Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

191. Note From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Palmer) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, February 6, 1986

Mr. Secretary,

Mark Parris and I took Oleg Sokolov up last night on a long-standing offer to have a drink together. I think you will find his comments on Moscow’s current mood of interest in interpreting the delay in scheduling a summit and related issues. They reinforce the view I have shared with you elsewhere of the need for more than a minimalist response to Gorbachev’s January 15 proposals.

The message which came through loudest was that, in the run-up to the Party Congress, any actions on our part—from our response to the Gorbachev initiative to more mundane steps—may affect what is said at the Congress and thus, disproportionately, the tone and substance of what follows. Some of this is clearly self-serving. But there is probably enough truth in it that the prudent course in the weeks ahead is to avoid steps which will require the Soviets to respond strongly.

With that in mind, we intend to delay informing the Soviets they will have to reduce their U.N. mission by about one hundred until after the Party Congress, the first week in March.² Jack Matlock agrees with this approach.

Mark Palmer³

Attachment

Memorandum of Conversation⁴

Washington, February 5, 1986, 7–10 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • Mark Palmer DAS, EUR
  • Mark R. Parris EUR/SOV

• U.S.S.R.

  • Oleg Sokolov, Minister Counselor, Soviet Embassy, Washington

The meeting was set up at U.S. initiative after Sokolov had hinted to both Palmer and Parris that he would be willing to share the Soviet Embassy’s assessment of the current mood in Moscow.

Sokolov was clearly concerned to drive home one basic message: that Moscow is highly displeased as the Party Congress approaches that there has been no response to Gorbachev’s January 15 proposals. In seeking to put the situation into perspective, Sokolov made clear that the impetus for the proposals had come directly from Gorbachev and stemmed from Gorbachev’s desire to maintain the momentum he and the President had established in Geneva. Even allowing for the fact that the U.S. may not have expected an initiative as sweeping as that tabled, the Soviets were perplexed and increasingly frustrated by the silence out of Washington. The fact that there had been no reference to the proposals in the State of the Union speech had compounded these feelings.⁵

Sokolov warned that the signals being received in Moscow with respect to U.S. intentions—accurate or not—were of enormous importance in the period leading up to the Party Congress. It was not a question of Gorbachev’s strength or weakness. His authority was unchallenged. Nor would the basic thrust of policy toward the United States rise or fall on the basis of what happened in the next three weeks. But Gorbachev and other foreign policy spokesmen at the Party Congress would not be able to ignore a U.S. failure to respond to his January proposals, or a response which did not appear serious. And whatever might be said based on the U.S. answer or other U.S. actions prior to the Congress would set the tone and direction for the period ahead.

Sokolov was concerned that these dynamics might be inadequately understood in Washington. He said that Shevardnadze’s frankness with Art Hartman earlier this week and the unusual publication of a statement on Art’s meeting were indicators of this concern.⁶ Sokolov stated with feeling that he could not emphasize too strongly the importance of ensuring that the U.S. leadership got the message. Palmer indicated that Sokolov could be sure that the views he had expressed would be conveyed to the Secretary and assured Sokolov that a response to the Gorbachev initiative would be forthcoming well before the Congress opened.

While Sokolov did not dwell on the substance of Gorbachev’s various proposals, he made clear that a pro forma U.S. reaction would be as bad as no response at all. He acknowledged that there was a healthy propaganda element to the January 15 initiative, but stressed that there were also important shifts in Soviet positions which the U.S. should not discount. He highlighted the initiative’s treatment of British/French systems in INF, verification, and the three-part framework for achieving elimination of nuclear weapons as particularly significant. Such steps, he argued, could never have come from the bureaucracy; rather, they were Gorbachev’s attempts to address areas President Reagan had raised in Geneva. Chances of achieving a concrete agreement by the next summit were good if the U.S. picked up on these elements.

In a subsequent discussion of prospects for movement on regional issues, Palmer asked Sokolov what might be expected from the Soviets on Afghanistan in the months ahead. Sokolov gave no hint that he was aware of any forthcoming Soviet initiatives, but rather strongly affirmed that Moscow was serious about finding a way out of the conflict. He called for tangible evidence of U.S. seriousness (a token reduction of aid to the insurgents) as a first step.

