets at the nub of the matter.

b. On strategic arms, translate our current proposals into numbers—or figures which can be easily grasped, concentrating on the degree of reductions. This need not contain anything radically new, but we need something to capture imaginations. For example, 50% reduction in warheads over a seven year period, with a commitment to negotiate another 50% reduction in the decade which follows. The more ambitious the reduction seems, the better. The further out the commitment, the less practical—but the better it will look in headlines. (Obviously, a lot of thought must be given to the precise figures used, and the time periods; my point is that we have to make it simple and ambitious.)

c. On INF (which we should not neglect, given European attitudes), I believe Mike Glitman has some ideas which deserve careful thought.

d. On defense and space, we should stress the point that we take the commitment to avoid an arms race in space seriously. The most dramatic step to avoid such a race would be a radical reduction of ballistic warheads which use space. Then a discussion of the desirability of using space for defense, not offense could follow. Then, if we could find a responsible formula which would convey the nub of how we might achieve an agreed transition with protection to both sides, it would round out our position on this issue.

The objective of b, c and d, taken together, would be to move the terms of the debate away from the perceived and false proposition that SDI is the enemy of nuclear reductions. We need to find a way to demonstrate in relatively simple terms why this is not so. In other words, on this as well as the other issues, we need more than a critique of the Soviet position; we need to state our case in positive, practical terms.⁴

e. Regarding communication, the basic thrust should be that we are two very different societies which must learn to live with each other in peace. Anything which breaks down the barriers to communication and bolsters confidence will contribute to a peaceful world in the future. We must break the barriers which keep our peoples from sharing their thoughts, hopes and dreams—and the riches of the cultural life in both countries. We must no longer be content with trivial steps; the problem is too deep for them to have much effect. So far as contacts are concerned, we could propose some dramatic things:

—A massive exchange of undergraduate students. As a start, at least 5,000 each way for a year of study in the other country.⁵

—A substantial increase in exchange professors: from the score or so at present to a few hundred, at least.

—Regular mechanisms for exchanging views in the media, such as:

—Annual TV messages by the leaders of both countries;

—At least an hour each month of televised discussion by officials of each government on TV in both countries.

—Regular exchanges or articles in the print media—specified numbers and frequency.

—Establishment of cultural centers in our respective countries, including libraries, exhibition space and facilities for the performing arts, all with uncontrolled access.⁶

—A massive expansion of “sister-city” relationships, with at least one “people-to-people” visit each year, each way. Goal: 100 cities paired within a year.

f. Some new “cooperative” projects:

—Peaceful use of space: already proposed, no response. We should flesh out and include this in the public presentation.

—A joint “environmental preservation” project along the rim of the Bering Sea could have possibilities. As you will recall, Robert O. Anderson was pushing this last year; State was cautious but not totally negative; I don’t know what sort of problems Defense might see in it—there are doubtless some.⁷ Although it could have considerable symbolic value, I am inclined to think we don’t have time to staff it properly.

—A proposal to cooperate in developing microcomputer educational software for secondary school instruction might be a relatively safe one which has Soviet interest (Velikhov has mentioned it to me) and could serve a dual purpose: the massive introduction of microcomputers into Soviet society—if they ever let it happen—could do a lot to open up the flow of information and to bring real pressures to bear on centralized controls. But the offer would seem magnanimous: help in solving one of their real and acknowledged problems.⁸

—Some CBM’s could also be worked in, either here (as cooperative measures) or as adjuncts to arms control.

7. What is excluded: I have omitted trade and human rights from the above. I have done so because I believe this should, for a time at least, be handled very privately. The message should be: we expect some meaningful changes; you know what they are. If you move there, we will take a careful look at what we can do to promote peaceful trade, and you will see some meaningful movement. If you want more details, we can talk about it privately. The important thing, however, is what happens. And there should be no illusion that we will consider the meeting a success if there is not some significant movement in this area.

8. Shevardnadze meeting: I believe the President could lay the private groundwork for the public enunciation of his vision by telling Shevardnadze at the outset that he is dissatisfied with the state of preparations for the Geneva meeting. He has reviewed the preparations, and while he has no problem with anything, it seems to him much too cautious. He can talk a bit about the enormous responsibility he and Gorbachev have, and why he thinks we need major steps to get the two countries on a more positive course.

This would lead him into presenting some of the ideas above, and allow him to set the context for discussion. He would not debate the ideological points but go right to his agenda, describing it and the rationale for it.

