Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

251. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, July 12, 1986, 1857Z

219318. Subject: President’s Oral Response to Gorbachev on Nuclear Safety. Ref: State 177227.²

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Ambassador should seek earliest opportunity for meeting with Shevardnadze or other appropriate senior official to deliver President’s oral response to Gorbachev on nuclear safety.³ Text follows para 3 below. The message responds to Gorbachev’s oral statement delivered to the Department on June 1.⁴ Embassy should note that the President’s oral message contained in this cable constitutes the President’s more detailed views on the subject, as mentioned in the President’s initial response to Gorbachev (reftel).

3. Begin text:

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

As I noted previously, I read with great interest your message delivered by the Soviet Embassy on June 1 on conclusions on nuclear safety which follow from the Chernobyl accident. I appreciate your proposals on nuclear safety and welcome their positive spirit.

As you know, the leaders of seven Western industrialized nations met in Tokyo the first week of May and called for the strengthening of the International Atomic Energy Agency to improve international cooperation on ensuring safe nuclear installations, handling nuclear accidents and providing mutual emergency assistance.⁵

The seven leaders at Tokyo also called for the early elaboration of an international convention committing the parties to report and exchange information in the event of nuclear emergencies or accidents. I welcome your proposals suggesting a mechanism for speedy notification in case of nuclear power plant accidents and the provision of radiological data in connection with such accidents. So too, I believe it possible to develop mechanisms ensuring the availability of assistance in dangerous situations.

I note with satisfaction that the IAEA has already taken a number of important steps to begin to address these problems at the special session of the Board of Governors on May 21. Among those steps was a decision to draft on an urgent basis conventions on notification and mutual emergency assistance, which carries forward both the statement of the leaders in Tokyo as well as your own proposals.

Regarding your concern that we act as expeditiously as possible on a system of notification, I am informed that all members of the IAEA Board of Governors undertook to provide prompt notification and information in the event of a nuclear accident with potential transboundary effects and urged all countries to do likewise. We welcome the prompt and cooperative spirit with which the IAEA has acted. This only reinforces our mutual belief that this international technical organization should continue to be strengthened and be a principal forum for continuing international collaboration in this area.

In addition I welcome your plans to expand the links between your nuclear safety specialists and those in other nations and international organizations. We wish to cooperate with you in this regard. A number of your other proposals are of potential interest and deserve further study.

I share your expressed concern about nuclear terrorism and believe that nuclear facilities of all countries must be protected against this threat. We must take all necessary steps to combat terrorism in whatever form it appears. With respect to nuclear terrorism, the United States proposed the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which was opened for signature in 1980.⁶ Our two countries have ratified the convention, and we have welcomed your continued cooperation in working to urge all other states to become parties to this convention without delay. And last June, as a result of a U.S. initiative, our two countries signed a common understanding to the 1971 “Accidents Measures” Agreement that clarifies our obligations to consult in the event of a nuclear incident involving unknown or unauthorized groups or individuals, including terrorists.⁷

With regard to the testing of nuclear weapons, I have read your recent letter, delivered by Ambassador Dubinin, with much interest and am responding to you separately on that subject.⁸

If nuclear energy is to continue as a growing source of electric power, each country must continue to make its existing and future nuclear power plants as safe as they can possibly be. The nations at the Tokyo summit recognized that safety and security at nuclear power plants were crucial. While each country is fully responsible for its own nuclear program, each country bears full responsibility for the safety of the design, manufacture, operation, and maintenance of its installations. Cooperation among countries can help each country to meet its responsibilities on nuclear safety. It is our job to foster and support the fullest possible international cooperation in nuclear safety.

Mr. General Secretary, we in the U.S. are encouraged by Soviet efforts to learn from the tragic accident at Chernobyl. Those Soviet citizens directly affected, and their families, have our deepest sympathy and best wishes for a rapid return to a normal life. We welcome your offer to share your knowledge with other nations. You have our commitment to work closely with you, your experts, and the appropriate international organizations to improve and expand new international nuclear safety measures to ensure the safety of all nations.

Sincerely,

His Excellency

Mikhail Gorbachev

General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

The Kremlin

Moscow.

End text.

Shultz

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N860007–0182. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Sell; cleared by Collins, Talcott, and McDaniel; approved by Parris. In a July 11 memorandum to Platt, McDaniel explained: “The attached oral statement has been cleared through the interagency process and represents the President’s full reply to General Secretary Gorbachev’s statement of June 1 on nuclear safety.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Gorbachev (8690433)) In a June 25 NSC covering note, Rodman wrote: “1. I think it should be an oral message, since the incoming was. 2. The language on testing, I think, is a bit abrupt in view of what we are thinking of saying in our proposed letter on arms control issues. Perhaps trim it way back here with a hint that we will have some thoughts to suggest in response to his letter of June 19.” Jack Matlock agreed. The issue of nuclear testing was addressed in Reagan’s July 25 letter to Gorbachev; see Document 254.
2. See footnote 2, Document 237.
3. In telegram 12537 from Moscow, July 22, the Embassy reported: “Acting DCM met with Deputy Chief of MFA USA Department Mikol’chak July 22 to hand over the text of the Presidential message.” The Embassy continued: “Acting DCM drew on Ref B talking points,” contained in telegram 225208 to Moscow, July 17, “noting that the President’s message was a positive response and encouraging full disclosure on Chernobyl. He continued, however, that the U.S. did not accept the Soviet formulation of the August IAEA meeting as a multilateral presentation on nuclear accidents; in particular, the U.S. had already briefed the IAEA on Three Mile Island two months after that accident.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N860007–0310 and N860007–0249, respectively)
4. See Document 237.
5. See footnote 3, Document 230.
6. The text of this agreement, INFCIRC/274, is available on the IAEA website.
7. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–October 1971, Document 320.
8. See Document 247.