In response to Palmer’s inquiry as to the best channel for conducting a dialogue on Afghanistan, Sokolov suggested that the Soviet U.N. Deputy Permrep, Safronchuk, would be the place to start. Safronchuk had been the Soviet DCM in Kabul at the time of the invasion and the head of the MFA department responsible for Afghanistan thereafter. Ultimately, however, the key figure would be First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko. In an aside, Sokolov acknowledged that Korniyenko was unpopular in some quarters here. He stressed, however, that the very quality which made Korniyenko unpopular, his willingness to speak up when he saw Soviet interests at risk, made him invaluable and highly influential in Moscow. Sokolov warned against underestimating Korniyenko’s clout with Shevardnadze and in broader circles in Moscow and hinted that efforts to go around him, e.g. through the Central Committee apparatus, would fail.

Sokolov seemed genuinely surprised by Palmer’s suggestion that the U.S. perceived Soviet foreign policy under Gorbachev as more assertive and characterized by a greater willingness to expand its military involvement in regional disputes. Sokolov’s own sense of Gorbachev’s approach was that the new leader saw no Soviet interest in getting more deeply engaged in these areas of conflict. Sokolov claimed to reflect the view in Moscow in asserting that since Geneva the U.S. seemed to be reverting to a more belligerent stance on regional questions. In what may have been mirror-imaging, he wondered whether the Administration felt such posturing was necessary to molify conservatives fearful of compromises on arms control.

Sokolov agreed that it could be useful to deepen U.S.–Soviet regional discussions and encouraged the U.S. to put forward any ideas it might develop. Disingenuously, he attributed Moscow’s non-reply on the President’s UNGA regional initiative to our failure to give the Soviets adequate advance word. Palmer reminded him that we had a similar complaint with the handling of Gorbachev’s January 15 proposal.

1. Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 4D, 1986 Soviet Union Feb. Secret; Sensitive; Summit II.
2. The 27th Party Congress of the CPSU took place in Moscow from February 25 to March 6. The decision to reduce the number of Soviets serving at the UN Mission was called for in the November 1, 1985, NSDD 196, “Counterintelligence/Countermeasure Implementation Task Force,” scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988. In telegram 286191 to Islamabad, September 18, 1985 addressed “For Under Secretary Armacost Only” from Ridgway, Abramowitz, and Sofaer they wrote “we already are considering intensively an alternative option to cut substantially (by approximately 100 employees) the size of the Soviet UN Missions in New York. This move would significantly reduce the Soviet presence in this country and make the task of the counterintelligence community easier.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number]) See Document 201.
3. Palmer signed “MP” above his typed signature.
4. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Watergate Hotel bar.
5. For the text of Reagan’s State of the Union address on February 4, see Public Papers: Reagan, 1986, Book I, pp. 125–130. In telegram 2179 from Moscow, February 7, the Embassy reported that a February 7 Pravda editorial, highly critical of Reagan’s speech, “contains unusually authoritative and sharp criticism of U.S. policy and President Reagan personally. This blast probably reflects both Moscow’s defensiveness about the Soviet ‘State of the Union,’ and its continuing propaganda emphasis on arms control.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860104–0213)
6. In telegram 1978 from Moscow, February 5, the Embassy sent the text of a TASS statement on Hartman’s February 4 meeting with Shevardnadze. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860093–0075) Hartman sent a read-out of his meeting with Shevardnadze to the Department, which was used in preparation for Shultz’s February 7 meeting with Reagan. See Document 192. In this read-out, Hartman wrote: “1. You asked for ideas. I think we have now reached the point where we should go hard for an agreement with Gorbachev and his new team. We may not succeed, but we need to be perceived as trying. The President has an historic opportunity to negotiate reductions in nuclear weapons. That opportunity should not slip away. 2. Indeed, it is clear from my meeting with Shevardnadze and other soundings that the Soviets feel they have made a significant effort in our direction, not only in NST, but in other arms control negotiations and on other fronts such as the people-to-people exchanges. They are looking anxiously for a constructive response.” He continued: “Our negotiating leverage is declining. We have a summit meeting on the agenda which many will see as a failure if it makes no progress in strategic arms control. On the propaganda front, Gorbachev has made an impressive gesture with his plan to eliminate nuclear weapons. We need a serious, pragmatic response to maintain U.S. credibility.” (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Secretary’s Meeting with the President (02/11/1986); NLR–775–18–101–1–9)