Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

198. Notes of an Interview With Oleg Gordievskiy¹

Washington, February 24, 1986

Project “RYaN” (Raketno-yadernoye napadeniye)

Noting this subject as one of the most important and disturbing elements of OG’s reporting,² [name not declassified] asked what he thought of the hypothesis that Project “RYaN” was an “active measure” campaign intended to insinuate convincing evidence of Soviet leadership fears of a rising war danger into Western, particularly US, intelligence for the purpose of moderating the anti-Soviet policies of the US administration in the early 1980s.³

OG replied that he’d been given this question in writing [less than 1 line not declassified] some months before and had searched his memory very thoroughly for evidence that might validate or refute the hypothesis. He concluded that, while the proposition was faintly plausible, it was very unlikely for the following reasons:

While there was always a mixture of belief and disbelief about the whole project, particularly with respect to its assumptions on the manner in which NATO governments might go to war and the probability of a pure surprise attack, too many high-level and informed people believed in the validity of the project. These included Kryuchkov, Leonov (head of the first service [?] and a very expert America watcher), Mityaev (deputy head [?] of the Institute for the Study of Intelligence Problems). These people were 100% serious. In addition, some dozen very able serious analysts in a section of this Institute [?], as well as Department One, the US Department [?], worked on the project in 1981–82. There was great urgency in getting letters on requirements out to the residentury.

Furthermore, if the Center planned to leak the project to the West, the operations would have involved an impossibly elaborate deception and double book-keeping down into a great many residentury. This would have been evident to OG or at least the resident.

If, on the other hand, the Center did not plan purposely to leak the project, then it would have to be proceeding on the assumption that it would leak anyway through Western agents in the KGB. This would be too horrifying an assumption for the KGB and political leaderships to accept as an operational premise.⁴

In view of this strong case against the “active measure” hypothesis, [name not declassified] noted that we seem to be dealing with an instance of unusual irrationality or lack of realism at the top of the Soviet system. He noted further that careful study had revealed no unusual Soviet military measures, such as stockpiling, changes in routine force readiness levels, or mobilizational steps, that would seem to have been in order had the Soviet leadership really believed that the danger of a major war, especially with very short political and strategic warning, had indeed sharply increased. [name not declassified] asked whether this atmosphere of unreality sprang from some unique political circumstances of the time, such as the condition of the Brezhnev leadership (per OG’s reporting that he and others speculated Project “RYaN” could have been inspired by Andropov’s political maneuvering). Or might it be something that could recur at the top of the leadership almost any time?

OG replied that, as Project RYaN was marked by a mixture of belief and disbelief, so, one must remember, is Soviet military management marked by a mixture of high concern, on one hand, and inaction, on the other. Moreover, according to OG, there were defense-related developments which he observed on trips home during the late 1970s and early 1980s indicating heightened regime fear of war. For example, he saw increased civil defense activity, notably in hospitals; reserve officers were called up for duty or training with increasing frequency; and there was more shelter building going on. In July 1985 OG personally saw such a shelter project in the Semyonovskaya area 80–90 kilometers from Moscow, in the neighborhood of Chebrikov’s dacha, also near one of Stalin’s dachas, the “Far (Dal’naya) Dacha.” An engineer on this project, a friend of OG’s, said there were three degrees of shelter protection, A, B, and C, with A the most protected, capable of withstanding a direct hit with a nuclear weapon. This particular project, labeled with a sign as a garage, was said by the engineer friend to be of Type A, the deepest type. Construction troops were working 24-hour shifts.

As to the sense of timing or urgency that governed Project “RYaN”, OG reiterated that it was a belief in the increasing likelihood of surprise attack at some undetermined future time, perhaps months or years away, not a sense that a surprise attack was just around the corner, that animated the project. The project came to the KGB in the summer of 1981. Originally the plan was to develop a concept of the project over the following year, producing a plan by autumn 1982. But the whole thing was speeded up, with initial requirements letters going out in September 1981. Also remember: the project originated in the Ministry of Defense with the GRU. It may have come over to the KGB out of some political motive of Andropov’s; but that is largely speculation.

[name not declassified] noted that this period of intense activity coincided with the beginnings of the Reagan Administration. Of several factors presumably involved, the policies and rhetoric of the new US administration, INF deployments, and Soviet internal developments, which did OG believe to be the most important in inspiring Project “RYaN”? OG replied that the Soviet perceptions of the new US administration were most important.⁵

[[name not declassified] comment: Perhaps because of the nature of the questions posed, OG gave more emphasis to the sincerity and authenticity of the fear of war that motivated Project “RYaN” than he did in earlier reporting, which gave at least equal emphasis to the lack of realism in underlying assumptions of the project appreciated by many of its participants.]

