Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985

331. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting¹

Washington, December 10, 1984, 2–3 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Discussion of Geneva Format and SDI (S)

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• The Vice President

• The Vice President’s Office:

  • Admiral Daniel J. Murphy

• State:

  • Secretary George P. Shultz

• OSD:

  • Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger

• CIA:

  • Director William J. Casey

• JCS:

  • ADM J.D. Watkins

• ACDA:

  • Director Kenneth Adelman

• Chairman, U.S. INF Delegation

  • Ambassador Paul H. Nitze

• Chairman, U.S. START Delegation

  • Ambassador Edward Rowny

• OMB:

  • Alton Keel

• White House:

  • Mr. Edwin Meese, III
  • Mr. Robert C. McFarlane

• NSC:

  • Dr. Ronald F. Lehman II

Minutes

Mr. McFarlane opened the meeting, noting that we had discussed previously U.S. objectives for Geneva and our defense program as well as Soviet objectives and their program.² Today we would be getting down to specifics concerning the first of two baskets of outcomes, namely, what do we want in the way of continuous negotiations. The second basket, substance, will be dealt with next Monday when we go over the nuts and bolts of START, INF, ASAT, etc.³ The paper for today’s discussion presents six options on format although these options can be reduced to a number of questions.⁴ Do we want separate START and INF negotiations or should they be merged? What shall we do about Space—negotiations or discussions only? Should Space issues be dealt with separately or merged with START and INF? Should we combine everything together in one large negotiation, perhaps having separate working groups? How do we deal with the objectives of Umbrella discussions? Should we view these as “Umbrella Talks” or perhaps “Stability” talks? In discussing format, we must remember that the US/Soviet announcement gives us some guidance.⁵ The meeting in Geneva is to set the subject and objectives and we should remember that we and the Soviets have agreed to the “new negotiations” in general terms. In the short term, our objective is reduction of offensive nuclear arms. Our long term objective is the elimination of nuclear weapons. (S/S)

The President interjected: Yes, that’s right. (S/S)

Mr. McFarlane continued, noting that we would discuss the significance of SDI after our discussion of format. Turning to Option 1 (separate START and INF and Space discussions only), Mr. McFarlane noted the advantages and disadvantages. As advantages, Mr. McFarlane noted that Option 1 would not reward the Soviets for their walkout, could build upon established delegations, would be easier, would be better for Allied consultations, and would give us an opportunity to exchange views without committing to negotiations on Space. As a disadvantage, Mr. McFarlane noted that it would be unacceptable to the Soviet Union and would draw charges of bad faith, perhaps even a walkout because the Soviet Union is under the impression that we had agreed to new negotiations which include Space negotiations. (S/S)

The President interjected that we should take the Options one at a time and noted that he didn’t think that Option 1 would be acceptable to the Soviet Union. The President asked Secretary Shultz his view. (S/S)

Secretary Shultz responded that the Soviet Union would be upset if there were no space negotiations at all. Indeed, they believe that that is what we had agreed to. (S/S)

Secretary Weinberger noted that we can deal with Space but we must look out for preconditions, especially moratoria. (S/S)

Secretary Shultz said that we need to consider the possibility that the Soviet Union might walk out of these talks and we must consider our response. He added that he would hate to go to the meeting having to reach an agreement—we should avoid a walkout but be prepared to try again if we don’t reach an agreement. (S/S)

The President noted that Chernenko and Gromyko had quoted his words supporting the goal of the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. Mr. McFarlane noted they have agreed to negotiation on “nuclear and space arms.” First of all, they have agreed to negotiations and we must hold them to that. Second, this includes negotiations on space arms. (S/S)

The President asked if, on space arms, we couldn’t discuss only offensive and not defensive arms. Secretary Weinberger responded that it is important to talk about the relationship of offensive and defensive arms but that ASAT could be defined so broadly that SDI would be impossible. The President asked again whether we could oppose the offensive systems that attack satellites while protecting defensive systems. Secretary Weinberger responded that we should discuss all of these issues but we must recognize that the Soviet Union will call for a moratorium on ASAT in order to undercut SDI and our efforts to get reductions in offensive systems. He reminded everyone that the Soviet Union has an ASAT system whereas the United States does not. (S/S)

Director Adelman raised three problems with an ASAT moratorium: first, any SDI deployment would be an ASAT, therefore, SDI research could be hurt; second, the Soviet Union has an ASAT already tested; and third, ASAT arms control involves extremely difficult verification and defense issues, all of which means that the Soviet Union will retain an ASAT capability. He concluded that there are not many areas in space arms control in which we want to negotiate. The real incentive for Space talks comes from publics, Allies, and in providing trade-off incentives to the Soviets. (S/S)

