Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

50. Memorandum From the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, July 1, 1985

SUBJECT

• SDI, NST Talks and East-West Relations

Mr. Secretary—

It is timely to stand back and take as objective and analytical a view as possible of the developing situation with respect to SDI, the NST talks, and East-West relations. Important elements of the situation are:

A. The possible evolution of Soviet attitudes and the factors which drive those attitudes. Those attitudes manifest themselves in what is said:

—at the Gorbachev level,

—at the Gromyko level, and

—at the negotiating level in the Geneva NST talks and elsewhere;

and in what the Soviets do with regard to:

—force structures,

—foreign policy actions, and

—negotiating positions.

B. The factors driving those attitudes include external political, military, and to some extent internal political factors (such as Gorbachev’s need to consolidate his power base).

The external political factors have included a desire to exploit divisions within political parties in Europe and the US, between parties, and between countries. There has also been a desire to cover over the Soviet return to the negotiating table despite NATO’s having ignored the Soviet precondition of a prior withdrawal of US LRINF missiles from Europe. A further desire has been to exhibit Soviet adamancy and thus push those who wish to help move the situation toward peace to bring pressure on the US to take more accommodating positions, rather than on the Soviets who “cannot” be influenced.

Political factors mitigating such an adamant stance include the Soviet desire to maintain the perception of its leadership in the fight for peace and concern that too irresponsible positions will backfire in the struggle for world opinion.

The military factors include a determination, not only among the military leadership but also among the highest levels of the Politburo and the nomenklatura, to maintain their current margin of military superiority. They see that that advantage would be threatened by our insistence on the right to de jure equality in LRINF systems globally and de facto equality in Europe, by our drive for deep reductions in their large MIRVed ballistic missile force, which is the heart of their margin of intercontinental nuclear superiority, and now by our drive to develop and perfect SDI technology.²

Even some of those Soviets apparently more disposed than others to seek an agreement with the US insist that, if we persist on our current course, they have no alternative but to force a major showdown before the correlation of forces could be drastically shifted by SDI to the Soviet Union’s disadvantage (in a recent conversation with US scientists, Academician Velikhov specifically used the term “preempt”).³ The general principle in this case may well be to achieve decisive results but to take the minimum risk required to achieve such results. In this context the new Soviet leadership may be willing to take greater risks than Soviet leaders have been willing to take in the past, and may see the correlation of military forces to be more favorable now than in the past. Past experience and conventional wisdom may, therefore, not be an adequate guide.

A possible scenario to achieve decisive results would be for them to bring ascending pressure on the West, and particularly on us, until such results are achieved. The deadline for achieving such results would be earlier than SDI could shift the correlation of military forces in a meaningful way.

Opportunities for exploiting a series of interrelated initiatives against politically and militarily weak salients on the Western side certainly exist. Support for worldwide terrorism, and for guerrillas in Central America, Africa and elsewhere can be expanded. Access routes to Berlin can be disrupted. Pressure on the Afghan-Pakistan border can be increased. Middle East factions can be manipulated to exacerbate tensions. The Iran-Iraq war can be exploited. An attempt can be made to build bridges to Peking, etc.

The Soviet leadership will also weigh the overall correlation of forces. While the correlation of military forces now favors the Soviets, the overall correlation—including economic, political, and ideological factors—has turned against them in the last few years. This could prompt the Soviets to adopt one of two courses. On the one hand, they might choose to seek a genuine accommodation, or perhaps a pause in the competition, with the West so that they can turn their attention and energies inward to address internal problems. On the other hand, the Soviets may be tempted to exploit their advantages in the military balance in the near future, before the overall correlation shifts further to their disadvantage.

The objective of our policy should be to diminish the chances the Soviets will act now (i.e. “preempt”) out of fear that their overall position is slipping. We instead want to increase the chances that they will adopt a more benign policy.

C. As one looks at the SDI/NST picture, several alternative futures present themselves.

One is that the Soviets will agree to something approaching our concept—a radical reduction in offensive nuclear forces and a jointly managed phased introduction of SDI systems should they prove survivable and cost-effective. One can ask what the odds are that the Soviets will find it to their interest to cooperate with this concept. I should think they are no greater than one in ten.

What are the odds that the Soviets will do whatever they regard as necessary to offset the risks to them of SDI before it can become effective? I should think they are high, higher than one in two.

What are the chances that we would in fact be able to abrogate the ABM Treaty and thus be free to deploy SDI without Soviet consent while holding together an internal consensus and allied support? It would appear that the odds are low unless the Soviets had earlier demonstrated clear prior Soviet effective abrogation of the SALT treaties. Would it not be wise, if that were a likely alternative, to prepare for it by taking actions to concentrate on the Soviets’ responsibility for the possible breakdown of the negotiating process and the remaining SALT restraints.

What are the chances of an accountable give-and-take compromise in Geneva which would alleviate the risks of the above emerging issues? At this time I would say they are less than 50 percent.

D. How should we organize ourselves within the Executive Branch and within the State Department to analyze and deal with this range of issues and branching decision points? When you have an opportunity, I would like to discuss this with you.

Paul Nitze⁴

1. Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, June–July 1985. Secret; Sensitive.
2. See Document 49.
3. In telegram 7608 from Moscow, June 7, the Embassy reported on arms control discussions between U.S. and Soviet scientists at the Soviet National Academy of Sciences from June 4 to 6. The U.S. delegation briefed Embassy personnel on the meetings noting the following topics were discussed: “1. Stability of strategic forces; 2. Boundaries of the ABM Treaty and how to prevent its erosion; 3. Weapons in space; ASAT; 4. Biological weapons proliferation; 5. Freezing of nuclear weapons; 6. Balance of conventional forces in Europe and the impact of stability of tactical nuclear force deployments.” The delegation also noted the final topic was not discussed “because of lack of time.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850402–0650)
4. Printed from a copy with this typed signature.