DATE AND TIME: Friday, August 5, 1:30 p.m.
II. BACKGROUND: U.S.-Soviet relations are
presently at a low ebb. Ongoing arms control negotiations have failed
thus far in finding common conceptual ground. The Soviets also have not
displayed any signs of moderation on such regional issues as Afghanistan
or the Middle East. At the same time, considerable domestic and Allied
pressures for enhanced dialogue and summitry are building.
In view of the current situation, a briefing has been scheduled to
provide you with a comprehensive review of Soviet views of the current
international situation and prospective developments, as well as Soviet
intentions and policies. Specifically, the briefing will cover: 1) the
nature of the Soviet system and underlying determinants of Soviet
behavior, 2) leadership psychology, 3) Soviet threat assessment/view of
Soviet international position, and 4) the Soviet foreign policy agenda
and its implications for future U.S. decisions. Given the crucial
upcoming decisions on our policies toward the Soviet Union that lie
ahead, the briefing will provide an informative backgrounder which will
be useful in devising effective responses to the Soviet challenge.
III. PARTICIPANTS:
IV. PRESS PLAN: Not applicable.
V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:
1. Briefing (30 minutes)
2. Qs and As (30 minutes)
Attachment
Paper Prepared by the National Security Council
Staff3
BRIEFING OUTLINE
I. INTRODUCTION
An attempt to describe how the Soviet leaders view the world and the
implications of this for U.S.-Soviet relations. There is often a
tendency to assume that the Soviets view the world as we would if we
were sitting in Moscow. This is emphatically not the case, and today
we shall try to explain some of the more important characteristics
of Soviet thinking. John
Lenczowski will discuss the nature of the Soviet
system, Paula Dobriansky
will take a look at how the Soviets view their international
position and assess the threats to it, and Jack Matlock will describe the
psychology of the Soviet leaders and discuss some implications for
U.S. policy.
II. NATURE OF SOVIET SYSTEM, FOREIGN POLICY
DETERMINANTS AND STRATEGY (Lenczowski)
The USSR as
a Communist Power
A. Distinction between a communist power and a traditional
imperialist great power: limited versus necessarily unlimited
objectives.
B. Various influences encourage us to believe that USSR is no longer communist:
1. Wishful thinking.
2. Mirror imaging.
3. Soviet disinformation.
C. Inescapable fact: USSR must be
communist because of the role of ideology in the system.
1. Ideology as source of legitimacy.
2. Ideology as key to internal security system: Emperor’s New
Clothes.
3. A key index that this is so is to observe that ideology
defines basic structure of society.
D. Ideology and Foreign Policy.
1. Ideology serves as frame of reference to view the
world.
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2. Ideology defines international reality as struggle between two
social systems: capitalism and socialism, a struggle inevitably
to be won by socialism.
3. Therefore ideology determines friends and enemies—it sets an
international standard of behavior.
4. Ideology presents a discrete set of strategies and tactics of
revolutionary behavior.
5. Ideology sets a standard of measurement of correlation of
forces: strategic decisions to advance or retreat are made on
the basis of “scientific” assessments of the correlation of
forces. Ideological strength or weakness is the key
criterion.
6. Ideology serves as a weapon of political influence: an
instrument of subversion and deception.
7. Foreign ideologies (and therefore any competing version of the
truth) are the principal threats to the Soviet
system.
Soviet Strategy
A. Because USSR is prisoner of the
ideology, its lies, and its predictions, it is compelled to try to
fulfill those predictions. This means:
1. Creating false appearances—therefore a strategy of
deception.
2. Creating new realities, by exporting revolution.
B. The principal means of Soviet expansionism is “ideological
struggle”.
1. To win men’s minds.
2. To deceive those who cannot be won.
3. Therefore propaganda, subversion and disinformation are the
key features of Soviet foreign policy.
4. Suppression of the truth is the ultimate
objective—self-censorship by Soviet adversaries is prelude to
political uniformity.
5. A principal effort: to define the acceptable vocabulary of
international political debate—both words and
issues.
C. Military power is the principal adjunct to this.
1. It can forcibly create the new reality.
2. It can serve to intimidate and accelerate the process of
ideological subversion.
D. Struggle between two systems as a protracted conflict.
1. Soviet control over the time frame of the conflict enables
them to control timing of attack and choice of battlefield while
permitting possibility of strategic retreat.
2. Proper understanding of time permits strategy of
attrition—nibble at edges of Free World, never risk final
showdown.
3. Strategy of indirect attack:
—A deceptive means of escaping culpability.
—Use of proxies, front groups, agents of influence,
etc.
4. Strategy of monopoly of offensive.
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5. Strategy of psychological conditioning:
—War-zone, peace zone.
—Demarcation of scrimmage line.
—Soviets have conditioned us to believe that peace zone is
inviolable but war zone is not.
—Therefore Soviets have developed a no-lose strategy: they have
nothing to lose by continually trying to cross the scrimmage
line.
III. SOVIET THREAT ASSESSMENT: THREATS,
OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES (Dobriansky)
A. Zero-sum mentality: The U.S. poses the
greatest threat to Soviet security as it is the main obstacle to the
achievement of Soviet geo-political objectives. Ergo, Soviet foreign
policy is generally designed to reduce and curtail the U.S.
geo-political position. Moscow evaluates all international
situations from one perspective—whether they would detract or
enhance the Soviet position vis-a-vis that of the U.S.
