Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

149. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, November 15, 1985

SUBJECT

• Soviet Desire for Joint Statement: Hartman-Shevardnadze Meeting November 14

Secretary Shultz has sent the President a Memorandum which reports on the meeting Art Hartman had with Shevardnadze yesterday.² Not surprisingly, Shevardnadze made quite an issue out of our position that there will be no joint communique. Art considers this clear evidence that the Soviets badly want some sort of joint document to emerge from the meeting.

Assuming that if we get agreement on a sufficient number of concrete items, we are not adverse to formulating it into some form of a joint document (not, of course, a communique in the traditional sense), I believe we can use the Soviet eagerness for a document as some modest leverage. It is also my understanding that this is not counter to the President’s wishes, since there would still be separate statements dealing with the meeting as a whole, and any joint statement would be confined to those specific actions on which both sides have agreed.

I have drafted a cover memorandum to the President on these assumptions. You should, of course, amend it if it does not reflect your thinking.³

RECOMMENDATION:

That you forward the Memorandum at Tab I to the President.⁴

1. Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron November 1985 (6/10). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for action.
2. Attached at Tab A but not printed. In a November 14 covering memorandum to Shultz, sent through Armacost, Ridgway sent Shultz a draft of the memorandum to the President. She explained that during his meeting in Moscow with Hartman “Shevardnadze expressed ‘amazement’ that there could be any question of our willingness to sign onto a joint communique in Geneva.” She surmised that “he was clearly discomfited—a reaction which could show up in a hardening of positions on outstanding bilateral issues.” She recommended that Shultz initial the memorandum to the President. (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (11/14/1985))
3. Attached at Tab I but not printed.
4. McFarlane first initialed the Approve option, then struck it through. He initialed his disapproval and wrote in the margin “Handled orally.”