76. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan1
SUBJECT
- Is There a Sensible Nuclear Testing Initiative in the Cards for the Gorbachev Meeting?
In preparing for Geneva both George Shultz and I have tried to focus press and public thinking on this being a “beginning” of a process with the new Soviet leader rather than a “culmination” of previous negotiations involving signature of several agreements. On the whole, people understand that when they reflect on the state of paralysis in the Kremlin and the Russian inability to focus on foreign affairs for the past six months. While this effort to lower expectations for the number of agreements to be signed is taking hold, we do want to nurture such opportunities as may exist for taking the initiative with bold proposals where such proposals are in the national interest. One possibility is in the area of nuclear testing. Both sides have recently made public proposals—the Soviets, a grandstand call for a moratorium; the U.S. a modest step forward by inviting them to come measure [Page 308] one of our tests with on-site equipment.2 After the public exchanges died down, there appears to have remained some interest on the part of the Soviets in trying to make some progress in this area. It is possible that we can come up with some ideas although everyone acknowledges that for as long as we have nuclear weapons some testing will be necessary, if only to be confident that the aging weapons will still work. But within that framework, we ought to be able to move gradually to get a better handle on measuring those test yields, or to lower the threshold or to improve confidence on both sides that the other is not violating the threshold. In order to determine just what might be feasible, I have prepared the attached memo to Cap and General Vessey asking that they review the matter. I am handling this in a very limited (couriered) fashion so as to try to minimize the possibility for leaks. Cap and Jack will also courier their responses to you.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memo to Secretary Weinberger and General Vessey at Tab A.3
- Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Chronological File, Sensitive Chron 1985; NLR–362–7–38–12–8. Top Secret; Sensitive. Reagan initialed at the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. An attached covering note reads: “Original of memo to Weinberger and Vessey handcarried to Washington by Ron Lehman August 16, 1985. Eyes only for JM Poindexter.”↩
- For the July 29 Soviet statement, see footnote 2, Document 68. The text of the July 29 White House statement made by Speakes is printed in the Public Papers: Reagan, 1985, Book II, pp. 953–954.↩
- Attached at Tab A and printed as Document 77. Reagan initialed his approval of the recommendation.↩