The Political Role of the KGB

[name not declassified] asked what was the contemporary gossip on the death of KGB First Deputy Chairman S.K. Tsvigun in January 1982.

OG said this development was unexpected and shocking because Tsvigun was regarded to be in robust health and, as a man of the elite, well cared for. His death caused a lot of talk; but there was little hard information. It was immediately noted, of course, that Brezhnev failed to sign Tsvigun’s obituary. It was known that Tsvigun was a Brezhnev man, as were the other two deputies as well, Tsinev (the old man), and even Chebrikov, who also came out of the Dnepropetrovsk “Mafia.” Chebrikov shifted his allegiance to Andropov at some point. Tsvigun was, as widely reported, related to Brezhnev; their wives were sisters.

OG said he was inclined to believe the version of events which gained widest currency. As overseer of the Second Chief Directorate with responsibility for KGB operations in Moscow, Tsvigun became aware of the corrupt dealings of Brezhnev’s daughter. He may have gone with this to Andropov. In any event, he took the story to Suslov. Tsvigun’s report put Suslov, the last real idealist and true believer in the leadership, into a towering rage, not over the allegations of corruption, but at Tsvigun’s apparent violation of the most vital of Kremlin injunctions: The KGB must never collect damaging information on Politburo members. Suslov was extremely rude and threatening to Tsvigun, who then committed suicide because he felt himself to be in an impossible situation.

[name not declassified] asked why Tsvigun went to Suslov instead of Brezhnev. OG and [name not declassified] speculated jointly that a) Brezhnev would have been very unhappy with Tsvigun’s report too, and b) Brezhnev’s deteriorating health was undermining his ability to protect any of his clients.

[name not declassified] posed the following argument and question: Andropov exploited his chairmanship of the KGB in Kremlin intrigues to become General Secretary. Through such people as Victor Louis, he even advertised his rise to power, undermining his rivals thereby.⁶ This made the KGB leadership an unusually important factor in Kremlin politics. According to some rumors and reports, Chebrikov played a role in stopping a Romanov-Grishin move against Gorbachev in March 1985. Could not this political importance of the KGB, especially its chairman, become a threat to the party and to Gorbachev at some point?

OG said the preceding assessment of the KGB’s role in Andropov’s rise was exaggerated. There may have been some Victor Louis stories put about. But, on the whole, Andropov was exceptionally careful not to give any hint of exploiting his KGB position in the manner implied. Of course, he used KGB information of all kinds to enhance his knowledge and his image as a supremely informed, judicious, rational leader within the inner circle. He scrupulously avoided and, indeed, supressed any aura of self-promotion or tendency for KGB reporting to glorify its chairman. For example, he stopped [or rewrote] cables seeming to promote his image or interests if they were headed for the Central Committee or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Andropov, of all people, knew that exploitation of his position for political intrigue would be noticed immediately in the party apparatus and could lead to his demise. He was an exceptionally shrewd and careful man.

After his elevation to the General Secretaryship, however, Andropov could and did rely heavily on KGB information in his campaign against corruption and for cadre replacement. He didn’t get very far because his health gave out. At that time the KGB came to regard Gorbachev as “their kind of leader”. During the rule of Chernenko, whom the KGB saw as a transitional figure, the KGB was, once again, very careful about seeming to be involved in politics, although it did put forward reports and information subtly making Gorbachev and his policy line look good. When he became General Secretary, Gorbachev began using KGB information just like Andropov did in pursuing his cadre and other policies. It’s OK for the General Secretary to do this. For example, in OG’s view, much of Yel’tsin’s indictment of Grishin at the recent reporting conference of the Moscow Gorkom probably came from the KGB. All this makes the KGB a very useful tool in the hands of the top man, but not an independent factor in Soviet politics.

[name not declassified] asked: What about relations between the KGB and the military, in the light of a bloody history of such relations?

OG asked what areas of friction [name not declassified] could point to. OG did not really see a conflict here. As to the relative power balance, we should examine the make up of the new Central Committee after the 27th CPSU Congress. OG said one should expect 4–5 KGB figures and 12–14 military figures among its members.

Leadership Appreciation of US Politics

Leaving aside the experts in the KGB, MFA, and the institutes, [name not declassified] asked, how sophisticated are the perceptions of Soviet political leaders of political life in the United States?