The President noted that we don’t need SDI if the Soviet Union agrees to zero except for security because of verification uncertainties. The President then suggested that we move on to the other options. (S/S)

Mr. McFarlane recommended that the discussion move directly to Option 4 which deals with the question of START and INF merger and provides a negotiating forum for space. He noted that a START and INF merger has been finessed in our discussions of Umbrella Talks. The disadvantages of a merger are that it makes negotiations more complex, could result in undue influence by the Allies in negotiations less central to their interests, and might permit the Soviets to divide us from our Allies through proposals to trade off START and INF issues. (S/S)

The President stated that the Soviet Union cannot justify not counting the SS–20. (S/S)

Secretary Weinberger responded that with a merger, the Soviet Union would focus more on the British and French systems. He noted that the SS–20 is mobile and with the removal of just one of its warheads, could strike the U.S. Secretary Weinberger sought to turn the discussion to Option 5, a combined negotiation, noting that it was complex and might bring great pressure on defensive systems. (S/S)

The President returned to discussion of INF, noting that the Soviets have warheads in Eastern Europe and that the Allies requested our deployments. (S/S)

Mr. McFarlane noted that under the Soviet definition of strategic systems, they consider our systems in Europe strategic, but do not consider their systems, which cannot hit the U.S., strategic. The President responded by pointing out that the P–II is really for our Allies. Director Adelman noted that the SS–20s were not, in fact, in Eastern Europe but could reach all of Europe, that SS–12s, 22s, and 23s (sic) have been moved into Eastern Europe. (S/S)

Secretary Shultz added that the SS–20 was a terrific weapon, that we need to deal with these issues and that we need to manage our Allies. The President told Secretary Shultz that he should be on guard for what the Soviets want and what we want. Secretary Shultz responded that substance and procedure are interrelated. He noted that the Soviet Union has many advantages in offensive systems and that those advantages are unlikely to diminish. Soviet forces are destabilizing and threatening and we need to get some limitations on that threat. (S/S)

The President interjected that, therefore, we cannot exclude SS–20s. The President asked whether or not there was a consensus on Option 4, perhaps going in with Option 2. Secretary Shultz responded that Options 2, 4 and 5 are similar and that they involve Space negotiations and would inevitably involve separate working groups. Secretary Shultz noted that Option 2 and Option 5 would be quite similar as long as there is someone over all to deal with all the questions and make tradeoffs. (S/S)

Ambassador Rowny agreed that there was much to be said for opening with Option 2 and then having Option 4 as our fallback position. Secretary Weinberger said that Options 5 and 6 would be difficult to manage, stressing that we need to find out what the Soviet Union wants. He believes that formal negotiations are acceptable but we need tight rules. Ambassador Rowny noted that Gromyko would bring his START representative, Ambassador Karpov and Deputy Obukhov, but not anyone from INF. Secretary Weinberger said the question is do we want to deal with procedure only or do we have to deal with substance. (S/S)

Admiral Watkins stated that the Chiefs were united in the view that we should keep space negotiations separate because Option 5 would give the Soviets too much of a handle on SDI. The Chiefs could support a merger such as Option 4 but would prefer to keep START and INF separate. We should consider a procedure merger before a merger on substance. (S/S)

Director Casey stressed that we must protect our intelligence assets and the Soviet ASAT talks present a specific danger for sensitive sources and methods. He noted that during the talks in Helsinki in 1979 and 1980 (sic),⁶ special rules were established including no use of non-secure phones and no post-plenary sessions. He noted that Ambassador Buchheim had carefully protected U.S. intelligence interests.⁷ He added that SDI should be dealt with in the offensive negotiations. (S/S)

Director Adelman agreed with this point and with the suggestion that we go in with Option 2 because of the concern over complexities and Allied consultations, but Option 4 is acceptable. He believes that Umbrella Talks should continue at the Foreign Ministers level. He stressed that the Soviets had mentioned “medium range” systems in their proposal and this means that we can hold them to this. (S/S)

Secretary Shultz agreed that we need Umbrella Talks to discuss what Heads of State had agreed, namely, that there is an organic relationship between offense and defense and other issues. (S/S)

Secretary Weinberger interjected that discussion of these organic relationships was mainly something we needed to do internally. (S/S)

The President interjected that we need talks which can eliminate suspicions, noting that he is willing to admit that the USSR is suspicious of us. (S/S)

