340. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to President Reagan1
SUBJECT
- The Geneva Talks
I believe Geneva offers some hope that we can secure genuinely useful agreements with the Soviets; but there will also be considerable risks for us at Geneva.
Everything depends upon the ultimate attitude and goals of the Soviet Union, and these will be very hard to discover, at least in the early phases of the negotiations.
The opportunities that we hope for at Geneva would develop if the Soviets have indeed concluded that (a) they cannot achieve a sufficient degree of military superiority to enable them to impose their will on the world; and (b) if they conclude that, at least for now, the best policy for them to pursue is to try to strengthen their economy and the quality of life for their people, and thus to reduce significantly the major increases and strength they have added every year to their military.
However, it will I think, be some time, probably several months or perhaps even a year or more into the negotiations before they would disclose any such intentions, or express any willingness to reduce significantly their offensive systems.
I believe it is more likely that they will continue to test us by any one of a number of means, including demanding either a moratorium or a permanent ban on anti-satellite weapons, and either a moratorium or a permanent ban on any more work on space-based strategic defen [Page 1216] sive systems as the price of either their remaining at the talks, or willingness to discuss offensive systems, etc.
The Soviets believe that they can always win in negotiations with “impatient democracies”. They know that our press and the great bulk of the so-called “arms control community”, as well as most of the columnists, commentators, etc., measure success in negotiations by whether or not we get an agreement. These same groups are strongly against our insisting on any position by us that might block “an agreement”, no matter what are the contents of an agreement.
There is a remarkably revealing paragraph in Tom Wicker’s column which appeared in the New York Times on Friday, 21 December.2 I attach the column, but the critical paragraph comes after Mr. Wicker’s comments that our Administration has “insisted publicly that it has always sought balanced and verifiable arms control agreements”. Mr. Wicker then goes on to say “Within the Administration, however, a powerful faction—possibly Mr. Reagan himself—has been suspicious of arms control on principle; some officials fought hard to establish U.S. negotiation positions that would be either unacceptable to the Russians or, if accepted would yield advantage to the U.S.” In short, we stand convicted of this serious offense of supporting agreements that would be of advantage to the U.S., presumably unlike the Soviets who have only the broad world interests at heart.
This impatience of democracies and the natural desire of most negotiators to achieve a “success”, that is “an agreement”, will be played upon by the Soviets. They will, I am sure, try to make us appear both stubborn and “lacking sincerity” as we maintain our positions that we should not give up the SDI or agree to banning or moratoria on anti-satellite weapons.
That is why I think it is so critically important and beneficial that you, and others in the Administration, have said that the Strategic Defense Initiative will not be given up, that it offers the most, indeed the only, hope of any of the strategic arms proposals; that it is not designed to protect any particular target, but is designed to destroy weapons and not people; and that it is not the militarization of space, but on the contrary, the use of space to keep the earth free of nuclear holocausts.
In other words, we should put them in the position of trying to block the one system that offers hope of a nuclear free future to all mankind.
[Page 1217]Incidentally, I think it is most important that we continue to present and discuss the Strategic Defense Initiative in terms of seeking “a thoroughly reliable defense against Soviet missiles whether of intermediate range or of strategic range.”
Any discussion of “setting our goal aside” while we work to develop an interim system to “protect our missiles”, or to “protect our cities” simply gives substantial comfort to those many opponents of Strategic Defense who say it cannot be done at all.
The conventional wisdom insists on knowing whether we are trying to protect our cities or our missile systems, and builds a lot of specious arguments as to what the Soviets would then do to their plans, etc. I think we should insist at all times that we are trying to destroy Soviet missiles before they get near any target, and we are trying to protect the world by destroying Soviet missiles before they get near any target. That is our goal. It may be we can deploy that kind of system on a phased basis if our research so develops, but anything short of our goal is indeed only a piece of the ultimate system we want. We should not allow our energies or the momentum, or indeed the great public support which I am convinced SDI now enjoys, to be diluted or diverted into anything less than securing the ultimate goal.
As you know, and as the Joint Chiefs have mentioned to you many times, there is a major link between anti-satellite weapons and the capabilities we may ultimately need to secure a thoroughly effective Strategic Defense Initiative. Therefore, it is vital that we not accept any bans or moratoria on anti-satellite weapons, either as the Soviet price for continuing the discussions or for any other purpose.
Also as you know from various briefings, there are other compelling reasons for not agreeing to what will undoubtedly be as a general rule the Soviet demand for a ban or a moratorium on ASAT or related weapons. I am always most reluctant to give up anything the Soviets make a special point of demanding we give up such as the Pershing, and SDI and ASAT are no exceptions to my general rule.
I firmly believe that only if we are strong, united, and completely determined about the above positions, will we bring home to the Soviets that they cannot block our Strategic Defense Initiative, and that they will then conclude, probably several months later, that it is indeed in their interests to discuss seriously, and ultimately to agree to, major reductions in offensive systems.
On offensive systems, I believe we can and should present, at a very early stage in the negotiations, proposals continuing the pattern of your past proposals on both the intermediate and strategic range weapons that call for sharp reductions down to equality at much lower levels by both sides, and that we argue strongly for effective verification.
[Page 1218]I have read Bill Casey’s very good paper on verification,3 and we are working to produce studies of the kind called for by Bill, that in effect will tell “how much cheating by the Soviets can we accept.” Nevertheless, I think both substantively and as part of our attempt to retain the moral high ground in the court of world opinion, we should continue to seek, publicly and strongly, on-site verification, recognizing it is certainly not a perfect or a fool-proof method of verification, but far better than relying on satellite photography. We could also suggest on-site verification by international teams of observers, or other ways of improving on-site and other verification methods.
The critical point of all of these recommendations is to urge as strongly as possible that we not be an “impatient democracy” playing into the Soviet hands by being unable to hold out long enough for worthwhile agreements.
There were many so-called “victory celebrations” when SALT I and SALT II were agreed upon, but it is very important to bear in mind the lesson that neither those agreements, nor the ABM agreement, nor indeed any other agreement with the Soviets, have slowed the growth of Soviet military power. They continue to deploy far more than we, measured by numbers, varieties, continuing modernization and improvements of short, intermediate, and long range missile systems, and they continue their major attempts to defend themselves by all available systems, as they have for the past two decades.
I personally want, more than anything else, to secure agreements that are genuinely verifiable, and that make major reductions in offensive systems so that we can secure deterrence at vastly lower levels while we pursue the goal of achieving the thoroughly reliable strategic defense you proposed nearly two years ago that would be effective against intermediate as well as long range missiles.
We must constantly emphasize the nobility, and the morality of that goal, and the hope it offers the world.
- Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Geneva—NSDD Package, 12/31/1984–01/01/1985 (3). Top Secret; King.↩
- Not found attached. Reference is to Tom Wicker, “A World Concern: Focus on Geneva Arms Talks,” New York Times, December 21, 1984, p. A35.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 338.↩