OG replied that Brezhnev and Chernenko were hopeless. Andropov was a lot better in this area. Gorbachev started out from real ignorance, but works very hard and is a fast learner. He studied very diligently prior to his trip to the UK in December 1984. But his judgment and sophistication should not be overrated. For example, when he spoke to the London embassy staff during that trip, he commented mockingly and sarcastically about the factional strife within the US Government, and how silly Washington often appeared in its inability to reach timely, clear decisions. Gorbachev seemed smug and satisfied about the advantages this gave to Soviet propaganda and political tactics.

[[name not declassified] comment: OG’s characterization of Gorbachev’s low regard for US decisionmaking was quite vivid. At the same time he clearly implied that, in OG’s view at least, Gorbachev’s satisfaction with perceived US policymaking disarray was a mark of inadequate understanding.]

The Papal Case

Posing one last question on this everlasting matter, [name not declassified] asked: Would it be possible for some Soviet intelligence entity, KGB or GRU, to coopt Bulgarian agents or assets for use in such an operation without the approval or even knowledge of the Bulgarian security or political leadership? If that were possible, then one might imagine a plot in which only two or three people (some now dead) would really know what happened.⁷

OG replied that it might be possible for some Soviet entity to coopt a Bulgarian asset in, say, Turkey or Cyprus. It was not possible to do so without Bulgarian knowledge in Bulgaria. [[name not declassified] comment: I’m not sure whether OG said “in Bulgaria” or “if he were a Bulgarian.”]

In OG’s view, if one accepted the “Bulgarian Connection”, it could have gone this way: The KGB works with the counterpart Bulgarian service. The Soviet military intelligence, GRU, works very closely with Bulgarian military intelligence. The latter are always coming to Moscow and always getting intelligence of value, but are rarely able to give much back. This creates a sense of obligation. The Bulgarian military intelligence has, or could have had, some “hit man” (boyevik, member of a revolutionary fighting group, also “hit” as in “hit of the season”) on the string. They could have let this be known to their counterparts in Moscow, asking whether the latter had any worthwhile targets in mind. In the period 1980–81, Moscow military intelligence might have mused, well, if there’s one man we’d like to see out of the way . . . And the whole thing took off from there.

[[name not declassified] comment: Without prompting OG twice singled out the Soviet-Bulgarian military intelligence tie as the relationship of interest here.]

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Russian and European Analysis, Job 87T01145R: Policy & Substantive Files, Box 3, Folder 39: [file name not declassified]. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Prepared by the interviewer. All brackets except those denoting text not declassified are in the original. Copies were sent [text not declassified]. In a February 24 covering memorandum [text not declassified] wrote: “1. Attached are my notes on a [text not declassified] session with Gordievskiy which occurred 1500–1600 on [text not declassified] February 1986. Because so many had gone over related matters before, I chose, in the main, to pose questions for his judgment and opinion. Significantly, he gave both his judgments and the line of reasoning or factual basis for them in most cases. 2. My uncertainty about what exactly he said on several points is indicated by [?].”
2. Throughout the notes, Oleg Gordievskiy is abbreviated as “OG.”
3. See Document 125. For information on the war scare, Able Archer, and “VRYaN” see also Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Documents 134, 135, 221, and Appendix A.
4. Documentation on Gordievskiy’s reporting is also scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988.
5. In a separate [text not declassified] Information Report, disseminated in memorandum format on January 27, “Aspects of Soviet Strategic Concerns—Priority Intelligence Requirements,” the summary explained the report provided a “KGB requirements list with a summary and introduction by Oleg ((Gordievskiy)). These requirements were sent to the London Residency in December 1984. In Gordievskiy’s opinion, this list was one of the indications that the KGB Center was reducing the emphasis in collection during the last year on the threat of a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. It encourages increased collection activities against more traditional military targets in the US, NATO, and China. The list emphasizes the following requirements: (1) reliable information regarding preparations by the US to take political decisions and adopt operational plans for a nuclear or conventional war against the Soviet Union, (2) data concerning scientific and technological breakthroughs applicable to new weapons systems that might be capable of radically shifting the balance of power, (3) general factors that could affect the ‘correlation of military forces,’ and (4) intelligence/counterintelligence capabilities of the Soviet Union’s current and potential adversaries.” (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, 1981–1986, Intelligence Reports [Pre 1980, May 1985–January 1986](2))
6. According to his obituary in the New York Times, July 21, 1992, Victor Louis was a “Russian journalist who for decades purveyed information that the Soviet Communist Party and the K.G.B. wanted to appear in the Western press.”
7. Documentation on this is in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 67, footnote 4.