47. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)1
SUBJECT
- Summit Venue and Current Soviet Propaganda
A few bits of information and scattered thoughts on the question of the summit venue:
1. Gorbachev’s speech yesterday:2 His harsh rhetoric is particularly striking, in view of the conciliatory gestures in the meeting with Dobrynin last week.3 Also note that, according to press reports, he read this section from the prepared text, rather than delivering it ex temp as he did much of the rest of the speech. Speculation: Have the Soviets concluded that the President wants a meeting so much that they have the opportunity to intensify pressure for greater substantive give? It looks like this to me, and I must wonder if the quick suggestion for Geneva did not contribute to this.
2. Context of a Geneva Summit: Besides his plan to visit France in October, we are getting reports of Soviet probes to other European countries for Gorbachev visits, and also of attempts to arrange an address to the European Parliament. Suspicion: The Soviets may have in mind sandwiching a meeting with the President in between visits to other countries, and perhaps an address to the European Parliament, [Page 170] so that the summit can be played as incidental to a “triumphal” tour of Europe. Thus they would insulate Gorbachev from the imagery of a failed summit, and set up the President to look second best in comparison. (We can be sure that Gorbachev will not go to Bitburg, and also that the conservatives in the European Parliament are sufficiently civilized that they would not walk out on him.)
3. Gorbachev’s Role in Foreign Policy: Mark Palmer told me of an interesting private conversation he had with Sokolov at Chautauqua day before last.4 (They were walking around the lake; in private, Sokolov can be rather frank.) He asked Sokolov if Dobrynin had grasped the significance of what was said to him last week. Sokolov said yes, he had, but that we should not expect a quick reaction from Moscow. He explained that, while Gorbachev is reading voraciously and getting briefed on foreign affairs, he has not really taken charge of it yet. He opined that Gorbachev would not do so until the time and place for a summit had been set, at which time he would focus “on Afghanistan and other issues,” since he would have a personal stake in the outcome. Until the time and place is set, he suggested, it is probably useless for the U.S. to make suggestions for breaking deadlocks, because Moscow is simply unable to respond.
Implications: (1) Gromyko still is tying things up, but Gorbachev will have an interest in breaking out of the stalemate if a meeting is arranged; and (2) we should not be in a hurry to push new ideas, particularly with Gromyko.
Comment: The suggestion, from a Soviet diplomat, that we not waste our time at the moment being conciliatory is really astounding. It is very rare (though there are precedents) for a senior Soviet diplomat to suggest that the U.S. should act contrary to official Soviet policy demands. I can only infer that Sokolov senses that Gromyko’s days as foreign policy tsar are numbered and is trying to position himself not to get burned in the fallout.
4. Summit Venue: The more I think through the question of what locale would provide the greatest pressure and incentive for Soviet concessions, the more I am convinced that the order of desirability from the U.S. standpoint is (1) Moscow and (2) Washington. As for a third country, I believe it far better not to have a meeting than to go there. I know this flies in the face of the President’s current thinking, but I wonder if all the relevant factors have been called to his attention. [Page 171] I can write down the considerations which have brought me to this conclusion in more detail if you wish.
As possibly relevant, I would note that during my conversation with Suzanne Massie yesterday I asked her,5 putting the question abstractly, which locale for a meeting, in her opinion, is most propitious for the U.S., from the standpoint of Russian psychology. Her answer was unequivocally Moscow. She gave a number of reasons, the principal one being that the gesture alone would demolish the Soviet propaganda image of the President as a malign, threatening force, which would permit Gorbachev to play the meeting as a success without intense attention on who gave way on what point. It would also give Gorbachev and his immediate staff the bureaucratic grounds for taking charge of the visit. She also opined—and I agree—that a Gorbachev visit to the U.S. before the Party Congress next February carries great political risk for Gorbachev and predicted that he would be most reluctant to undertake it unless he was sure in advance of substantive concessions which he could tout as a “victory” upon his return. She thought that a meeting in a third country could be a “disaster,” since Gromyko would be in a position to control most arrangements, and he is unlikely to have an interest in a productive meeting which Gorbachev could use to bolster his personal authority in foreign affairs. At the same time, the President would be burdened by a thousand or so journalists asking every minute on the minute for evidence of concrete results.
If you think it would be useful for the President to hear Suzanne’s views on this, she of course would be delighted to come down to Washington again at any time.
- Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron June 1985 (4/4). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Not for system. Sent for information. Sent through Poindexter.↩
- In telegram 8694 from Moscow, June 27, the Embassy reported that Gorbachev gave a speech at a factory in Dnepropetrovsk on June 26, which provided “another pep-talk on the need to get the Soviet economy rolling again.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850454–0742) In a separate telegram reporting Gorbachev’s specific attack on the U.S. negotiating position in Geneva in the same speech, the Embassy provided the following comment: “Although similar to his plenum speech, Gorbachev’s remarks on the Geneva talks in Dnepropetrovsk are a shade more bitter, and his hint that the USSR might abandon the talks a shade more direct. He also puts less emphasis on the possibility of a change in U.S. policy. We interpret the hint of a walkout not as a guide to Soviet intentions but as a deliberate attempt to make U.S. allies and the peace movement nervous. As usual, Gorbachev places on the U.S. the whole burden of progress in the talks, portraying SDI as the barrier to radical nuclear arms reductions. By repeating the same line he has taken in the past, Gorbachev digs himself in deeper behind the current Soviet position and postpones the day when he can gracefully show flexibility.” (Telegram 8649 from Moscow, June 27; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850453–0780)↩
- See Document 46.↩
- From June 24 to 28, the Chautauqua Conference on Soviet-American relations took place in Chautauqua, New York, hosted by the Chautauqua Institution. (Louise Sweeney, “Diplomacy by day, culture by night. Soviet and US Delegates make music at Chautauqua,” Christian Science Monitor, July 5, 1985)↩
- In telegram 846 from Leningrad, June 6, the Consulate reported that Suzanne Massie “spent much of April and May in Leningrad doing research for her current project on the history of Pavlovsk.” A reception took place in her honor on May 16, which “provided her the opportunity to explain her work and to thank those Soviets who provided assistance.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850429–0365) Presumably the purpose of Massie’s meeting with Matlock on June 26 was to report on her stay in the Soviet Union.↩