Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985

79. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, August 18, 1983, 2058Z

10508. Subject: CODEL Pell Discussion With Andropov.

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. Summary. During an hour and three-quarter discussion with nine Democratic senators led by Senator Claiborne Pell (D–RI), Andropov launched a Soviet anti-satellite initiative and engaged in unprecedented back and forth exchanges on most of the major US-Soviet issues. On ASAT, Andropov told the group that it was the first to be told the Soviet decision not to be the first country to launch into outer space any types of ASAT weapons; Andropov said that the Soviet Union would initiate a unilateral moratorium for as long as others, including the U.S., refrained from launching ASAT weapons of any kind. Andropov’s prepared remarks on INF and START were along familiar lines. On INF, he chose to downplay and generalize the threat of retaliation to U.S. deployment: He said that deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles would have consequences “for us and for you” and that Americans would feel the difference between the situation before and the situation after deployment. The Soviet leader laid great stress on the freeze. On Central America, he said that things would not be solved by threat of arms, “arrogant military demonstrations”, or interference in internal affairs. Following Andropov’s prepared statement, Senator Pell read a statement summing up the views of his group (full text septel).² The Pell statement proposed, inter alia, greater political and military contacts between the two countries, a U.S.-Soviet summit, and the consolidation of the START and INF negotiations. Senator Pell also expressed on behalf of his delegation concern about the Soviet military buildup; Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Poland, Southeast Asia, Africa, Central America; and concern regarding Soviet human rights performance, naming Sakharov, Wallenberg, Orlov and Shcharansky. The last half of the meeting was a give and take in which Andropov, with animation and sometimes heat, responded to the Senators. Pushed by Senator Pell on whether the Soviet Union was prepared to dismantle its ASAT systems, he bobbed, weaved, and finally changed the subject. Andropov gave a somewhat rambling response to the group’s proposal for the summit. He said that the Reagan administration had put forward proposals on CBMs which boiled down to a discussion of the Hot Line and wondered how the two Presidents could sit down and talk about such minor things. He said that, until the Soviet Union is convinced that the U.S. is ready to discuss substantive, important issues, the summit would be meaningless. On Southern Africa, Andropov said that not a single Soviet soldier was, is, or would be in Angola. On Poland, he said that nobody had been able to discover any Soviet influence on the situation, including American representatives who have visited Poland and the Pope who—though not an American representative—acted like one. On Afghanistan, he said the Soviet position was unchanged, then challenged the U.S. to get out of Nicaragua and the French to get out of Chad and “then we’ll talk about Afghanistan.” Andropov took a tough position on human rights, specifically addressing the names Senator Pell had mentioned. He said that Sakharov was “mentally ill” and had written an article in “Foreign Affairs” urging the U.S. to declare war on the Soviet Union (sic). He said that Shcharansky must serve out his sentence before there can be discussion of his leaving; Andropov’s interpreter Sukhodrev, questioned by the Chargé following the discussion, said that Andropov’s statement would not be inconsistent with a pardon for Shcharansky since Andropov had not said that Shcharansky had to serve his “full sentence.” Andropov said the statement on Shcharansky also applied to Orlov; regarding Wallenberg, “he is not here.” On the merging of START and INF, Andropov said that no decision had been made but that he saw no point in merging the two negotiations. Andropov was intellectually vigorous during the whole meeting, not flagging during the whole hour and three quarters. As on other occasions, he walked with a shuffle although unattended; and his hands shook occasionally especially when he seemed to be making deeply felt points. End summary.

3. The meeting was held at one p.m. August 18 in Andropov’s Kremlin meeting room. Andropov was accompanied by First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko, his aide Aleksandrov, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities Ruben, and his interpreter Sukhodrev. On the American side were Senators Pell, Long, Bumpers, Leahy, Metzenbaum, Riegle, Sarbanes, Sasser, and DeConcini; Secretary for the Senate Minority (Griffin) and Senate staff members Ritch and Ashworth; and the Chargé. Andropov entered the room last, possibly to save on the amount of time he would have to stand up. Andropov sat at the head of a long table, with the two sides ranged on either side.

4. After the Soviet press was admitted—during which time Andropov smiled and joked—he greeted Senator Pell and his group and began by expressing his concern about the state of Soviet-American relations. He said that he saw the group as responsible political figures with an influence on policy making. It was not important that they were representatives of only one political party; he would say exactly the same thing to Republican Senators. Andropov said that the tensions which characterized all areas of our relations are not the Soviet choice. There are some in Washington who prefer situations of tension and games played with no rules; but the Soviet Union does not share this view. Would the U.S. allow the other side to achieve superiority? Andropov doubted it and said that the Soviet Union could not allow it either. Soviet policy is directed at a level of accord assuring normal, stable, and good relations to the common profit and to the benefit of universal peace. The Soviet Government wants to conduct matters on an equal footing taking account of each other’s legitimate interests.

