51. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff1

Jack, I have discussed our concerns over the possible schism between Gromyko and Gorbachev with the Secretary. Coincidentally, he had received a reply from Dobrynin on our earlier agreement to a meeting in Geneva during the week of November 18.2 Separately, Shultz and I had met with Dobrynin two weeks ago to lament the sterility of exchanges on central issues between us and raised the possible value of establishing a backchannel (“. . . direct communications between the President and the General Secretary. . .”).3 I never had any illusions about their (Gromyko’s) acceptance of such a proposal but it was an unavoidable square to fill if we were to bring the Secretary to the realization that the Gromyko-Gorbachev disconnect is intrinsically counter to the notion of such a channel in Gromyko’s eyes. At any rate, my fears were proven out in a second paper given to Shultz today by Dobrynin which provides a “boilerplate” turn-down to our earlier proposal.4 With that in hand, I talked to the Secretary who found appealing the idea of exploring the establishment of backchannel through Ryzhkov. I told him I would work up a message which could [Page 189] be sent for his consideration. He agreed. I never mentioned you in any context.

Accordingly, please modify your earlier draft tonight in light of the above so that I can give it to Shultz and hopefully get his agreement to its dispatch promptly.5 Even though we are at the point of announcing the agreement on place and time, you might still mention our doubts while at the same time expressing our willingness to proceed as agreed through the Gromyko channel.

Many thanks.

  1. Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File—1985 (10/03/1985–11/18–1985); NLR–362–3–26–2–6. Secret; Sensitive. McFarlane signed “Bud” next to his typed name.
  2. See Document 52.
  3. See Document 43. In his memoir, Dobrynin wrote on this June 17 meeting: “Shultz said he was authorized by the president to propose that he and I conduct through the confidential channel a discussion ‘in a broad, philosophical sense’ of the key arms control questions already under negotiation in Geneva. The exchange could be continued by him and Gromyko late in July, when the two foreign minsters were due to meet in Helsinki for the next Conference on European Security and Cooperation. I recommended to Moscow that we accept this framework for discussion because it meant that Shultz proposed to reactivate the confidential channel. I thought it meant that the administration was serious about dialogue following Reagan’s re-election, although that remained to be proven. Two weeks later Moscow accepted November 19–20 in Geneva as the date and place for the summit, but declined the confidential discussions in favor of continuing to work through the regular Geneva arms negotiators.” (Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 573)
  4. Not found.
  5. Not further identified.