361. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the Department of State and the White House1
Secto 1024. For the President. Subject: Memorandum for the President on the Secretary’s Third Meeting With Gromyko, Tuesday Morning, January 8, 1985.
1. Secret—Entire text.
2. We spent another two-and-a-half hours this morning going over and clarifying our positions on the structure and content of possible future negotiations. Nothing very new arose from this discussion but it gave me the chance to explain clearly our view of what the three groups might discuss. Gromyko made an interesting clarification that in effect means that any agreements coming out of the groups can be called up and approved if both sides want it that way. At the end of our session both sides tabled a text of a draft joint announcement. (These texts are contained in the last paragraph of this message.)
3. Before we began the morning session. I took Gromyko aside and went through privately with him all of our human rights points including specific names and cases, as well as general points on emigration, Hebrew teachers, divided families and American nationals. He listened but took the predictable position that he would not comment.
4. I then began the meeting with a lengthy statement designed to put on the record or restate our views on the subject matters for the [Page 1336] three fora: strategic arms, INF, and nuclear defensive and space arms. I restated what we expected to take place in each and recalled particularly my list of subjects for the third fora which I laid out yesterday. I recognized that we have a different approach to the third fora and wanted that clearly understood. I expressed the hope that they would come to see the advantage of looking at defense in relation to offense. His long answer amounted to a negative answer on ever being persuaded that SDI was defensive. He insisted that they would always assume it to be offensive but that did not seem to deter him from wanting to get his complex of negotiations going. He even made absolutely clear that the complicated system of joint reviews of the work of the three groups was not designed to stop all agreements from emerging.
5. I made crystal clear that we would not agree to any proposition that appeared to rule out or control research in the space area. He did not appear to feel that they would stop their research, but rather stated that they hoped nothing would be allowed to the development stage.
6. Finally, we both tabled texts (which follow) and these will be discussed at our meeting beginning at 2:30 pm.
7. Begin text of U.S. statement:
The United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to begin a new complex of negotiations to address the interrelated questions of nuclear and space arms. To this end, three negotiating groups will be convened in Geneva, beginning on March 5, 1985, to begin the process of negotiating agreements on strategic offensive nuclear arms, intermediate-range nuclear arms, and nuclear defensive and space arms. The objective of these negotiations shall be the reduction of nuclear arms and the enhancement of strategic stability, with the ultimate goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.
8. Begin text of Soviet statement:
As previously agreed, a meeting between Andrei A. Gromyko, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, and George Shultz, Secretary of State of the USA, took place on January 7 and 8, 1985, in Geneva.
The question regarding the subject and objectives of the forthcoming Soviet-US negotiations on nuclear and space weapons was discussed during the meeting.
The sides agree that the subject of the talks will be a complex of questions pertaining both to space weapons and nuclear arms—strategic and medium-range—with all these questions to be discussed and resolved in their interrelationship.
[Page 1337]The objective of the negotiations will be to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space, limiting and reducing nuclear weapons, and strengthening strategic stability.
Eventually, the two sides believe, the forthcoming negotiations as, generally, efforts in the field of limiting and reducing armaments should lead to the complete elimination everywhere of nuclear weapons.
The date of the beginning of the negotiations and their venue will be agreed through diplomatic channels within one month.
- Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, Geneva Meeting: Shultz/Gromyko 01/08/1985 Morning. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Hartman; cleared by McFarlane, M. Bova (S/S), Hill, and K. Clark (S); approved by Shultz. Sent for information Priority to Moscow.↩