I draw your attention in particular to the final paragraphs of the
letter, in which Gorbachev says
he has a “positive attitude” to the idea of holding a summit. He
indicates that it would not be necessary to sign documents at such a
meeting, although agreements on issues of mutual interest which had been
previously worked out could be “formalized” during the meeting. He
defines the main purpose of a meeting as a “search for mutual
understanding on the basis of equality and taking account of the
legitimate interests of each side.” Gorbachev thanks you for your invitation to Washington,
but asks that you agree to return to the question of timing and venue
for a summit at a later point. The Soviets may be thinking of suggesting
a summit in Helsinki in August, on the occasion of the tenth anniversary
of the CSCE Final Act. In a meeting
last week with Art Hartman,
Gromyko pointedly asked for
our plans on attendance at Helsinki.3
I am holding the text of the letter very closely, and will be sending you
a suggested draft response for Gorbachev in the next few days.
[Page 34]
In answering press inquiries about a Soviet
response to your summit invitation, I suggest we reply simply that our
two governments are in touch, but that as the media knows, we do not
intend to discuss our confidential diplomatic exchanges in public.
Attachment
Letter From Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev to President
Reagan4
Moscow, March 24, 1985
Dear Mr. President:
Let me first of all express gratitude for the sympathy shown by you
personally on the occasion of a sad event for the Soviet people—the
death of K.U. Chernenko.
We also appreciate the participation in the mourning rites in Moscow
of the Vice-President of the United States Mr. George Bush and the Secretary of
State Mr. George Shultz. I
think that the conversation we had with them was—though it had to be
brief—mutually useful and, one might say, even necessary under the
current circumstances.
We value the practice of exchanges of views between the leaders of
our two countries on the key issues of Soviet-American relations and
the international situation as a whole. In this context I attach
great importance to the exchange of letters, which has started
between the two of us.
First of all I would like to say that we deem improvement of
relations between the USSR and
USA to be not only extremely
necessary, but possible, too. This was the central point that I was
making in the conversation with your representatives in Moscow.
For your part, you also expressed yourself in favor of more stable
and constructive relations, and we regard this positively. We have
also taken note of your words about the new opportunities which are
opening up now.
This being the case, the problem, as we understand it, is to
give—through joint effort on the level of political leadership—a
proper impetus to our relations in the direction the two of us are
talking about, to translate into the language of concrete policy the
mutually expressed willingness to improve relations, with account
taken of the special
[Page 35]
responsibility borne by our two countries, of the objective fact
that the Soviet Union and the United States of America are great
powers and that relations between them are of decisive importance
for the situation in the world in general.
Our countries are different by their social systems, by the
ideologies dominant in them. But we believe that this should not be
a reason for animosity. Each social system has a right to life, and
it should prove its advantages not by force, not by military means,
but on the path of peaceful competition with the other system. And
all people have the right to go the way they have chosen themselves,
without anybody imposing his will on them from outside, interfering
in their internal affairs. We believe that this is the only just and
healthy basis for relations among states. For our part, we have
always striven to build our relations with the United States, as
well as with other countries, precisely in this manner.
Besides, the Soviet leadership is convinced that our two countries
have one common interest uniting them beyond any doubt: not to let
things come to the outbreak of nuclear war which would inevitably
have catastrophic consequences for both sides. And both sides would
be well advised to recall this more often in making their
policy.
I am convinced that given such approach to the business at hand, on
the basis of a reasonable account of the realities of today’s world
and treating with a due respect the rights and legitimate interests
of the other side, we could do quite a bit to benefit the peoples of
our countries, as well as the whole world, having embarked upon the
road of a real improvement of relations.
It appears to us that it is important first of all to start
conducting business in such a manner so that both we ourselves and
others could see and feel that both countries are not aiming at
deepening their differences and whipping up animosity, but, rather,
are making their policy looking to the prospect of revitalizing the
situation and of peaceful, calm development. This would help create
an atmosphere of greater trust between our countries. It is not an
easy task, and I would say, a delicate one. For, trust is an
especially sensitive thing, keenly receptive to both deeds and
words. It will not be enhanced if, for example, one were to talk as
if in two languages: one—for private contacts, and the other, as
they say,—for the audience.
The development of relations could well proceed through finding
practical solutions to a number of problems of mutual interest. As I
understand it, you also speak in favor of such a way.
We believe that this should be done across the entire range of
problems, both international and bilateral. Any problem can be
solved, of course, only on a mutually acceptable basis, which means
finding reasonable compromises, the main criterion being that
neither side
[Page 36]
should claim
some special rights for itself or advantages, both on subjects
between the two of them and in international affairs.
No matter how important the questions involved in our relations or
affecting them in this or that manner might be, the central,
priority area is that of security. The negotiations underway in
Geneva require the foremost attention of the two of us. Obviously,
we will have to turn again and again to the questions under
discussion there. At this point I do not intend to comment on what
is going on at the talks—they have just started. I shall say,
though, that some statements which were made and are being made in
your country with regard to the talks cannot but cause concern.
I would like you to know and appreciate the seriousness of our
approach to the negotiations, our firm desire to work towards
positive results there. We will invariably adhere to the agreement
on the subject and objectives of these negotiations. The fact that
we were able to agree on this in January is already a big
achievement, and it should be treated with care.
I hope, Mr. President, that you will feel from this letter that the
Soviet leadership, including myself personally, intends to act
vigorously to find common ways to improving relations between our
countries.
I think that it is also clear from my letter that we attach great
importance to contacts at the highest level. For this reason I have
a positive attitude to the idea you expressed about holding a
personal meeting between us. And, it would seem that such a meeting
should not necessarily be concluded by signing some major documents.
Though agreements on certain issues of mutual interest, if they were
worked out by that time, could well be formalized during the
meeting.
The main thing is that it should be a meeting to search for mutual
understanding on the basis of equality and account of the legitimate
interests of each other.
As to a venue for the meeting, I thank you for the invitation to
visit Washington. But let us agree that we shall return again to the
question of the place and time for the meeting.
Sincerely,
