Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985

379. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan¹

Washington, March 8, 1985

SUBJECT

• Principals’ Views on Geneva Options

Secretaries George Shultz and Cap Weinberger and ACDA Director Kenneth Adelman have sent separate memoranda to you forwarding their views on preferred options for the Geneva negotiators.

Secretary Shultz’s memorandum (Tab A)² endorses START Option 3, arguing that while this option permits more ballistic missile warheads than our current START proposal (i.e., far more than 5,000), it seeks to cut the most destabilizing categories (i.e., warheads on MIRVed missiles and heavy ICBMs) and would set important numericals limit on air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) by aggregating these with ballistic missile warheads. For INF, Shultz argues in favor of a new initiative incorporated in Option 2 that, in his view, properly amplifies previous positions while sustaining US and Allied public opinion. On Defense and Space, he states that to avoid focus on SDI as an obstacle, the US must avoid being perceived as standing pat on START and INF.

Secretary Weinberger’s memorandum (Tab B)³ cautions against moving too rapidly on START and INF as time is needed to build support for SDI and as rapid progress in START and INF would build pressure for US concessions on SDI. Concerning START, Weinberger endorses Option 5 as simplifying constraints to two measures (warheads and throwweight) as opening with a proposal for truly deep reductions to 4,000 warheads after 12 years, and as thus taking the Soviets at their word on favoring “radical reductions,” while offering substantial flexibility on various tradeoffs during the course of the negotiations. For INF, Weinberger endorses Option 1, and strongly criticizes Option 2’s “equal percentage reduction” concept as moving us far from our current concept of zero-zero and of global equality and as leaving more Soviet than US missiles in place.

ACDA Director Adelman’s memorandum (Tab C)⁴ is silent on INF and Defense/Space issues, but endorses START Option 6 as an elaboration of our current position (Option 1) and as providing a long-term “road map” outlining a path to our long-term goal, without tying our negotiators to a specific tactic.

In addition, Senator Tower has sent a memorandum (Tab D)⁵ to NSC Staff outlining his views as to how Option 1 (our current position), which he favors, can be enhanced to make it more dynamic. We are drawing on several of his suggestions.

Recommendation

That you review the attachments together with the proposed National Security Decision Memorandum draft which is being provided in a separate package.⁶

1. Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Chrons, March 1985 Chron File: [No.44–No.46]. Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Kraemer and Linhard. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it.
2. Shultz’s memorandum is not attached, but an unsigned copy, dated March 6, is in the Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Chrons, March 1985 Chron File: [No.21–No.25].
3. Weinberger’s memorandum is not attached, but an undated, unsigned copy is in the Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Chrons, March 1985 Chron File: [No.21–No.25].
4. Adelman’s memorandum is not attached, but a copy, dated March 6, is ibid.
5. Tower’s memorandum is not attached, but a copy, dated March 6, is ibid.
6. Reagan did not indicate his approval or disapproval of the recommendation.