Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

154. Record of a Meeting¹

Geneva, November 19, 1985

Meeting While Leaders Walk

Shultz:

—Do you wish to talk on guidelines? No need to let the time pass. There are some points of intersection. We could try to narrow it down. President Reagan is doing that. Do you have suggestions?

Shevardnadze:

—The General Secretary has outlined our approach: a ban of space weapons, and an exploration of the gap between our two proposals.

Dobrynin:

—This would provide short, good guidelines.

Shultz:

—We will not stop our research. President Reagan is ready to talk about what we can do if progress is made—and we are ready to talk about this now.

Shevardnadze:

—I can’t understand the purpose of this.

Shultz:

—Our purpose is to move the concept of deterrence into a more stable and humane posture. It will also serve to deal with unstabilization of offensive arms brought about by increasing accuracy and mobility. Those developments bring us to the need for a shield. Stability can be enhanced if it is not a race, but is a cooperative effort. Unilateral actions are not stable. A negotiated transition would be more stable.

Shevardnadze:

—What you are proposing, cooperating in unknown area, is more like science fiction. The General Secretary has said if we can agree on a ban, then on that basis, and on proposals put forth by both, there is a realistic way forward. You have said that what is destabilizing today is offensive forces, but I say it is your SDI. But for this program, we could have serious progress in Geneva. One more point, not mentioned earlier, you have been saying in the context of explaining your SDI program that the USSR has similar research and that we are somewhere ahead of you. This is being asserted by your press and your official spokesman. If that is so, why are we now proposing a ban on a space strike?

Shultz:

—I am confident your research is parallel to ours, and I can tell you why we feel it exists.

Nitze:

—In the area of lasers, there is no doubt.

Shevardnadze:

—If you have invited us to talk to convince us of the utility of SDI, I doubt you can do it. As the General Secretary has said, our arguments are not made of thin air. We have worked this issue with our experts. As a result, we hold deep convictions that the development of space strike arms will usher in new era of the arms race. Any talk of regulating this process by treaty is not realistic. In fact it is most unrealistic. The right decision is not to allow a new cycle of the arms race.

—We may not be informed on your data, but can one say that any guarantee that defense weapons will not be used for offense is no guarantee. Any defensive weapon can be used for offense.

—Let me ask, President Reagan and others have said that after you find out if development is feasible, and before deployment, you will share the benefits of the research. But, the research to get to that point will take many years. Will President Reagan have the same policy and objectives ten to fifteen years from now? In 10–15 years, when your weapons are developed, we will have own objectives. In the process, treaties will be thrown away. How can we be assured we can trust your actions that are 10–15 years in the future?

Shultz:

—[Interrupting] That is a good question. We have proposed an “open laboratories” approach calling for visits back and forth to eliminate surprises. Our scientists could visit each others’ laboratories so they can get a sense of what is taking place.

—Secondly, it is in our interest to maintain such a policy, not a matter of goodwill or trust. It is in our interest to have a cooperative development rather than unilateral defensive deployment. Unilateral action creates instability. It creates concern in the mind of the side not deploying. It is simply not in our interest to create instability, therefore, it is not in our interest to handle the transition differently than President Reagan has proposed.

—Third, our two sides are finally discussing reductions. This has been a long time coming. Our agenda, agreed here in Geneva, put both offense and defense on the table. President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev both have said they aspire to go to zero. The more you get down to zero, the more a defensive shield is an insurance policy vice a device to let offensive forces strike without risk. So if we stay on this path, and get others to join, we will change the nature of the situation.

Shevardnadze:

—If you would permit, I would like to respond and ask a question. We are now discussing deep cuts in offensive strategic weapons, cutting all by 50% as we look for the elimination of all nuclear weapons. If we are serious in following this path, and others join us in this, why do we need the shield? What is it for, since we will not only eliminate the weapons but also take measures to ensure none retain them?

Shultz:

—Good point, verification is needed.

McFarlane:

—Your question is reasonable. Treaties are broken. However, the history of actions by democrats provides a basis for judgment. Recent evidence demonstrates that, even if we have no treaties but only agreements, we have continued to observe them beyond expiration when we had no reason to do so. This should provide some basis for confidence.

