Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

126. Memorandum From John Lenczowski of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, October 31, 1985

SUBJECT

• Putting the Onus on the Soviets

A significant part of the Soviet propaganda strategy in preparation for the Geneva meeting is to put the onus for success or failure squarely on the shoulders of the President. In addition to focusing on arms control as the principal terms of debate, the Soviets would like to convince the Western public that the USSR has a reactive foreign policy rather than a pro-active or revolutionary foreign policy. Once we become convinced of this, we began to accept the idea that Soviet aggression is simply a response to our stimuli, and that it is necessary for us to change the stimuli unilaterally to achieve peace. The fact that tensions persist must mean that the U.S. is too aggressive, provocative and insufficiently interested in peace. Needless to say, such propaganda puts the U.S. on the defensive.

Unfortunately, given the attitudes of significant segments of the public and press, we are already forced into this position. Under the circumstances, the President faces the risk of being seen as having failed in his peace meeting with Gorbachev if he falls off either side of the tightrope: 1) If expectations are raised too high, the President faces the prospect of “post-summit let-down.” This will inevitably occur when the Soviets shoot down another airliner or U.S. Army Major, and many will attribute it to the President’s “failure” as a peacemaker; or 2) If we succeed in lowering expectations but, in the process, appear too confrontational, the President will also be criticized for failing to try hard enough to make peace.

A Suggested Solution

There is only one way to avoid these two pitfalls, and that is to lift some of the onus of peacemaking from the President’s shoulders. This can be done by educating the press and the public about the limits the Soviet system imposes on Gorbachev in terms of what he personally can do to reduce tensions with the U.S.

To do this, Administration spokesmen and other prominent ex-officials must make the following points in background briefings to the press:

—Gorbachev is part of a Party dictatorship, but he personally is not a dictator.

—Therefore, despite his apparent success in consolidating power quickly and putting his own people in office, his own individual decisionmaking power is severely limited.

—In fact, a Soviet Party leader has much less discretion and latitude in his decisionmaking than does an American President, whose Constitutional powers in foreign affairs come much closer to those of a king.

—The Soviet Party leader is constrained principally by a system of political conformity which is enforced by a collective leadership that uses ideology to set the standard against which deviationism is measured.

—For anyone to advance in the Party as far as Gorbachev has, it is necessary to demonstrate one’s ability to discipline oneself to subordinate all of one’s individual predilections to the ideological dictates of the Party.

—Gorbachev is thus constrained to stick within the general parameters of communist ideology whether he believes it or not, lest he risk being ousted by his own colleagues for excessively individualistic political actions—the same way Khrushchev was removed. Such individualistic deviation from Party norms is regarded as a threat to the cohesion and therefore the power of the Party and the very existence of the Soviet system.

—Thus, we are dealing here not with an individual so much as we are dealing with a system. This means that many of the results of conventional personal contact cannot apply in this situation.

—This does not mean that this meeting cannot serve a number of worthwhile purposes. But it does mean that we must be realistic about the limitations that the Soviet system imposes on its leaders.

—The fact is that no Soviet leader can ever accept the permanence of any arrangement in the world whereby the U.S. remains a democracy. This would be tantamount to accepting a “social status quo” which is contrary to what the Soviets consider to be morally and strategically acceptable.

—When the Soviets say that they are for “peace,” they do not mean the same thing that we do. As they see it, true peace cannot be achieved until the causes of war have been eliminated. Since their ideology brands the “capitalist” system as the source of war, peace cannot happen until the political-economic system in America has been destroyed and transformed into a communist system. For the Soviets, the word “peace” is synonymous with “communism.”

—Similarly, their expression “peaceful coexistence” does not mean what we think it means—i.e., “we may hate each other but we will live and let live.” Rather, for the Soviets, “peaceful coexistence” is defined as a “form of struggle against capitalism” where all forms of struggle are permissible except all-out war.

—Unless we understand that these are the realities of the Soviet system and its foreign policy, we will continually be disappointed in our search for peace. A successful and realistic effort to seek peace must recognize that there is only so far the Soviets can go in reaching some kind of accommodation with us.

—Our challenge, therefore, is to work within these constraints to build a safer world.

Pros and Cons

Having presented these recommended talking points to Jack Matlock, he observed that there is a danger in making these points insofar as they risk excusing Gorbachev in advance for not changing his positions, whereas our strategy is to try to pressure him to make changes (See Matlock comments at Tab I).² Thus, Jack suggests that we reserve such points for after the meeting to explain why Gorbachev may have failed to rise to our challenge.

I believe that Jack makes a very good point. But I believe that if we wait exclusively until after the meeting to make the general point that Gorbachev is constrained by the system, we will look as if we are rationalizing a failure and inventing excuses for ourselves. Recognizing the risks of excusing Gorbachev in advance, I still believe that it would be helpful to make these points publicly—not necessarily prominently, but nevertheless on the record in some fashion. That way, should the Soviets fail to be forthcoming, we will be able to point to the fact that our expectations were not unrealistic. These points about the Soviet system, after all, are true. They are also not well understood by the public whose general distrust of the Soviets may be intact, but whose understanding of the communist system is woefully deficient. With all the media focus on this meeting, we have a golden opportunity to educate the public about certain realities with which we all will have to live for a long time. If the public understand them, they will be far less likely to blame the President.³

1. Source: Reagan Library, John Lenczowski Files, Subject File, U.S.-Soviet Union (20); NLR–324–10–20–13–4. Confidential. Sent for information. A stamped notation reads “RCM has seen.”
2. Not attached; a copy of Matlock’s handwritten comments are in the Reagan Library, John Lenczowski Files, NSC Files, Chron File October 1985; NLR–324–12–37–10–7. Matlock wrote: “I think this should be worked with the Public Diplomacy group, which is charged with putting together a comprehensive and coherent strategy. Some of the points are very well taken, but there is danger in relying on them exclusively. Basically, we want to put pressure on Gorbachev to change his positions and not excuse him in advance for not being able to do so. If he can’t rise to the challenge, then our focus should be on the reasons for this after the meeting. Jack.”
3. McFarlane wrote below this paragraph: “I have been making this point about why significant Sov chg is unlikely for several months. I agree with you.”