5. Turning to INF, Andropov said that whether we can find a solution acceptable to both sides and thus arrest a dangerous new round will determine where we go from here. The Soviet side feels that in America people may not be aware of how much is at stake. Perhaps they believe that the issue is not important because it’s thousands of kilometers away. But they are wrong, because deployment of the Pershing II and cruise missiles would have “consequences for you and for us.” Americans would feel the difference between the situation before deployment and the situation after deployment. This is not a threat, but there is simply no other way out; such are the linkages inherent in this issue.

6. Continuing on INF, Andropov said that the Soviet Union proposes a balance at the lowest possible levels. It seeks equality via the largest possible reductions. Its first choice is that neither the USSR nor NATO should have any intermediate or tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. What is unfair about that? Only those who don’t want equality think it’s unfair. It provides truly zero levels with a solid reserve behind. Since the U.S. has shown no desire even to discuss that option, Andropov went on, we came out with several constructive proposals. If those proposals took effect, there would be a threefold reduction in the quantity of medium nuclear systems on the Soviet and NATO sides. Moreover, NATO would only reduce airborne systems, while the Soviet Union would reduce missiles, including a considerable number of SS–20’s. We would be left with less than we had in 1976, when nobody said we had particular superiority. Why is that unacceptable? We are very flexible; if the U.S. showed an interest in an honest agreement on an equitable basis, success in Geneva is still possible. But our flexibility has limits. The security of our people and of our allies means that we will make no unilateral concessions, not even five minutes before midnight.

7. Turning to START, Andropov said that if the negotiations failed, more sophisticated and horrendous weapons systems would emerge, causing disarray. Such systems are imminent. If the U.S. wants an agreement, it is wrong to portray some bombs and missiles as frightening and some as acceptable. Moreover, it’s absurd to presume that you can compel the other side to reduce the basic components of its strategic forces while leaving yours a free hand. Andropov added that, as long as the U.S. position remains what it is, it is meaningless to show artificial optimism. Unless a solution is found, the threat of nuclear war will increase; we in the Soviet Union are against that.

8. Andropov then launched into a strong defense of a freeze on American and Soviet strategic arms. He said that military technology is moving faster than discussions to limit it. The risk is therefore that the talks will focus on yesterday’s problems; a freeze would allow the diplomats to catch up with the arms makers. Andropov called for a no-increase rule on existing weapons, for no development and testing, and for limitations on modernization. He said the Soviet side would also accept a freeze on nuclear components. In addition to checking the arms race and improving the political atmosphere, a freeze would make it easier to come to terms on cutting back our stockpiles.

Andropov contested statements that a freeze would solidify Soviet superiority in the strategic field. He said that during recent congressional hearings your Generals were asked if they would exchange nuclear arsenals with the Soviet forces; they said no. Andropov said that calls for a freeze were not coming only from the Soviet Union, but also from other countries and were not alien to political circles in the United States.

9. Andropov then moved on to the ASAT. He said that the danger of the arms race was spreading to outer space. The planet is saturated with nuclear weapons; now there is an effort to stuff outer space with it. Such a development must be prevented. He noted the concern of American legislators and a feeling against creating an ASAT capability or an anti-missile defense system involving the use of outer space. The Soviet Union proposes a ban on the use of force in outer space and from outer space.

10. Andropov outlined Soviet views on the prevention of militarization of outer space. He said it is necessary to agree on the full prevention of testing and deployment of any space based weapons designed to strike targets on the ground, in the air, or in outer space. We would agree to dismantle all existing ASAT systems and ban the development of new systems. Andropov said that detailed proposals would be submitted by the Soviet Union in the forthcoming UN General Assembly.³

11. He then unveiled a new Soviet decision which the Senatorial group “is the first to hear.” The Soviet Union, he said, [omission in the original] first to launch into outer space any type of ASAT weapons. The Soviet Government will introduce a unilateral moratorium for as long as others, including the United States, refrain from launching ASAT weapons of any kind. He said he would like to count on the U.S. as positively responding to this Soviet initiative. (Comment: There is some ambiguity between this language as heard, and later TASS renderings of it. The issue is whether Andropov’s language would exclude ground-based ASAT’s or would exclude only orbiting ASAT’s.)