Mr. McFarlane noted that our presentation for the January 7 meeting must include a discussion of offense and defense and how to achieve a more stable world in the future. Both sides must reconsider the postwar history of strategic defense. We must explain the role of defense, both to the publics and to the Soviets. We must discuss why we agreed in the past to mutual vulnerability; namely because we had no other option and because we lacked confidence in defense. That is why the ABM Treaty constrained defense. Our view then was that vulnerability was not only desirable but that basic assumption would reduce pressures to insure offensive arms. In SALT I, we expected a limitation on offensive arms that would leave both sides vulnerable to counter city attacks but not vulnerable to first strike counter-military attacks. Instead the Soviet Union has invested heavily in achieving a first strike capability and has worked on improving defenses as well. Not only were our assumptions wrong, but circumstances have changed and now technologies are available to increase the possibilities of defense. We must review the foundations of our thinking, indeed, we may be where the Russians were 15 years ago, looking at defense. (S/S)

Director Adelman noted that the Soviet Union is not abiding by the ABM Treaty. Adelman again suggested that we go in with Option 2 and fall back to Option 4 with Secretary Shultz continuing general discussion at the Foreign Ministers’ level. Secretary Weinberger agreed. (S/S)

The President noted that life in the U.S. was too good for anyone to consider starting a war and joked that he hoped life doesn’t get so boring in Russia that they would consider starting a war. (S/S)

Secretary Weinberger stressed that we must focus on reducing offensive systems and reminded everyone that the ABM Treaty was supposed to make it unnecessary for the massive Soviet buildup in offensive systems. (S/S)

The President agreed that there should have been reductions in weapons in conjunction with the ABM Treaty. Secretary Weinberger added that now there had been a breakthrough in defense technology and that we have moved away above the old systems of defense that were 50% effective and ground based. The President interjected that we are now talking about non-nuclear systems. Secretary Weinberger said that we are talking about non-nuclear systems that are very popular because people can understand about destroying weapons and not people. (S/S)

Mr. McFarlane noted that even if we had never heard of SDI, we would have had a problem—the American people don’t like land-based missiles and this presents a military problem. We need another solution other than simply building up land-based missiles. (S/S)

The President turned to Secretary Shultz and said that he wanted to make sure that Shultz had the Brezhnev quotation from Prague in which he said that because of detente, by 1985 the Soviet Union would have their way in the world. They were wrong. Secretary Shultz agreed. (S/S)

The President noted that the situation today is like a duel between two gunfighters. Our policy of MAD could get us both killed. It is just too dangerous. The President added, however, that that is the situation today and asked whether or not deterrence would be strengthened if we told the Soviet Union that we would not wait out an attack. Director Casey suggested that that was what the Soviet Union would say. Director Adelman noted that all warning systems would have to be fool-proof. Mr. Meese said that is if you are talking about launch on warning (LOW), but what we are talking about is launch under verified attack (LUVA) which is quite a different thing. (S/S)

Secretary Weinberger said that the Soviets know that this might be an appropriate response. Director Adelman quoted Paul Nitze in saying that this was a policy of weakness, a policy that we would adopt only if we were driven to it. Mr. McFarlane raised the question of whether attack assessment capabilities were sufficient for a LUVA policy and concluded that we would meet on Monday on the specifics of the negotiations. (S/S)

1. Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Chronological File, Chron File 12/15/1984 (2). Secret; Sensitive. Prepared by Lehman. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.
2. See Documents 323 and 326.
3. December 17.
4. The paper was not found attached to any of the preparatory materials for the December 10 NSPG meeting. However, in a December 9 memorandum to McFarlane, Linhard, Kraemer, and Lehman wrote: “We have received the revised version of the SACG ‘format issues’ paper for Monday’s NSPG. General Chain has circulated it through SACG members to the NSPG principals for their reading prior to the meeting.” Attached to this memorandum were talking points for McFarlane’s use during the meeting, which note: “the paper examines six alternative formats: —Separate START and INF negotiations and discussions only on Space issues; —Separate negotiations on START, INF and Space; —Merged START and INF negotiations and discussions only on Space issues; —Merged START and INF negotiations and separate formal negotiations on Space; —Merger of all three subjects (START, INF and Space) into one formal negotiation; and —Continuation of Umbrella Talks—overarching discussions from which individual negotiations could be spun off later when appropriate.” (Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Geneva Talks—Background #2 12/09/1984–12/11/1984))
5. See footnote 6, Document 314.
6. As several different U.S.-Soviet negotiations were ongoing at that time in Helsinki, Casey’s reference is unclear.
7. Robert W. Buchheim served as U.S. Commissioner on the U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission from 1977 to 1981.