B. Soviet conception of a threat: In contrast
to the Western conception of a threat—an action which might
undermine one’s existing position—the Soviet definition also
includes any actions which might frustrate potential Soviet gains.
As the Soviets strive for absolute security, any attempts to upset
the current balance or Soviet gains are perceived by Moscow as a
threat. There are two underlying reasons: (1) Soviet penchant for
expansionism to solve security problems (2) Existence of democratic
societies poses constant threat to domestic Soviet stability by
providing an example of an alternative social and political entity.
Public and private Soviet complaints indicate that U.S. ideological
offensive is taken seriously and regarded as an important
threat.
C. Role of military power in foreign policy:
Soviet leaders regard military strength as the foundation of the
USSR’s status as a global
superpower and as the most critical factor underlying successful
Soviet foreign policy. Yet, concern about the danger of nuclear war
has been a serious consideration in Soviet foreign policy decisions.
Essentially, the nature of the Soviet dilemma has been how to wage a
successful expansionist foreign policy without unduly increasing the
risk of a nuclear war.
Soviet Assessment of Current International
Environment/Projected Trends
A. U.S.: Despite domestic opposition,
budgetary pressures and Intra-Alliance tensions, the Soviets expect
that the U.S. is likely to sustain its present foreign and defense
policies (i.e., MX, INF, etc.) which seek to curtail
Soviet expansionism.
B. Western Europe: Despite Intra-Alliance
tensions, the peace movement, etc., the Soviets do not realistically
expect a break up of NATO, and
believe that Western European governments would continue to follow
(by and large) the U.S. lead on major security issues.
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C. Third World: Soviets anticipate
acceleration of the process of disintegration, anarchy triggered by
economic stagnation, border and resource disputes and the lack of
stable political organizations. They anticipate many Third World
crises which will present both opportunities and threats to Soviet
security. Soviet concern is that a newly assertive U.S. bent on
stemming Soviet expansionism would intervene in a future Third World
conflict.
Regional Geographic Assessments:
Threats/Opportunities (Countries are listed in
order of priority from Soviet perspective)
A. Eastern Europe: Only area which offers no
opportunities, only potential threats;
B. Western Europe: European military
capability is minimal threat in short term, but with U.S. support it
is a significant military threat. Substantial ideological/political
threat, moderate opportunities.
C. Asia: High threat/high opportunity; East
Asia—China, Japan, Korea—growing security threat; main
option—containment; Southeast/Southwest Asia—opportunities, of
immense strategic value.
D. Middle East: Moderate Threat/Moderate
Opportunity; do not anticipate dramatic successes.
E. Africa: Low risk/low threat/moderate
opportunities; no dramatic successes; recognition of gains and
losses.
F. Central America: High risk/low threat/high
opportunities; creation of strategic diversion—tying up U.S.
resources, distracting U.S. attention from other critical areas,
generating U.S. domestic cleavages.
IV. PSYCHOLOGY OF SOVIET
LEADERS (Matlock)
A. Some widespread characteristics
—Communist ideology, Russian traditions and the imperatives of
ruling a highly bureaucratized, multinational empire are fused
in the thinking of the leadership.
—The legitimacy of the rulers rests entirely on the ideology;
they must cling to it even if they do not fully believe it.
—Their first priority is preserving their system; their second is
expanding their power, so long as it does not conflict with the
first.
—Legitimacy and status are extremely important to them and
comprise an important foreign policy objective. This contributes
to an acute sense of saving face.
—Their attitude is fundamentally totalitarian: citizens are
viewed as property of the state, allies as puppets (or else they
are not really allies).
—They take a long-term view and do not accept defeats as
permanent. A defeat in one area is viewed as a challenge to find
other means to achieve the same objective.
—They are persistent bargainers, adept at exploiting time
pressures on the other side, but willing to strike deals rapidly
if they feel compelled to.
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—They are often prisoners of their own ideological proclivities
and thus misjudge the effect of their actions on others.
—They are much more preoccupied with the United States than we
are with them.
B. Soviet view of Reagan
Administration
—Soviets cautiously welcomed the President’s election because
they were fed up with Carter and thought a Republican president might
return to the Nixon-Ford policies.
—When they realized in early 1981 that there would be no return
to “detente,” they played with the idea of “waiting out” the
Reagan
Administration, in the hope that it would only last four
years.
—They have been surprised and impressed by the President’s
ability to get his defense programs through, keep unity in the
alliance, and get the economy moving again. At the same time,
they have experienced a series of foreign policy defeats and
growing economic difficulties at home.
—There are signs now that they are reassessing their foreign
policy. They may feel overextended, and
in need of some reduction of tension to allow more attention to
domestic problems. They seem convinced that the President is
likely to be reelected, and if so must be asking themselves
whether it might not be better to deal with him before rather
than after his reelection.
—Given their preoccupation with U.S.-Soviet relations, they may
well exaggerate the political benefits to the President in
dealing with them. This could lead them to overplay their
hand.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY
A. The struggle is long-term. There are no quick fixes. This means
that we must devise a strategy which can be sustained for a decade
or, probably, more.
B. Two broad options in theory:
1. Unrelenting pressure on the Soviets; and
2. Negotiation of specific differences on basis of strength, with
follow-up to keep gains permanent rather than
temporary.
Only the second seems sustainable in a democratic society, but it
requires a recognition that agreements are only stages in the
struggle, not the end of it.