—Did you intend to propose a question about the period of time while we are under ABM Treaty?

Korniyenko:

—Another point, this may seem strange but I do think it applies here.

—President Reagan began his explanation of mistrust by asserting that US pilots died because the USSR did not allow US planes to land—but this is inconsistent with the truth. The truth is that, as soon as sufficient territory was liberated to get within range for planes, a huge Soviet air base at Poltava was opened in 1944. They used this airfield as much as needed.

—I personally was a citizen defending that air base, and was injured. Many died there. I know the US general in charge. Everyone knows about that.

—Foreign Minister Shevardnadze has said that Stalin and FDR did not have misconceptions on this.

—What kind of information is being given to President Reagan? Who does this, and what do they inform him of?

Shultz:

—If President Reagan is wrong, I will tell him.

—Let us turn to different subjects.

—Three important things were said today. Two by the General Secretary, and one by Shevardnadze.

—You said we should be working on a way of expressing the results of our meeting since we found many areas of agreement. That’s true.

—This afternoon, the General Secretary spoke of Afghanistan, noting that a political settlement is highly desirable. We agree.

—The way the General Secretary made his comments is new to me. Maybe something can be worked out.

—We agreed beyond so-called expert talks and that at the foreign minister level we should continue to have meetings on our agenda, and on processes that we should consider.

—I put this down as a plus. Then I added something else said this morning. The General Secretary laid out an outline for a desirable process for our two countries involving meetings at varied levels, down to citizens. We agree this is desirable.

—This brings me to the question of how to report results of our meeting to our countries and publics at large.

—I gave Dobrynin a statement that we agreed on drawn from your previous document. I added a paragraph that refers to areas of agreement as listed on the following pages:

—we already have some items agreed, like NPT language.

—If you want to work on this. Fine. I propose we use the meeting at 9 p.m. this evening for this purpose.

Dobrynin:

—But what is following page?

Shultz:

—That depends on what is agreed upon. I showed Dobrynin in Washington only one page. This is a way to prepare to add on to this as appropriate and tell the public we met—did not agree on all but made some progress—and here’s what we agreed.

Shevardnadze:

—Not really clear what kind of issues would follow.

Dobrynin:

—In addition to guidelines, what should be there?

Shultz:

—What we can agree:

—NPT

—Cultural agreement

—No PAC

—Regional talks and FM impetus to them

—Arms control—not only guidelines

—Try to find things we agreed.

Shevardnadze:

—Today the General Secretary has mentioned a political mechanism that should function.

Shultz:

—We agree and have said we endorsed this.

—It is reflected in this approach.

Shevardnadze:

—We have mentioned this because the mechanism has components: the Summit; foreign minister’s meetings; Geneva negotiations; political consultations on regional matters; negotiations on Civil Air, etc.

Shultz:

—Also people exchanges.

—We had all of this in mind.

Shevardnadze:

—We should record the facts of this meeting to give political impetus to this meeting.

—What we need is serious and sound documentation.

—Ridgway and Sokolov will meet tonight.

[1654 PM. At this point the President and Secretary General returned and the meeting ended.]²

1. Source: Reagan Library, Robert Linhard Files, Arms Control Chron, Geneva Summit Records, 11/19/1985–11/21/1985 (2 of 4). Secret; Sensitive. There is no drafting information. All brackets are in the original. This side meeting among Shultz, Shevardnadze, and their assistants took place during the Gorbachev-Reagan private meeting that started at 3:40 p.m.; see Document 153.
2. In his memoir, Shultz recalled: “While they were talking by the fire, Shevardnadze and I and all the others chatted among ourselves. The two leaders returned an hour later, having discussed inconclusively our approach to arms control. Both were obviously in a good mood. The president made an important announcement to us. They had agreed on reciprocal visits: first Gorbachev to a Washington summit, then Reagan to a Moscow summit. I was surprised and encouraged, as much by the obvious rapport between the two men as by their quick agreement without hesitation on reciprocal visits for two follow-on summit meetings. Such agreement was one of our main objectives in Geneva. The president’s brand of personal diplomacy seemed to be working.” (Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 601)