12. Andropov then turned to regional issues. He had the impression that uppermost in the mind of many American politicians is the desire to explain away any international problem by blaming it on communist intriguers or Moscow’s scheming. This approach can only multiply the explosive situations already existing in the world. In Central America, for example, causes of the problems run very deep. The threat of arms, “arrogant military demonstrations,” or interference in internal affairs will not solve the problems but will only make them more dangerous. We are deeply convinced that only a political solution will help. Andropov gave credit to “those Latin American countries seeking solutions.” He did not specifically name the Contadora Group. He said that the proposals for settlement advanced by Nicaragua and Cuba provide a good basis for solution.” He did not specifically name the (#) is for solution. Everything must be done to ensure that the situation in and around Central America does not get out of control. Andropov said that throughout the world—for example, in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Africa, and elsewhere—the top priority for the Soviet Union is lowering tensions and removing conflict situations.

13. Andropov then made his only reference to the internal situation in the Soviet Union. He said that the Soviet people, guided by the Communist Party, were involved in a great and difficult effort to enhance the efficiency of the economy, improve management levels, and achieve new levels of scientific progress. If you’ve followed these events, you will know that our plans for peaceful cooperation are long lasting. Our foremost goal is to elevate the material and spiritual levels of the Soviet people. Therefore the main goal for the Soviet foreign policy is peace and avoiding the threat of nuclear war.

14. Andropov closed his prepared remarks on a bilateral note. He said that the Soviet Union is open to fruitful mutually advantageous cooperation with all states, including the U.S. However complicated the world situation is, we look at it with optimism and confidence that common sense will prevail. The normalization of bilateral relations must be one of the major components of that process. Referring jocularly to his position as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, Andropov said he would not be a good Chairman unless he said that the Soviet Union was in favor of various forms of parliamentary contacts and that this includes contacts with the U.S. Congress.

15. Following Senator Pell’s exposition (septel), Andropov agreed, at Senator Pell’s request, to a dialogue. Andropov, noting that Senator Pell had proposed a joint US-Soviet moratorium on anti-satellite testing and a ban on ASAT weapons, said he didn’t see what remained to be discussed. If the U.S. says that it won’t launch anti-satellite weapons into outer space, the problem is solved. He asked Senator Pell to call that to the attention of U.S. authorities. Senator Pell responded that his group advocated not just a moratorium, but dismantling of ASAT weapons with on-site verification, and noted that the Soviet Union was ahead of the United States in this field. Andropov agreed that there should be verification but did not address the issue of on-site. Nor did he make any direct reference to dismantling or destruction of ASAT weapons. He appeared somewhat discomfited by Senator Pell’s persistence on this issue; he finally changed the subject, noting that little time remained for other topics.

16. Senator Long then argued for finding a way for each side to have early warning before an attack was launched. Andropov remarked that for a start, the U.S. should not put missiles in Europe since it only takes six minutes for them (sic) to reach the Soviet Union whereas Soviet missiles take 20 minutes to reach the United States.

17. Responding to the Senators’ opening statement that Soviet leaders were badly informed about the United States, Andropov conceded that there was some truth to this and that not enough is done to provide knowledge about the U.S. in the Soviet Union. But he complained that even the bare minimum that the Soviet side tries to convey to the American public does not reach it.

18. On the Senators’ proposal for a summit, Andropov seemed to get a little beyond his brief. He said that the Soviet Union is for a summit in principle, but what would be discussed? Recently we understand that the Reagan administration has put forward proposals on CBMs which boil down to discussion on the modernization of the Hot Line and certain other issues of that low level type. Do you think it would be proper for the two Presidents to sit down and talk about telephones? As for our proposals, they have been passed over in silence. Andropov concluded, until we are convinced that the U.S. is ready to discuss substantive issues, a summit meeting would be meaningless. (Comment: Andropov is clearly confused about the President’s CBM initiative which was not proposed as a subject for discussion at a summit.)

19. Andropov took issue with the assertion by the Senators in one of their prepared questions that Afghanistan had caused the non-ratification of SALT II. He claimed that the U.S. had refused to ratify SALT II way before the Afghanistan problem appeared and that there was, therefore, no linkage there.

20. On the issue of the arms race, he asserted that the Soviet Union always had to play catch [up] to American military activities—first with the atomic bomb, then with MIRVs. At that point Korniyenko said that, at a time when there were no MIRVs, the Soviet Union had proposed a ban on them. Andropov then stated that the Soviet Union did not manufacture the cruise missile, the U.S. did; the Soviet Union therefore had had to try to catch up. The Soviet Union opposes any new spiral, any new type of weaponry. But if today the U.S. develops a new type of weapon, we will have to catch up.