9. The public diplomacy follow-up: We should subtly shift our current presentation by putting increasing stress on what the President wants to achieve; if asked why we have “lowered expectations” we should explain that we have done so because the Soviets have not yet been willing to engage us on the concrete issues sufficiently for us to judge that they will be constructive, but that we want to make the most out of the meeting that we can.

In his October 24 speech, the President would set forth the high points of his proposals. We could then make sure that every day something is done to keep them in the public eye. Then, on the eve of his departure, he could do a TV address to the nation in which he conveyed his vision of the future, making clear that he can’t do it alone, and if progress proves difficult, it is not because he failed to reach out and offer a less threatening and more cooperative future.

10. To conclude, I believe we risk allowing ourselves to be maneuvered into a position whereby the Soviets are defining the agenda for the public, unless we formulate our policies in forward-looking, positive terms. The Soviets doubtless calculate that they are putting the pressure on what they believe to be our weakness: our need to bring our people along on any policy in a free and open debate. It is not really a weakness, however, unless we act as if it is. And we are acting as if it is so long as we confine ourselves largely to criticism of the Soviet positions—however valid this criticism may be. The public wants to be given hope that problems can be solved—or at least alleviated. To say they are insoluble may be true, but sounds like defeatism, which is not the way Americans address problems.

Our basic national strength is our democracy. We have to use this creatively and mobilize its virtues behind a creative and visionary (in the best sense) policy. We should not act as if we are afraid our people can be hoodwinked (although, of course, some can be), but go forward with a positive message. The greatest asset we have is our President, who has an unparallelled capacity to lead the nation when he sets an ambitious course. So let us not get bogged down in debating every secondary and tertiary issue, but help him find a positive message which can rally the nation behind him as he goes to Geneva, and protect his leadership if Gorbachev is unable to respond.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you authorize me to organize two very small groups to work up some concepts along these lines in the regional issues and bilateral areas. I could provide the interface with the Lehman/Linhard group for the arms control component. Don Fortier and Steve Sestanovich could be helpful on the regional issues side, plus perhaps Peter Rodman from State. On the bilateral, informational and contacts side of things, I believe I should work with Walt Raymond, Mark Palmer and perhaps one of Charlie Wick’s people. (Individually, these are not quite as sensitive as some of the others, but we will need to draw on specialist advice.)

If you agree in principle, I will provide a precise list of the people to be involved for your approval before proceeding (and of course would welcome your suggestions). What I have in mind is, in effect, three discrete groups: (1) regional issues; (2) bilateral, information and communication, and (3) arms control (identical with the one being organized by Lehman and Linhard). A very small group (say, one from each of the three subgroups) would then assemble the components for principals.⁹

1. Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron September 1985 (2/6). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Not for System. Sent for action. Sent through Poindexter, who wrote in the right-hand margin: “Bud, this looks very promising.” McFarlane responded below: “I agree. Let’s share it with Shultz.”
2. James H. Billington, who was then Director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, sent McFarlane a letter on September 3, attached but not printed, providing analysis on Gorbachev and the Soviet positions and possible opportunities the upcoming summit could present. In an undated, handwritten cover note to Matlock forwarding the letter, McFarlane wrote: “Jack, This is imaginative. We need some ‘new’ ideas. Please review personally w/o coord and give me your private views. Thx Bud.” (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron September 1985 (2/6)) On September 5, Matlock responded in a brief memorandum to McFarlane, explaining he was leaving for a speaking engagement in Nashville and would “send more careful thoughts” later. The longer September 13 memorandum, printed here, provided Matlock’s more complete analysis.
3. Reagan addressed the 40th session of the UN General Assembly on October 24; see Public Papers: Reagan, 1985, Book II, pp. 1285–1290. See also Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 253.
4. McFarlane drew a vertical line in the left-hand margin and wrote “I agree.”
5. McFarlane placed a check mark in the left-hand margin next to this and the subsequent two points and wrote “good” next to each.
6. McFarlane placed a check mark in the left-hand margin next to this and the subsequent point.
7. Robert O. Anderson, Chairman and CEO of Atlantic-Richfield Oil Company, proposed the project to Velikhov during a trip to the Soviet Union in May 1984. See Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 244, footnote 3.
8. McFarlane put two check marks in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph.
9. McFarlane did not initial his approval or disapproval of the recommendation.