21. On Southern Africa, Andropov said that, if you find a footprint of a single Soviet soldier or a single Soviet military unit in Angola, “then I’ll surrender.” He said that no Soviet unit was, is, or will be in that country. That is the Soviet approach toward Southern Africa.

22. Regarding Poland, he said that “your American representatives have visited Poland.” The Pope has also visited Poland, although he was not your representative though he acted like one. They went there to find proof of Soviet influence on the situation in Poland, but nobody has yet found it.

23. On Afghanistan, Andropov said that the Soviet position has been that the Soviet Union will withdraw as soon as intervention ceases. But he’d also put it differently: Let the U.S. get out of Nicaragua, let French troops get out of Chad, and then we will talk about Afghanistan. Our position of principle on Afghanistan is unchanged.

24. The Soviet leader then took on the Senatorial group on the issue of human rights. He said it was an intricate and complex problem, with different understandings deriving from ideology, philosophy, and approach. We don’t claim the right to make you think as we do; neither should you claim that right. The more often this issue appears, the more it leads to quarrels. It cannot help us achieve the ultimate objective of normal relations.

25. Andropov addressed one by one the names mentioned in Senator Pell’s opening statement. On this subject he spoke with heat, his hands sometimes shaking. He said that Sakharov is mentally ill, although we don’t say this publicly because we don’t want to cast a slur on a member of the Academy of Sciences. He recently wrote an article in an American magazine (Korniyenko interjected that it was “Foreign Affairs”) in which he urged the U.S. to declare war on the Soviet Union (sic). Andropov said he could produce thousands of letters from indignant citizens criticizing Sakharov’s position. Would the Senators want his government to show disrespect for all these people in order to show respect for Sakharov?

26. Shcharansky, Andropov continued, was tried and convicted of espionage for a foreign power. There was nothing political about his actions. Therefore, my answer to you is “no.” He is serving his sentence. He must serve his sentence before there can be a discussion about allowing him to leave. (Following the meeting the Chargé asked Sukhodrev to check his notes on this passage, particularly whether Andropov was excluding the possibility of any pardon for Shcharansky. After checking, Sukhodrev said categorically that Andropov had not said that Shcharansky must serve his “full sentence”; therefore, Andropov’s statement did not exclude a pardon, although of course Andropov was not explicitly including it or suggesting it.) On Orlov, Andropov said the same thing applied as to Shcharansky. On Wallenberg, Andropov said that the Soviet Union had said many times that “he is not here.” (Comment: Andropov apparently did not know the Soviet position that Wallenberg died long ago in a Soviet prison.)

27. On Jewish emigration, Andropov read from a paper purporting to show that from 1945 until July 1983, 273,000 Jews have emigrated. This includes 20,000 to the U.S., 12,000 of them on temporary visas. Thus, there are no grounds for saying that the emigration rate is slowing down (sic). He said that 92 percent of all applications for emigration have been met. For the rest, most of those are people who have had access to state secrets. Aleksandrov interjected at this point that there are others serving terms as criminals, a comment which Andropov then repeated himself.

28. Andropov then addressed the issue of merging START and INF. He said that no decision has been taken as yet, since the Soviets wanted to see how the talks progressed. So far, the U.S. shows no desire for agreement in either set of negotiations; therefore, the Soviet side doesn’t see any point in merging the two negotiations. Moreover, Andropov continued, if the Pershing II’s and cruise missiles are deployed, that would put the whole thing into question.

29. In concluding, Andropov picked up on Senator Pell’s reference to the Soviet Union and the U.S. as a bear and a whale. He said he liked the metaphor. He said that a bear and a whale would not resort to nuclear arms. Therefore, our two countries should have the same mature approach.

30. At the end of the meeting, Andropov stood up, shook hands with every member of the American group, and walked with difficulty but without assistance into his anteroom. Apart from his difficulty in walking, an obvious shaking of his hands when he was stressing a point or holding a paper, and a few deep coughs, his health seemed very good. And his vigor in the discussion was sustained from beginning to end of the meeting.

31. Department distribute as appropriate.

Zimmermann

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N830007–0378. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis; Stadis. A notation in the telegram indicates that “#” indicates an omission in the original.
2. In telegram 10642 from Moscow, August 23, an informal translation by the Department of State interpreter of Andropov’s opening remarks was sent to the Department. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830483–0669) No separate telegram with Senator Pell’s remarks was found.
3. On August 18, the Soviet Union submitted to the UN General Assembly a draft treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the earth. See Documents on Disarmament, 1983, pp. 684–686.